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ABSTRACT
This work proposes that the foundation for justice in society begins with an 
understanding of personliood that begins with Chiistian theology. Wliile ethical 
stances such as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights are helpful in 
articulating the boimds of justice in society, such humanistic declarations and 
programs may reach an impasse if they do not incoiporate the depth and complexity 
of human personliood revealed in Jesus Chi ist. I will make this argument by 
comparing the Chiistian antlu opologies of two prominent advocates for social justice 
in the Catholic and Protestant traditions: Karol Wojytla/Pope Jolm Paul II and Karl 
Barth. Parts One and Two of this thesis will examine the strong critique which both of 
these men offered within their own historical context toward systems which denied 
the vital connection between Christian theology and persons in society. These parts 
will outline the distinctly Chiistian anthiopologies that each theologian proposed as a 
basis for social justice. The final part of this thesis will set these two antlu opologies in 
critical interaction with one another in the key area of divergence: the ontology of 
human personhood and the methodological issues integial to it. While John Paul has 
raised critical issues which are central to social ethics and has articulated many of the 
complexities of human action, Karl Barth’s Cluistological antluopology proposes an 
ontological construct of being which critically critiques human motivation and 
behaviour while also providing a social starting point for personal ethics.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations provides guidelines for social relations in the Universal
Declar ation of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in December 1948.
The preamble to this declaration declares:
Recognition o f the inherent dignity o f the equal and inalienable rights o f 
all members o f the human family is the foundation o f freedom, justice, 
and peace the world}
More than half a cerrtury after the signing of this crucial document, we must ask why
this recognition of human rights has not yielded freedom, justice, and peace. Why ar e
the societies that affirm these rights still shaken by a violence from within? Why has a
gr-eater understanding of himian rights not led to fieedorn, justice, and peace?
Urifortunately, the effect of the Declar ation has not been the emergence of
peace and justice in this world. One wonders whether the impact might have been
greater had it held a more profoimd rmderstanding of the depth of hiunan personliood
and the meaning of justice in the social sphere, hi the present conflict in
Israel/Palestine, for instance, the ethics of human rights has reached an impasse because
each party has claimed rights, which infr inge upon the other. While an ethic of human
rights does play a valuable role in establishing the dignity of himians in society, it fails
to adequately addr ess the conflict of concrete human encounters, the soiuce of such
conflict, and the means to resolution. The attempt to found justice and peace upon the
concept of human rights and the deficiency of such an ethical ideal stems from the
rmderstanding of what it is to be a person in society.
This work puts forward the thesis that social ethics and social progr ams require
an understanding of personliood that accounts for the complexity of hiunan relations in
society. I will propose that Christian theology, particularly theological anthropology,
can provide an effective foundation for social ethics because its antlnopology addresses
' Adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948, 
http//:www.un.org/Qverview/rights.html.
complexities such as ethical knowledge, human fr eedom, and the social relations of 
actual persons. Social progr ams that are divorced horn Clnistian theology may benefit 
society as the declar ation for human rights has done. But such programs may continue 
to miss their mark of generating a just and peacehil society imless they are informed by 
a Clnistian anthropology that outlines the tme dignity of the hiunan person. The mark 
will be missed because the concept of intrinsic and inalienable rights incorporates a 
modernist individualism that is inherently problematic, hi the UN Declaration on 
Rights, there exists no basis in the concept of rights for the giving up of one’s rights for 
the sake of another.^ In issues of peace and justice, this shortcoming easily leads to a 
stalemate in political relations.
As a means of seeking to address these issues, I have selected two contrasting 
dialogue partners: Pope John Paul II and Kaid Barth. Though cleaily divergent in their 
theological presuppositions and their ecclesiastical traditions, John Paul II and Karl 
Barth share a common concern to luiderstand the natm*e of the human person and to 
articulate the foundation for social relations in concrete political and economic 
contexts. They both argue for the intrinsic connection between Clnistian theology and 
ethics because they both locate the true dignity of personliood in the person and work 
of Jesus Christ.^ At the same time, their Cluistological anthropology differs both in 
method and content when it comes to determining the basis for social doctrine.
Jolm Paul II provides a vital voice in this discussion because he has been a 
leading spokesperson for human rights from a personalistic perspective."^ Arising out of 
a backgr oimd of oppression in Communist Poland, John Paul has played a vital role in 
the disbanding of tyraimical regimes that have violated human persons. He has argued 
for the inlierent dignity of all human beings, and he has consistently taken the side of 
the poor and oppressed. Secondly, in the spirit of Vatican 11,^  John Paul has turned to
 ^It only states in Article 30 that one does not have the right to perform any acts that destroy die rights of 
anotiier.
 ^Cf. Esther Reed, The Genesis o f Ethics, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd), 2000.
 ^See, for example, a compilation of speeches and documents by Jolm Paul and representatives of the 
Holy See defending the rights and dignity of human persons in Paths to Peace, Brookfield, WI: 
Liturgical Publications, Inc., 1987.
 ^The Protestant church has historically linked its theology and etiiics more closely than the Catiiolic 
church. However, surromiding die work of Vatican II, Catiiolic thought has been fmding renewed 
relation between moral theology and dogmatic or biblical theology in the work of such figures Karl 
Rahner, Bernard Haring, J.B. Metz, Edward Schillebeeckx, Charles Curran, and Bernard Lonergan.Cf. 
James Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, (Chicago; The University o f Chicago Press, 
1978), 96-98.
theological anthropology to undergird his pui'suit of justice and peace.^ His argument 
for the dignity of the human person rests in his Cliristological anthropology: Cluist 
hilly reveals the human to himself/ By assuming humanity in the person of Jesus 
Cluist, God reveals the dignity of human persons. For this reason, Jolm Paul II argues, 
human dignity and the meaning of hiunan life can only be fully understood in the love 
and hope revealed in Chiist Jesus. A third reason to choose John Paul II as the subject 
of this investigation relates to the issue of accurately representing Catholic thought. 
Following statements of agreement with both Gottlieb Solmgen and Hans Kting, Barth 
questioned whether the lai ger Roman Catholic Church could concur with the doctrines 
these theologians had articulated.^ By choosing John Paul II as his dialogue paitner, 
this concern has clearly been addressed.
The second theologian, Karl Barth, also became an active proponent of justice 
in the social sphere, earning the nickname, “The Red Pastor” dming the eai'ly years of 
his pastorate in Safenwil, Geimany.^ In his concern for human persons, he stood as a 
witness against the economic oppression of his church members and the totalitarian 
regime of Hitler; later he argued for justice in the capitalist marketplace. Like John 
Paul, Barth linlced his approach to politics and economics to his theology. He aigued
® John Paul II, DM, 1. “We read in the Constitution Gaudium et Spes: ‘Clirist the new Adam.. .fully 
reveals man to himself and brings to light his lofty calling,’ and does it ‘in the very revelation of the 
mystery of the father and of his love.’ The words that I have quoted are clear testimony to tlie fact that 
man cannot be manifested in the full dignity o f his nature witliout reference—not only on tlie level of 
concepts but also in an integrally existential way—to God. Man and man’s lofty calling are revealed in 
Cluist tlu'ough the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love.” In recent years, John Paul’s 
social encyclicals have called forth special interest from Protestant readers because they draw on 
revelation as a primary source for social ethics. [See for example, Theodor Dieter and Reinliard Hùtter, 
éd.. Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage Pope John Paul IPs Moral Encyclicals, 
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998)]. The turn to revelation has been so profoimd that Karl Braaten recently 
raised the question, “What would Karl Barth have to say about the latest social encyclicals?” [“A 
Response,” in^  Preseiving Grace, ed., Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 34.]
 ^Neither Jolm Paul II nor Karl Barth consistently employ gender inclusive language in their primary 
wiitings. In this work, the quotations of their writings preserve the original masculine language. 
However, I have used gender inclusive language to expound the intention of their own works, except in 
cases where gender adds to the clarity or conciseness to the text. The use of masculine or feminine 
pronouns includes botli genders, unless stated otlierwise.
 ^Barth, Church Dogmatics, Geoffrey Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans., (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1957-1969), II. 1.82 and Hans Küng, Justification, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), xxxix- xl.
® Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth, (London: SCM Press), 83. Stanley Hauerwas told the story of his visit to 
Safenwil in the Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews, 2001. In Safenwil, Hauerwas inquired 
of the townspeople, “Do you remember Karl Barth?” “Ah, yes,” they replied, “the Red Pastor.”
See for instance “Answer to the open letter of Hera W. Hüssy of Aarbui g,” 9 Feb 1912 and “Jesus 
Chiist and the Social Movement,” 17 December 1911 [Cf. Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth, (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 70)], The Barmen Declaration, CD III.4.542.
4that ethics must be founded on theology—the two could not be separated. Barth started 
with the Doctrine of God as revealed in Chiist and he built his understanding of human 
persons and social ethics upon this foimdation.
While both John Paul II and Karl Barth provide a distinctly Christian 
understanding of human personhood that shapes their social ethics, a flindamental 
divergence in their anthiopology creates different assumptions regarding the foimation 
of just societies. Tliis thesis will examine these assumptions regarding human ontology 
as they were shaped by the historical and theological context of each man and the 
maimer in which these assumptions fonn their social doctrine.
I shall argue that the combination of the transcendent acts of human coui age 
that Jolm Paul witnessed in the oppressive political context in which he grew up, 
together with certain key emphases in modem Catholic thought gave rise to what might 
be described as “optimistic” anthropology. He believes in an essential continuity 
between God and humanity, expressed in the doctrine of the analogia entis, tln ough 
which humans aie capable of knowing God’s just law and freely making the choice for 
or against this law of nature. By means of this choice, human beings shape themselves 
and society in accordance with the common good. His optimism regaining human 
capacity for articulating and engaging in just action finds its expression in his theme of 
human dignity, the dignity of persons as rational and free beings, raised to a dignity 
beyond compare in Jesus Cluist.
Karl Bai'th, on the other hand, became critical of such optimism as he witnessed 
the deification of himianity in German culture, the destmction wrought, and the 
impotence of the church to fonn viable criteria for true justice. He saw that the 
assumption of unredeemed human goodness could lead humans to claim that they had 
the capacity to define what is just action and to make Chiistian revelation inelevant for 
issues of social justice. He watched the himian glorification of Hitler and the church 
ascribe such a high degi'ee of dignity to the German race that the Word of God was no 
longer heeded and the church was used only to facilitate human aiTogance and power. 
In response, Barth appealed to the revelation of God as the sole starting point for 
human justice. His anthiopology, which defined true humanity in relation to Jesus 
Cluist, gi'ounded both himian freedom and human goodness in the person of Cluist 
alone. This thesis will draw out the implications of such a starting point for social 
ethics, in compaiison with the positive estimate of Jolm Paul, assessing apparent and 
substantial differences that arise tlirough such a dialogue.
In order to compare the anthi'opological bases for social ethics, this work will 
consist of tlnee parts. The first two parts will interpret the wiitings of John Paul and 
Karl BaiHi, respectively, by examining the development of their respective tlieological 
anthiopologies as these provide a basis for their social ethics. Chapter One will briefly 
examine the early political and theological influences that formed the primary theme of 
human dignity that pervades Karol Wojtyla/John Paul IPs matuie social doctrine. The 
second chapter will explore this theme further in Wojtyla’s philosophical and 
theological wiitings, proposing that his anthropology maintained a deeply theological 
basis for the dignity of persons. Chapter Tliree will systematically delineate the 
significance of John Paul’s theology of personhood for his social doctrine.
In Part Two, we will turn to investigate the antluopological foundation for 
social ethics in the writings of Karl Baith. Chapter Foiu will examine the historical and 
theological context in which Barth reacted with his resounding ‘Wefri” against any 
appeal to a starting point for social ethics other than that which is foimd in the person of 
Clirist. The fifth chapter will examine the critical criterion that emerged fiom this new 
starting point in Barth’s doctrine of election and creation: the "real humanity” of Jesus 
Chiist. Chapter Six will examine what Barth calls "real humanity” from the perspective 
of reconciliation and will draw out the implication of Chiist’s reconciliation for issues 
of political and economic justice. In closing, Part Three will facilitate the critical 
comparison that emerges fiom their divergent assumptions regarding personal 
ontology.
hi summary, this work will examine the theology and social ethics of Jolm Paul 
and Karl Barth for two reasons. First, it will provide a theoiy of human personliood, 
which is based in Cluistian revelation and which accoimts for the complexities of 
human relations in society and overcomes the sort of impasse reached when individual 
rights collide. Second, it will contiibute to ecumenical dialogue and social action 
through a compaiison of Catiiolic and Protestant antluopological foundations for social 
justice. By engaging in critical dialogue with one another, Cluistian traditions may seek 
to discern the significance of God’s revelation in Jesus Cluist for the oppressed, the 
marginalised, and the violated in human society.
PART ONE 
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIAL ETHICS OF JOHN PAUL II 
CHAPTER ONE 
KAROL WOJTYLA’S AFFIRMATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
IN THE MIDST OF OCCUPIED POLAND
Both Karol Wojtyla^ and Kaii Barth faced the dehumanisation of human 
persons on an unfathomable scale. Both responded to social injustice by starting from a 
distinctly Chiistian rmderstanding of personhood in order to stand and fight against the 
ideologies that wrought the destmction that these two men witnessed against their 
neighbours, their fellow church members, and their fellow countrymen. Both came to 
the conclusion that a distinctly Clnistian anthropology provides the means for 
promoting justice in society. In Part One of this work, I will argue that John Paul 
believed that social ethics must be derived fr'om a Clnistian rmderstanding of human 
persons, and I will examine the antluopology that imdeiiies his social ethics.
Early in his life, Wojtyla discovered a dimension of personhood which Nazi 
armies and Communist officials could not harm, a dimension which led people to 
heroic acts, a mysterious aspect of humanity for which neither Communism nor 
Mai-xism could account: the transcendent human spirit. This discovery drove Wojtyla’s 
passion to study the dignity of persons as created by God and gifted with a moral and 
spiritual capacity that could transcend injustice, that could find peace and hope in the 
midst of turmoil tluough faith in the God who transcends the human situation. 
Throughout his life as Karol Wojtyla and later as Jolm Paul II, he has sought to affirm 
this dignity of human persons over against the dehumanising forces of society. He has 
argued that Cluistian antluopology affirms the dignity of human persons and that this 
dignity is the starting point for social ethics. Each chapter of this work will seek to
Pronounced Voy-tee-wah.
7explore dimensions of this dignity. The first chapter will trace the events and the 
influences that gave rise to Wojtyla’s humanistic impulses. Through these events and 
Wojtyla’s eaiiy writings, I will begin to raise some of the main themes of John Paul’s 
mature work, including the dignity of human persons, the transcendence of God as the 
being who is ‘other’ yet who graciously gives liimself for humanity, and the 
epistemological basis for laiowledge of this God, the hiunan person, and the moral law. 
The second chapter will look specifically at Wojtyla’s affirmation of human persons in 
his philosophical works and his theological reflections. The third chapter will linlc the 
social ethics that aiises from John Paul’s antluopological concerns to his broader 
theological fiamework.
Son of Poland
Karol Wojtyla was born in Wadowice, Poland on May 18,1920, as his nation 
experienced the pains of rebirth following World Wai* I. While his fellow Poles worked 
to build the Second Polish Republic as a free and imited nation, Wojtyla grew into a 
promising student and a talented actor. Wlien Wojtyla was only a yoimg boy of nine, 
his mother died of prolonged illnesses. Three years later, tragedy struck the Wojtyla 
family again when Kai'ol’s sole sibling, Edward, died of scailet fever. Though this 
suffering pressed hard upon Karol and his father, the elder Wojtyla encouraged his son 
in his studies and taught his son regarding faith in the transcendent God, prayer and 
Catholic instmction.^
At a very young age, while talcing part in a liturgical service, Wojtyla 
experienced what he calls the transcendence of God.^ As an adult, he gave words to the 
significance of those unique moments: “It was above all discovery of the dimension of 
the absolute, of the mystery expressed in the liturgy and which the liturgy conveys as a 
message that is valid for all time.”"^ This discovery first led Wojtyla to believe in a 
reality that ti*anscended his daily experiences.
 ^George Weigel, Witness to Hope, (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 27-30.
 ^He later recalled the words of the liturgy: the chant, “Christus factus est pro nobis oboediens usque ad 
/KO/tew,"(Christ was made obedient unto death for our sakes.) and the reading of Psalm 50, followed by 
the prayer, '"Respice quaesumus Domine super hanc familiam tuam pro qua Dominus noster lesus 
Christus non dubitavit manibus tradi nocentium et crucis subire tormentumP (Look down. Lord, we 
beseech you onto this your family for whom Jesus Christ our Lord did not hesitate to be handed over mto 
the hands of the guilty and to suffer and endure the torment of the cross.) Wojtyla, Sign o f Contradiction, 
(London: St. Paul Publications, 1979), 82.
" SC, 82.
upon graduation from his secondaiy schooling in 1938, Karol Wojtyla and his 
father moved to Kralcow so that he could attend Jagiellonian University. The young 
student entered the Faculty of Literature in order to pursue his interest in the human as 
person, as creator of language, and as the subject of literature.^ The following 
September of 1939, German aimies invaded Poland. Still ti'ying to build itself up from 
the destruction wreaked by World War I, the Polish army was imable to resist Hitler’s 
forces. Poland became divided as the eastern lands were absorbed into the Soviet Union 
while central and western Poland were divided, some incorporated into the Tlrird Reich 
and the remainder placed under the control of Hairs Frank. Frank mled with gi*eat 
cmelty, seeking to destroy Poland by depriving the Poles of their rights and by seeking 
to eliminate Polish cultur e.^
In one of the many efforts to achieve this goal, the Germans sought to desti*oy 
Jagiellonian University by aiTesting over 180 academics, destroying laboratories, and 
wrecking the libraries. In a defiant act of self-preseiwation, the University began to hold 
classes undergroimd. These secret lectures enabled Wojtyla to continue his studies in 
the evenings afrer working as a manual labourer during the day.^ hr addition, Wojtyla 
continued his involvement in theatre and began writing and directing plays. Most of 
these plays come to terms with the harsh reality of occupation by seeking hope in 
Christ, in the midst of conflict and suffering.^
 ^Jolm Paul II, Crossing the Threshold o f Hope, Vittorio Messiori, ed., (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994), 
199. John Paul wrote, “I must say that my concern for ‘the acting person’ did not arise from the disputes 
with Marxism or, at least, not as a direct response to those disputes. I had long been interested in man as 
person. Perhaps my interest was due to the fact tliat I had never had a particular predilection for the 
natmal sciences. I was always more fascinated by man. While studying in the Faculty of Literatme, man 
interested me inasmuch as he was a creator of language and a subject of literatme; then, when I 
discovered my priestly vocation, man became the central theme o f my workP
 ^Hans Frank was reported to give the following commands to his subordinates: “The Pole has no rights 
whatsoever. His only obligation is to obey what we tell him. He must be constantly reminded that his 
duty is to obey. A major goal of om’ plan is to finish off as speedily as possible all troublemaking 
politicians, priests, and leaders who fall into om- hands. I openly admit that some thousands of so-called 
important Poles will have to pay with tlien lives, but you must not allow sympathy for individual cases to 
deter you in your duty, which is to ensme that the goals of National Socialism triumph and that the 
Polish nation is never again able to offer resistance. Every vestige of Polish cultme is to be eliminated. 
Those Poles who seem to have Nordic appearances will be taken to Germany to work in our factories. 
Children of Nordic appearance will be taken fiom then parents and raised as German workers. The rest? 
They will work. They will eat little. And in the end they will die out. There will never again be a 
Poland.” Quoted fiom James Michener, Poland, (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1983), 451. Michener claims 
that this quotation is factual accoimt but provides no references to his somce.
 ^Weigel, 53-55.
 ^See for example, Job and Jeremiah. Boleslaw Taborski, “Introduction,” in Wojtyla, The Collected 
Plays, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 4. Unfortunately the play has been lost. For more
Mystical Foundations
In February 1940, Wojtyla met Jan Tyranowski, a mystically-gifted accountant 
and tailor who was asked to form a group of young men in order to continue the 
church’s youth ministry in the absence of clergy. Tyranowski initiated Wojtyla’s 
philosophical development by inti'oducing him to Caiinelite mysticism.^ Through this 
mysticism, embodied in Tyi anowski, Wojtyla began to develop a conception of human 
relation with God as both immanent and transcendent.^® Wojtyla recalls that 
Tyranowski taught him to live “a life which thiough mercy becomes paiticipation in the 
life of God.” According to Wojtyla, his way of life “proved that one could not only 
inquire about God but tliat one could live with God.”' '
During this year, Wojtyla’s father became seriously ill. In February 1941, 
Wojtyla returned fi'om work to find that his father had died in his bed. Even with the 
presence of friends, the death of Iris only remaining family member marked this man of 
twenty with a deep s o i t o w . He later recalled, “I never felt so alone... This grief in 
addition to the humiliation under totalitarian occupation and the heroism he had 
witnessed in the face of it created a “progressive detachment” fiom his earlier 
vocational plans and precipitated his decision to become a priest.'^
The Angelicum
In 1942, Wojtyla began attending the undergiound seminaiy in Krakow where 
he became intimately acquainted wiüi Archbishop Adam Stefan Sapieha. After Wojtyla 
completed his seminary degree in July 1946 and was ordained in November, Sapieha
on transcendence and suffering in Wojtyla during this stage, see John Saward, Christ is the Answer,
(New York: Alba House, 1995), 83-89.
® M. Malinski, Pope John Paul II: The Life o f my Friend Karol Wojtyla. (London: Burns & Oates, 1979), 
159.
Wojtyla reflected, "Everything he said was directed to a single object, the tinth of God dwelling within 
us. All his efforts, instructions, advice and methods of teaching were designed to show us, and me in 
particular, how to remain in the presence of God, both in our prayers and in our daily lives.” Malinski, 
19-20. Malinski also wr ote, "We discussed with them the problems of modelling oneself on Jesus Chiist 
in the light of one’s own temperament and one’s good and bad qualities. We tried to instil in each person 
a sense of responsibility for his thoughts, words and actions, and encouraged them to review their 
progress day by day.” Malinski, 29.
Description translated by Weigel, 60-61 fiom Karol Wojtyla, "Apostolf TygodnikPowszenchny n. 35 
(1949).
Tad Szulc, Pope John Paul //, (New York: Schribner, 1995), 117.
Jolm Paul II, Gift and Mysteiy, (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 34. Weigel, 68-69.
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decided that the young priest should begin doctoral studies in theology at Rome’s 
Pontifical Athenaeum of St. Thomas Aquinas (or “the Angelicum”).'"' Wojtyla soon 
moved to Rome and lived for two years in the Belgian College of the Angelicum. 
During his studies, he encountered the two forms of Thomism that predominated 
contemporary Catholic thought: Traditional and Transcendental Thomism.'^
Traditional Thomism and the Certainty of Moral Knowledge
The papal encyclical of 1879, Aeterni Patris, in which Leo XIII called for the 
establisliment of Chiistian philosophy in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas, soon gave 
rise to the reorientation of the philosophical development of the Catholic church.'® The 
metaphysical system of Aquinas clearly influenced Wojtyla’s understanding of human 
persons, with special regard to their means of knowing moral truth. Theologians of the 
Traditional Thomist strain of thought sought to counter the humanism of modern 
philosophy by restoring God, not man, to the measure of all things. They argued for a 
Classical view begimiing with the certainty of knowledge about the world over against 
the Cartesian model of investigation, which began with systemic doub t .The  classical 
fi amework presupposes that humans possess tmth about the world and themselves 
through natural reason. Though some tmths exceed the ability of human reason (such as 
the truth that God is triune), Aquinas argued that natural reason is able to reach certain 
tmths (such as the existence of God).'^
Wojtyla embraced this Classical epistemology and would later argue in favour 
of these two kinds of truth, the tmths that transcend the himian intellect and can be 
loiown tlnough revelation by God and the tmths that humans attain through natural 
reason. Tmth, with regard to ethical behavioin, falls into this later category. Ralph 
Mclnerny explains, “The moral philosopher can help us get clear about what we 
already laiow, but he does not confer our primary moral laiowledge on us. Again, he 
presupposes that we have it.”'® Thus, Traditional Thomism formed an epistemological
Weigel, 78-79.
Gregory Beaboiit, et al. Beyond Self-Interest. (Lanliam, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 44-46.
Aidan Nichols, O.P. The Shape o f  Catholic Theology, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, Ltd, 1991), 331.
Ralph Mclnerny, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas, (Notre Danie: University of Notre Danie 
Press, 1990), 33.
Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentes, Book I, 3.2. Trans. Anton C. Pegis, F.R.S.C., (London: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1955), 63.
Mclnerny, A First Glance, 34.
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foundation for Wojtyla’s social ethics. It affirmed that human dignity does not mean 
that the human begins with himself to attain laiowledge of God, in the tradition of 
modem philosophy. Rather, the dignity of the hmnan involves the principle of haiinony 
between the truths of reason and those of faith.
Transcendental Thomism and the Transcendence of Human Persons
The rise of modernism brouglit new questions for the study of philosophy and 
theology to the fore in Transcendental Thomism, or la nouvelle théologie?"  ^Kai‘1 
Rahner, Joseph Maréchal, Jean Daniélou, Louis Bouyer, Maiie-Dominique Chenu, and 
Yves Cougar all approached these questions, seeking to engage Thomism with modem 
schools of thought. Wliile the thought of each of these men would have had an 
influence upon Wojtyla, I will draw special attention to the influence of Hemi de 
Lubac, who was at the centre of the discussion sunounding la nouvelle théologie and 
who became an influential friend to Wojtyla during their work together at Vatican II.
Based upon his work in the patristic and medieval theology, de Lubac sought to 
argue that there is only one history of grace, which embraces every individual in this 
world. In opposition to the neo-scholastic divide between nature and grace, de Lubac 
contended drat in both Augustinian and Thomist thought, the supernatural embraces the 
natur al world and all of reality is infused with God’s grace.^^ Witir regar d to humanity, 
de Lubac believed that all humans contained an eternal element, a “‘germ of eternity’, 
which already ‘breathes the upper air’, which always, hie et nunc, evades temporal 
society. The tmth of his being transcends his being itself. For he is made in the image 
of God, and in the mirror of his being the Trinity is ever reflected. If a man inverts 
this relationship and declares that God is made in man’s image, he becomes estranged
Mclnerny, A First Glance, 26.
This movement was a reaction to tire perception tliat Traditional Thomists were growing increasingly 
scholastic in their method and focusing more discussion on debates witliin Thomism rather than dealing 
with the pressing concerns o f the present period.
^ Nichols, 340. Henri De Lubac, Le Mystère du Surnaturel, (Paris, 1965). Buttiglione daims that de 
Lubac and Balthasar appropriated the work of Bartli to develop a similar theme of the nature-grace 
relation and analogia fideL Karol Wojtyla, (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1989), 198.
^ Hemi de Lubac, Catholicism, trans. Lancelot Sheppard, (London: Bums & Oates, 1950), 202. Tliis 
concept of ‘infused grace,’ and die ‘germ of eternity’ likely helped to form Wojtyla’s doctrine of the 
analogia entis, the continuity of man with God. Barth critiqued such temis because they depersonalise 
God and they call into question the purpose of Cluist’s incarnation. If such ‘infused grace’ characterises 
the human person, then what does the grace of Christ have meaning? Does his incarnation indeed need to 
recreate humanity if  persons are infused with grace? I will address these questions in the thesis and in 
comparison with Barth in Chapter 7.
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from himself and remains incomplete. De Lubac believed the estrangement of this 
relationship had dangerous consequences for society as well. He critiqued the atheistic 
humanism prevalent in contemporary social philosophy, arguing that a society which is 
non-ti’anscendent or which reduces humans to the sum of their material existence or 
social relationships alone (as Marxism) will beget tyi'anny.^"' In time, Wojtyla began to 
incorporate this imderstanding of nature, humanity, and society into his own 
antluopology, seen in his conceptions of the imago Dei and tire analogia entis as the 
foundation for human transcendence
Under the supervision of Traditional Thomist, Father Reginald Ganigou- 
Lagiange,^® yet surrounded by discussion of la nouvelle théologie, Wojtyla became 
more grounded in the teachings of Aquinas tluough the eyes of a variety of inteipreters. 
Wliile the traditional approach provided a frmi foundation in the teachings of Aquinas 
regarding epistemology and access to moral tmths, the new theology provided Wojtyla 
with a basis for his future engagement with phenomenology. It reinforced his belief in 
the transcendence of humanity, and it drew parallels between this anthi opology and 
political concerns.
Faith and Reason in St. John of the Cross
After a year of coursework and a month of travels in Europe, Wojtyla worked to 
complete his doctoral dissertation under Garrigou-Lagrange. The doctoral thesis 
examined St. Jolui of the Cross’ imderstanding of faith. Wojytla argued that St. Jolm’s 
theology affirms an objective revelation of tmth as a means to union with God, in 
continuity with the tiadition of Thomas Aquinas.^® It is not necessaiy, for our purposes, 
to examine this work thoroughly. I will simply highlight tluee influences of St. Jolui 
regarding Wojtyla’s anthropological development.^^
First, with regard to epistemic foundations for theology, Wojtyla seemed to 
favour the view of St. John that humans cannot know God as object tluough natural 
reason. Wliile hmnans can attain to natural laiowledge, faith alone provides the
Lubac, Catholicism, 203.
Ganigou-Lagrange likely grounded Wojtyla in tlie basic concepts and origins o f Thomist thought, and 
he taught Wojtyla a methodology to bring other thinkers in dialogue with Aquinas, namely reconciling 
with Aquinas die mystical writings of St. Jolm of the Cross.
Karol Wojtyla, Faith According to St. John o f the Cross, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), 68-69.
Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla, 51-53. Further references to Buttligione will be to this book unless 
indicated otiierwise.
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“proportionate means” to the substance of revealed ti'uths and to unity with God. St. 
Jolm argued that the intellect obtains natural knowledge tluough the senses. However, 
knowledge of God may not come through the natural senses because of this “infinite 
distance” between God and the human creatuie.^^ Because no created thing possesses 
any “essential likeness” to God, faith provides the only means of revealing tmth to the 
soul and imiting the intellect with God.^ ® Wojtyla wi'ote, “Natm*al light of the intellect 
sti'ives by its own power to aiTive at the revealed tmths but fails to do so. It can extend 
no farther than natural laiowledge. Then the ‘excessive light’ comes to the aid of the 
intellect’s insufficiency and overwhelms it by reason of its excess and its supernatiual 
proportion to divinely revealed truths.” ®^ However, this excessive light, or light of the 
divine laiowledge, is not only objective but also subjective in quality because it 
transforms the intellect by engendering faith and it unifies the will with God through 
love.^*
Wojtyla neglected the vital tension between Aquinas and St. John regarding the 
possibility of knowledge of the tmth apart fi om faith. His discussion assimied that faith 
assists humans in attaining the tmth. For St. Jolm, the intellect is insufficient in itself to 
attain divine knowledge; the furthest natural reason can go is to say that God exists. 
However, Aquinas believed that more truths regarding God were known by natui'al 
means. He wrote, “The truths about God which St. Paul says we can loiow by our 
natural powers of reasoning^^—that God exists, for example—are not numbered among 
the articles of faith, but are presupposed by tliem.” "^' Wojtyla’s failure to deal with this 
tension in his discussion of faith and laiowledge betrays a failure to recognise this 
tension in his own work. I will explore this point fiirther in its implications for 
Wojtyla’s anthi'opology in the following chapter.
Wojtyla, Faith, 42.
Wojtyla, Faith, 43-44. An emerging issue that will be addressed in the discussion of faith and reason in 
the thii'd chapter relates to this problem of the intellect’s knowledge of ti uth.
Wojtyla, Faith, 73. This conception of light relates to de Lubac’s earlier idea of infused grace, and 
raises many of the same problems concerning the depersonalisation of God.
Wojtyla, FaUh, 72-73, 245-250.
32
33
Buttiglione, 49. 
Romans 1:19-20.
Also included in this list are God’s goodness, his unity, his creativity, etc. Thomas Aquinas, Swnma 
Theologiae, vol. 2 (la. 2-11), tians. Timothy McDemiott, O.P., (London: Byre and Spottiswoode, 1963), 
11.
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Second, this investigation of St. John’s experience marks the early stages of 
Wojtyla’s phenomenological and personalist interests. According to St. Jolm, faith is 
not given only in an intellectual gr asp of what God is but also in personal encounter. 
Like St. Jolm, Wojtyla sought to learn about faith by using observation and reason to 
probe the nature of this mystical experience. The object of this study was to investigate 
the personal experience of St. John, to discover the reality of faith, its activity in the 
hiunan intellect, its colloraries, and the effects on the movement of the soul toward 
union with God.^  ^Phenomenology would give him the tools to further develop his 
search to understand the human person to a gr*eater degi'ee.
Finally, the Mystical Doctor provided a theological foundation for 
anthropology. In his matm*e works. Pope Jolm Paul II argued for the dignity and value 
of the human as mystery. He grounded the mysterious nature of humanity in the 
mystery of God. Because humanity is mysterious, the hiunan is not reducible to human 
reason and each human holds special freedom and dignity. This theme is central, for 
Wojtyla developed his economic and political ethics around these affirmations.
The Personalist Movement
A final influence during this phase, which deseiwes mention, was the 
personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain.^® Though Wojtyla may have 
encountered personalism before his stay in Rome,^^ he began to interact with the 
philosophy more directly through the influence of Gan'igoii-Lagi'ange^^ and wliile 
travelling in France during his years as a student of the Angelicum. Personalism, which 
gi'ew out of the phenomenology of Husserl and the existentialism of Heidegger, spread 
tlnough France in the early nineteen-thirties. As a philosophical movement, it sought to 
offer a new vision of hiunan persons, based upon a belief in the primacy of the person 
as a spiritual, fr ee, and rational being.^® Because it conceived of hmnan persons as both
Wojtyla, Faith, 23.
John Heilman, “Jolm Paul II and the Personalist Movement,” Cross Currents (Winter 1980-81):409- 
419; Francis J. Lescoe, “Pope Jolm Paul II and Existential Personalism,” in Pastor o f  the Poles, ed. 
Stanislaus A Blejwas and Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski, (New Britain, Conn: Polish Studies Program 
Monographs, 1982), 80-91.
Mounier visited Poland in May 1946 and gave a widely publicised talk at Jagiellonian University in 
Warsaw. His wiitings had been circulated illegally under the Nazi govenmient, Heilman, 414.
Gan-igou-Lagrange’s interest m Cluistian spirituality created ties with the group.
Amato summarises Mounier’s anthi opology, “Committed to the primacy of the person as a fi'ee and 
spiritual being. Personalism denies all attempts to reduce the human person to any immanent order of
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spiritual and communal, Mounier described the philosophy both in opposition to 
individualism and collectivism, as well as idealism and materialism. Wojtyla is credited 
with adapting this new concern for the person in its significance for politics upon his 
return to Poland. The influence of personalism upon his antluopology and social ethics 
can be clearly seen in his philosophical theology and his encyclicals as John Paul II."'®
Early Priesthood: Promoting Human Dignity in the Midst of Dehumanisation
While Wojtyla was in Rome, his countiy imderwent a tremendous upheaval as
the Germans were expelled and replaced by the Stalinist politics of the new Soviet
order. In 1948, he returned to become a priest in a counhy “where the dawn laiock on
the door was still expected, where prisons were full and beatings many, where the
secret policeman was still his brother’s keeper, and where the Great Teacher was
neither Chiist nor Buddha but the megalomaniac son of a Georgian shoemaker through
whom millions had died.”""
In this context, Wojtyla found the insights of personalism especially helpfril
because it enabled him to engage critically with Marxist ideology. Wliile general
Catholic opinion held Communism to be utterly false, the personalists sought dialogue
with communist ideology and maintained that there were some truths represented by
the movement. Heilman explains this new personalist approach:
Instead of embodying evil incarnate, Commimism was a partially connct 
response to the injustices of an old feudal order, and the fragmenting 
individualism of capitalism. Since the mid-nineteen thirties they had 
called attention to the humanistic values which ran through the writings 
of the yoimg Karl Marx, and juxtaposed them to the aberrations of 
Stalinism. Personalism criticised Communism fr om the perspective of 
Marxist humanism. It also maintained that Marxism, whatever its 
valuable truth, was as incomplete and one-sided in its understanding of
society, politics, and history. Committed to the person as an embodied and communal being, Personalism 
equally denies all docti ines that deny man’s temporal and historicity in the name of a transcendent order. 
In its metaphysical impulse, Personalism thus aspires to a new realism by recognizing equally man’s 
spiritual and material nature. In its spiritual inspiration. Personalism affirms that man’s freedom is 
frmdamental, but that it is realized only amidst other men in their social and historical conditions. In its 
ethical and political aspirations. Personalism seeks to affirm the existing rmities between thought and 
action, person and community, community and historical situation.” Joseph Amato, Mounier and 
Maritan, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1975), 1-3.
Two books that have outlined tlie influence of personalism in the thought of Jolm Paul II are Beyond 
Self-Interest by Gregory Beabout, et al, and Human Nature and the Discipline o f Economics by Patricia 
Donohue-White, et ah
Geroge Blazynski, Pope John Paid II: A Man from Krakow, (London: Sphere, 1979), 59.
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the hmnan person as were the individualistic cultures in which 
capitalism flemished/^
As a new priest, Wojtyla engaged in this dialogue with Mai*xism and articulated
a third way to address social injustices of a capitalist society: the way of Cluist. A play
that he began writing during seminary and completed dming his eaiiy years as a priest,
Our God’s Brother, reveals the impetus behind Wojtyla’s work as a priest and his
stmggle with the question of human persons over against the Marxist view of persons.
The play deals with the vocational stmggle to malce oneself a gift, as illustrated in the
life of ai*tist Adam Chmielowski (1845-1916). After becoming dissatisfied with his life
as an ai'tist and angered at social injustice towards the poor in Krakow, Adam devotes
the remainder of his life to caring for the poor and homeless. The play tells the story of
Adam in the setting of the protagonist’s conscience, as Adam is in the process of
“becoming” Brother Albert thr ough giving of himself and embracing a life of radical
poverty and service. By becoming a servant rather than a revolutionary, Adam does not
deny the injustice of society or the anger that injustice spawns. Yet he comes to believe
that the only social transformation truly worthy of the hmnan person comes tlirough the
cross, which “transforms a man’s fall into good and his slavery into fireedom.”"'^  The
resolution of the drama is fomid in Brother Albert’s dying words, spoken as a worker’s
insmiection has broken out:
Ah well. You know that anger has to erupt, especially if it is great.
{He stops.1
And it will last, because it is just.
[He becomes even more deeply lost in thought. Then he adds one 
sentence, as i f  to himself, though everyone listens attentively.'\
I Imow for certain, though, that I have chosen a gruater fi'eedom."'"'
Weigel explains, “This is not religious quietism in the face of injustice and tyr anny, nor 
does the playwright accept that the only alternatives are acquiescence to injustice or 
priests with rifles. Brother Albert poses a third option: service to the poor in the 
transformation of cultme, which will lead in time to the tr ansformation of politics. It 
was a point well understood by Poland’s communist authorities, who wanted to cut the 
last line, about the ‘greater freedom,’ from the script when Our God’s Brother was
Heilman, 416.
Wojtyla, Our God's Brother in The Collected Plays, 263. 
Wojtyla, Collected Plays, 266.
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finally performed in Krakow in 1980.”"^  ^Thi'ough this play, Wojtyla sought to counter 
M amst ideology with his belief in the transcendent dignity of human persons. He 
ai'gued that the gift of Christ enables humans to ti anscend the anger and suffering of 
society by giving of themselves to others, and thus to God. This third way between 
Marxism and capitalism tlirough the gift of personhood will be a noted theme in the 
social encyclicals of Jolm Paul II.
A New Method of Investigating Ethical Personhood 
in the Phenomenology of Max Scheler
Tiiree years into Wojtyla's work as a priest. Cardinal Adam Stefan Sapieha 
passed away and Archbishop Baziak presented Wojtyla with a plan, which the Cardinal 
had agreed upon before his death. Baziak asked Wojtyla to pursue a second doctoral 
degi'ee by writing a habilitation thesis, which would qualify him to teach at the 
university level. Wojtyla began his study of ethics in September 1951, while continuing 
his work as a priest.
Probably due to the influence of Mounier’s personalism, Wojtyla chose to study 
the phenomenological approach to ethics in the works of Max Scheler.
Phenomenology was first developed by Edmund Husserl in reaction to the 
disintegi ating foundations of modem science. As a scientist himself, Husserl argued 
that scientific empiricism was too narrow and needed a new way of thinking that was 
capable of attaining universal, or general essences, on the basis of intuitive givemiess."^  ^
Many Catholic thinlcers, including Martin Heidegger,"^  ^Edith Stein, Scheler,and 
numerous participants in the second Vatican council embraced phenomenology as an 
approach that moved beyond the Kantian limits imposed upon reason.
Weigel, 114.
Momiier considered the philosophy of Max Scheler to be of vital importance for persoiialist 
philosophy. Heilman, 413.
John F. Kobler, Vatican II and Phenomenology, (Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), ix.
I include Heidegger because of his Catholic upbringing, though he formerly broke with Catholicism in 
1919. Heidegger defined phenomenon as “that which shows itself in itself, the manifest.” The word is 
taken from the Greek expression (jiaivopsvov, which is derived from ^aivscGai which signifies ‘to 
show itself,’ This word comes from the stem (ficoç, or light, “in other words, that wherein something can 
become manifest, visible in itself.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquaiiie and 
Edward Robinson, (London: 8CM Press, Ltd, 1962), (H. 28), 51.
Scheler broke with Catholicism sometime after 1924.
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In Scheler’s primary work on Phenomenology, Formalismus in derEthik und 
die materials Wertethick, he argued that the mind apprehends essence in two stages.^  ^
First, phenomenology provides a way of viewing whereby the viewer can enter directly 
into an immediate, intuitive relationship with the essence of things through 
experience.^^ In the second stage, the phenomenologist penetrates into what is given as 
“lived tlu'ough,” discovering the values given tlu'ough intentional fee l ing .h i  other 
words, knowledge is given tlirough experience, and then by abstraction may one 
distinguish the affective (in which realm values are discovered) from the cognitive/^ 
Thus, the phenomenologist seeks to penetrate behind all phenomena to their essential 
stmctui'es {Wesenheiten) and to describe these structures in such a way that the modem 
person is awalcened to the poetic dimension of reality which is incomprehensible to 
modern science.
According to Wojtyla, the study of phenomenology opened up a new approach 
to reality. He later reflected, “St. Thomas gave me answers to many problems, and 
Scheler taught me a lot about personality and the methods of investigation.”^^  The 
significance of Scheler’s work for the development of the young priest’s anthropology 
can be seen in the two concluding theses of Wojtyla’s dissertation, On the Possibility o f 
Constructing a Christian Ethic on the Basis o f the System o f Max S c h e le r .On the one 
hand, Wojtyla expressed appreciation for Scheler’s phenomenological approach to the 
study of persons, for his insight into the place of values in ethical decisions, and for the 
importance of following or of imitation. Scheler believed that human persons could be 
laiown and values could be determined through seeing and experience. In other words, 
he recognised the importance of himian action for an ethical system. Wojtyla wrote the 
following, which is key to his philosophical approach to Christian ethics:
When.. .with the help of phenomenological experience, we select a value
and examine it, we are malcing an experimental study of moral
Formalismus {Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics o f  Values] was first published in German 
in two parts in 1913 and 1916. For a brief introduction to Phenomenology, see Scheler’s 
‘‘Phenomenology and the Theoiy of Cognition,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973): 136-185.
Jolm Staude, Max Scheler, (London: Collier-MacMillan, Ltd, 1967), 22.
George Williams, The Mind o f Jolm Paul, (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 126.
”  Buttiglione, 68.
Staude, 23.
Malinski, 159.
Published in Lublin: TNKUL, 1959 and subsequently translated into German and Spanish.
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experience. It is possible to apply this method of experimental 
examination to Christian ethics. Given that our choice of moral 
experience as an object of examination derives fi’om the belief in the 
ethical principles supplied by Christian revelation, then the examination 
allows us to peneti'ate into Cluistian ethical values, to uncover the 
essence of the experience and to verify its uniqueness and specificity in 
compai'ison with non-Chiistian ethical values, and also the borders at 
which they touch one another.
In pursuit of the ethical in society, Scheler emphasised both this ascertaining of values
and the imitation of primary models of the community.^^ “It is by appropriating another
man’s ethos that one can identify with the values and qualities to which his life
testifies.”^^  Wojtyla agreed with this personalist approach, which recognised the
importance of experience, values, and imitation in contr ast to a purely objectivist or
metaphysical system of ethics because it penetrated into the dynamism of hiunan action
in ethical life.
Yet on the other hand, Wojtyla concluded that “the ethical system constmcted
by Max Scheler is not at all suitable as a means of formulating a scientific Chiistian
ethics.”*^® Due to inadequate use of his own method, Scheler failed to substantiate a
normative ethical order. For example, Scheler believed that good and evil are bound to
emotion and revealed only in moral experience. Wojtyla argued that this failure to
recognise ethical nonns results from his inadequate perception of human persons. For
Scheler, the human person is the place in which values are made manifest through
feeling.^' Persons are not substance but the unity of lived-tlu'ough emotional 
62experiences.
Wojtyla held over against Scheler’s antlu'opology his theological interpretation 
of persons as influenced by the writings of Thomas Aquinas. According to Wojtyla, 
Scheler’s phenomenology should have led him to recognise the ontology of persons as 
substance, as both will and emotions, and as foiining and formed by ethical behavioui*. 
We will return to these three themes as Wojtyla developed them in The Acting Person.
Wojtyla, Max Scheler, Italian translation by Sandro Bucciarelli, (Rome: Logos, 1980), 241. Translated 
into English in Buttiglione, 62.
Williams, The Mind o/JP, 130.
Buttiglione, 56.
^  Wojtyla, Max Scheler, 232. Buttiglione, 60.
Buttiglione, 59.
Wojtyla, “Act and Lived Experience” from Lublin Lectures, p.37-38 quoted by Keimeth Sclmiidtz, At 
the Center o f  the Human Draina, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 1994), 44.
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At this point, it is sufficient to conclude that although Wojtyla was drawn to the 
personalist approach of Max Scheler, he critiqued the imderstanding of personliood at 
which Scheler arrived because it did not give credence to the metaphysical ontology of 
persons or the nomiative character of ethics, which are hoth affirmed in revelation.^^
Promoting Human Dignity as a Moral Theologian
Wojtyla first began lecturing for Jagiellonian University in October 1953 when
he led a course in Catholic social ethics. After receiving his doctorate in 1954, he was
invited to join the Catholic University of Lublin [KUL] Philosophy Faculty. According
to George Weigel, the faculty was established in 1946 in response to the himger for
philosophical discussion that ensued after the Nazi’s attempted to decapitate Polish
intellectual cultui e. Following the bmtalities of the Occupation and the imposition of
communism, the Polish people were confionted with questions about persons and the
meaning of humanity in a new way:
Why had some men and women acted like h easts while others had 
shown remai'kable heroism? What accounted for the fact that, while 
some people were grotesquely self-serving, to the point of betraying 
their fiiends, others were nobly self-sacrificing, laying down their lives 
for others they may have known only slightly? "^^
The KUL philosophers sought to address these questions through philosophical
anthropology. They located the crisis of modernity and the inadequacies of communism
in a misunderstanding of the human person.
Wojtyla’s engagement in this lively community further developed a
philosophical foundation for his future work in social ethics. The four theses, which
united the KUL philosophy department, continue to resonate in his work:
1. “Human beings can only be free in the troth, and the measme of truth is reality.
They agi'eed that they must be realistic about the world and about the human
capacity to know the world. Troth must be an expression of things-as-they-are
rather than a fimction of power.
® Williams, 134.
Weigel, 132.
Weigel, 133.
^  Weigel writes, “A communist-era joke in Poland expressed the realist imperative in a way that 
everyone could grasp: ‘Paity boss: “How much is 2+2?” Polish worker: “How much would you like it to 
be?”’ The political meaning of the realist assumption of the KUL philosophers was later expressed in the 
famous Solidarity election poster that read, ‘For Poland to be Poland, 2+2 must always =4.’” (133)
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2. The starting point for philosophical inquiry must begin with disciplined reflection 
on human experience rather than a cosmology. They sought to get at the truth of 
things-as-they-are thr ough an analysis of human experience, asking questions like, 
“What is hummi vocation?” and “Is the redemption of history to be understood in 
material and political terms, or does history have a transcendent dimension?”^^
3. They shared a commitment to reason (as opposed to the in ationalism of Nazi 
propaganda) with the goal to illuminate what good men and women ought to do.^^
4. They finally agreed to mine both the past and the present in pursuit of the truth so 
that they would not he slaves to contemporaneity.^^
In 1956, at the beginning of his third year* on staff, Wojtyla accepted the Chair 
of Ethics, a position he would hold for twenty-two years. This lecturing position gave 
Wojtyla the opportimity to develop his antlrropology flirther by blending the 
phenomenological method with Thomist metaphysics. Though he lectured in ethics at 
this early stage, his lectures offer little insight into the shape of John Paul’s mature 
work.^° As Wojtyla worked as a philosophical lecturer and a theologian, his 
anthropology took upon a new significance because his understanding of the human 
person solidified, as seen in his writings during this period, which will be expounded in 
the next chapter. He began to relate anthr opology with social ethics and moral theology 
in a manner that continued to serve him in his papacy. In addition to his work as a 
university professor, Wojtyla’s involvement in the Second Vatican Council made a 
profomrd impact upon his anthropology.
The Second Vatican Council and the Dignity of the Human Person
hi 1958, Wojtyla was named auxiliary bishop of Kralcow. He continued 
teaching in KUL while fulfilling his responsibilities as bishop. The following year.
Weigel, 134.
This use of “ought” echoes the Kant’s ethical obligation. We will return to this theme of John Paul in 
tlie final section of Chapter Seven.
Four points adapted from Swiezawki, “Intioduction,” in Wojtyla, Person and Community, xii-xiii,
™ These ethics are primarily based upon the work of Wojtyla’s predecessor, Jan Piwowarczyk (1889- 
1959) and display little emphasis upon tire anthr opology that undergirds the later writings of Wojtyla and 
the encyclicals o f Jolm Paul II. Because these lectures offer Wojtyla’s social ethics at its earliest stage of 
development and lack the richness of Wojtyla’s later work, they will not be examined in this thesis. For a 
brief summary of these social ethics lectures, see Jolm M. Grondelski, “Social Ethics in the Young Karol 
Wojtyla: A Study-in-Progress,” Faith and Reason 22, No. 1-2 (Spriirg/Sunmrer 1996):31-43.™
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Pope John XXIII announced his intention to call an ecumenical council with a pastoral 
and ecumenical vision. A few months before the council opened on October 11, 1962, 
Bishop Wojtyla was elected temporary administrator to the Archdiocese of Krakow to 
replace Archbishop Baziak.
The tlnee sessions of the Second Vatican Council taking place from 1962-1965 
sought to address the problems and issues that had been raised in the modern period. As 
Bishop of Ki'alcôw and later as Aichbishop, Wojtyla took part in all thr ee sessions of 
the council. He addressed the council several times, and he worked on a sub­
commission re-drafting of Gaudium et Spes [The Church in the Modern World]. 
Wojtyla believed that the root of the issue with which the council was gmppling was 
the topic of the human person. He commented to a friend that in his opinion, the dignity 
of hmnan persons was the theme of the whole council.^^ The work of the Council 
shaped Wojtyla’s imderstanding of the person both through the formal discussions and 
tlnough interactions with key theologians like Henri de Liibac. The following chapter 
will address the philosophical and theological development of Wojytla during this 
period/^
Pastoral and Philosophical Work After the Council
Following the council, Wojtyla produced two books that reflected these 
documents. In 1969, he wrote The Acting Person, in which he sought to “give an 
account at the level of philosophical analysis of the conception of man presupposed in 
the [Vatican II] docimients.”^^  His second book. Sources o f Renewal: The 
Implementation o f the Second Vatican Council, was written to present the content of 
Vatican II in its theological and pastoral intent.
In 1967, Wojtyla was created Cardinal by Pope Paul VI. He worked to build up 
the Polish church, and he began to travel more extensively. Many of his sermons fi*om
Wojtyla, “On the Dignity of the Human Person,” Person and Community, 177-180. This essay 
contains a talk broadcast in Polish over Vatican Radio, 19 October 1964. He made this comment to 
Malinski before the radio talk, 173.
Those of especial importance to him were Gaudium et Spes, Lumen Gentium [Dogmatic Constitution 
on the Church], Dei Verbum [Dogmatic Constitution on Revelation], Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration 
on Religious Freedom], Nostra Aetate [Declaration on the Relation o f the Church to Non-Christian 
Religions], and Unitatis Redintegratio [Decree on Ecumenism]. When asked near the end of the council 
which documents were most important, Wojtyla listed these. Malinski, 188. They are consistently 
referred to tlnoughout his papal encyclicals.
For dns reason, in the following chapter, I will place the analysis o f Vatican II and Wojtyla’s Sources 
before the summary of The Acting Person. Rocco Buttiglione, “Wojtyla and the Council: Religious 
Liberty as the Heart of Vatican II,” Crisis 11 (February 1993), 21.
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this period have been published and include some valuable insights for the pmposes of 
this research. In 1976, Wojtyla was invited to preach the Lenten retreat to Pope Paul VI 
and the Roman Curia. The retreat developed the theme, which Wojtyla considered the 
theological centrepiece of Vatican II foimd in Gaudium et Spes 22: “It is only in the 
mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes c l e a r . H e  
published these reflections imder the title. Sign o f Contradiction, another important 
source for this study. After two more years of pastoral work in Poland, Wojtyla was 
elected Pope on October 16, 1978.
Conclusion
In a political context that sought to suppress and deny the rights of persons, 
Wojtyla took a great interest in human personliood. He critiqued the ideology that 
drove these systems by his appeal to God as the basis for human dignity and 
transcendence. The influence of Tyranowski and St. Jolm of the Cross solidified 
Wojtyla’s belief in the transcendence of God as a being who is “other” yet who 
gi*aciously gives himself to himianity. Because of this gift, Wojtyla argued, humans can 
transcend and shape their cuiTent political or economic situations thiough self-giving, 
as in the example of Wojtyla’s character. Brother Albert.
Wojtyla chose to research this experience of faith by examining the writings of 
St. John of the Cross. During these studies, Wojtyla’s encounter with Traditional 
Thomism led him to an affiiination of the hiunan capacity for reason; his encounter 
with Hemi de Lubac led him further in his critique against atheistic humanism by 
ai'guing for the “seed of eternity,”^^  which creates the hiunan capacity for 
transcendence. Through these experiences, Wojtyla found his home in the personalist 
movement, sharing the affiiination that humans are spiritual, fine, and rational beings.
The phenomenological meüiod provided further access into his personalist 
interests by enabling Wojtyla to study moral experience and to articulate the dynamism 
of human action and transcendence in ethical life. He utilised such research to argue for 
the dignity of human persons in order to directly oppose the atheistic humanism, which 
fortified the communist regime. The following two chapters will delineate more 
intricately the theme of human dignity as it relates to Wojtyla’s doctrine of God and his
Weigel, 224.
Hemi de Lubac, Catholicism, 202,
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philosophical anthropology, the role of reason in attaining truth about God and 
humanity, and the foundation that these themes lay for the social doctrine of John Paul
II.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN PERSONS IN KAROL WOJTYLA’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
This work has posed the thesis that social ethics must derive from a theological 
understanding of personhood. Thus far, we have aigued that Wojtyla’s Cluistian faith 
led him to believe in the God who transcended the political situation and the human 
suffering that surrounded him. Wojtyla’s faith clearly shaped his early emphasis on the 
franscendence and the dignity of the human person. In the 1950s, Wojtyla’s tmn to 
philosophical anthropology continued to reflect his interest in the human person. He 
used phenomenological tools to explore the human person and to defend the dignity of 
humanity in a political climate that suppressed and devalued human persons. In his 
ongoing pastoral work, Wojtyla also advocated the dignity of humanity. From his 
sermons to his reflections on Vatican II, he sought to put foiwai'd a Chiistian 
imderstanding of persons and to explore the political and economic implications of 
human dignity.
This chapter will explore Wojtyla’s philosophical and theological anthropology 
as he utilised it to discern and to defend the dignity of human persons. Section One will 
examine the primary antluopological themes of Wojtyla’s phenomenological 
philosophy. Because his antluopology was also influenced by his theology, this section 
raises the question regarding the relation between his philosophical and theological 
antluopology. I will argue that in the midst of his phenomenological influences, 
Wojtyla believed that his antluopology maintained a deeply theological basis for the 
dignity of hmnan persons, thus maintaining a continuity between his philosophical 
concerns and his theology. Thus, this first section will explore his philosophical
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antluopology and the degree to which he maintained a theological view of personliood 
in the yeai's preceding his papacy.
The second section of this chapter will examine Wojtyla’s theological 
foundations for the dignity of human persons. From his doctrine of God to his doctrine 
of Chiist to his eschatology, Wojtyla continually sought to explore the significance of 
theology for issues of human dignity in social ethics. This section will seek to 
demonstrate that establishing the dignity of human persons on theological grounds was 
one of Wojtyla’s primary concerns. The section will also serve as a preview of Chapter 
Three, which will explore the theological foundations of John Paul’s social ethics. The 
development of these themes of Wojtyla’s in the encyclicals of Jolm Paul supports my 
assumption regai'ding the continuity between Wojtyla’s philosophical and theological 
antluopology and John Paul’s antluopological starting point for social ethics.
The Dignity of Persons in Wojtyla’s Philosophical Anthropology
In nmnerous essays and books written diuing his years as a University
professor, Wojtyla sought to bring different schools of philosophy into dialogue on the
subject of ethics and the human person. Scholars are divided on the exact intent of
Wojtyla’s work during this period. Was Wojtyla’s antluopology fundamentally
phenomenological, borrowing elements from Thomism as Anna Tymieniecka and
Robert Haiwanek propose?^ Or should his work be interpreted as primarily
metaphysical, expanding Thomism with insights fi'om phenomenology as Gerald
McCool ai'gues?^ Other inteipreters such as Gerard Beigel and John Saward claim that
the later writings have a Chiistocentric stmcture for anthropology.^ Do Wojtyla’s
theological aims provide structure for his philosophical anthropology or vice versa! Or
does John Kavanaugh perhaps summarise his work best when he writes:
Wojtyla’s life and work, is a “dialectical” totality. Any approach [to his 
work] which is one-sided, dualistic or reductionistic will lead one astray.
Each aspect of his life and thought cuts tluough and across the other 
aspects. The meaning of each part rests upon its relation to the other
 ^Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Origins of the Philosophy of Jolm Paul the Second,” in The Human 
Person, ed. George McLean. (Washington, D.C.: The American Catliolic Philosophical Association,
1979):16-27. Robert Harvanek, “The Philosophical Foundations of the Thought of John Paul II,” in Hie 
Thought o f  John Paul II, ed., John McDermott, (Roma: Editrice Pontifica Universita Gregoriana,
1993): 1-22.
" Gerald McCool, “The Theology of Jolm Paul II,” in The Thought o f John Paul II, 29-54.
 ^Beigel, Gerard. Faith and Social Justice in the Teaching o f Pope John Paul II. New York: Peter Lang, 
1997 and Jolm Saward, Christ is the Answer, New York: Alba House, 1995.
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parts and the living totality itself. His phenomenology is Thomist, 
socialist, poetic, evangelical, di amatic, political and traditionalist. His 
Thomism is radical, phenomenological, contemporaiy, personalistic, and 
transcendental.'^
In the following section, I will ai'gue that imderlying the dialectical nature of Wojtyla’s 
work can be found the Thomist affirmation of the analogia entis. This fundamental 
assumption holds his philosophical and theological anthr opology together. Two essays 
will illustrate this argument in two parts. First, I will ai*gue that Wojtyla’s moral 
theology and the mamier in which he relates his theology and his philosophy begins 
with the Thomist affiiination of the analogia entis. Second, although Wojtyla does 
claim to move beyond Thomist metaphysics, his continued affirmation of the human 
capacity for moral norms demonstrates that in moving beyond, he does not leave 
Thomist metaphysics behind but he seeks to build these phenomenological insights 
upon this key Thomist assumption. These points are vital to our discussion because the 
analogia entis sheds light on the anthropological foundation for Wojtyla’s social ethics 
and it becomes the bridge between Wojtyla’s theological and philosophical 
understanding of personliood. After examining these two essays, we will turn to explore 
Wojtyla’s philosophical anthropology.
The Foundation of Morality upon the Analogia Entis
In 1959, Wojtyla wrote an essay entitled, “On the Metaphysical and 
Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm,” which affirmed his adoption of the 
Thomist concept of the analogia entis as the foundation for his moral theology. In this 
essay, Wojtyla argued that the metaphysical basis of Aquinas reveals the wealmesses of 
Scheler’s phenomenological approach. According to Wojtyla, Aquinas reconstructed 
the Ai'istotelian concept of the good by giving priority to the aspect of existence. 
Existence is a good and the good is identical with being. Assuming that every being has 
existence, every being is a good. For what detemiines good is sheer being. All beings 
have their own respective fullness of existence and, thus, of good. Because God has an 
unconditional fullness of existence, God is the highest good.^
John Kavanaugh, “John Paul II and Philosophy,” ed., Gregory Beabout, A Celebration o f the Thought 
of John Paul II, (St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1998), 17.
 ^Karol Wojtyla, “On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis o f the Moral Norm,” Person and 
Community, 74.
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Beings have different degrees of perfection and differing types of good. The 
good that exists in humans is the good of their natm*e, a good that is not diminished by 
sin. Another type of good is moral good. Moral good is destroyed by sin. Wojtyla 
explained, “The good connected with the very substance of oui' nature is not even 
diminished by sin, but the good connected with oiu natural inclination is reduced by 
sin, although not wholly destroyed, unlike the goods of virtue (moral good) and grace 
(supernatui'al good).”^
To varying degrees, creatiues paiticipate in God’s ftillness of existence and his 
unconditional perfection because they owe their existence to God. Participation in 
existence entails resemblance; so gi'eater participation in God, the fullness of existence, 
expresses itself in the greater degree of perfection of a given being.^ Thus, God is the 
supreme and ti anscendent measure of all beings. Wojtyla names this exemplariness, 
“the heart of the normative order,” for the exemplar “is the transcendent measure for 
what is modelled after it.”  ^The human measure of transcendence “results from the 
being’s exemplification of the supreme perfection of Divine Being.”  ^Thus, when 
Wojtyla spoke of the normative order, his basis for this order was God, who is the 
exemplary measure of all things. This normative order is the foundation for Wojtyla’s 
moral theology.
According to Wojtyla, the consequence of this exemplariness is an objective 
hierarchy of goods. This liierai chy has its origin in God. Humans are able to grasp this 
hierai'chy “sufficiently to be able to assume a proper attitude toward the objective order 
of goods.” °^ Wojtyla explained, “We Imow that created beings are more or less perfect 
and that they all stand in certain relation of resemblance and exemplification with 
respect to Divine Being. Human reason grasps these resemblances and differences in 
the beings that become ends of human action or means to such ends.”^^ Because 
humans have the capability to apprehend by means of reason the very essence of the 
good in a general way, humans have the ability to posit norms.
® MPB, 76.
’ MPB, 77.
* MPB, 78.
 ^MPB, 78.
MPB, 80. 
" MPB, 80. 
MPB, 80.
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Wojtyla believed in this capacity of human reason because of his commitment
to Thomist metaphysics of the good. In the tradition of the Catholic chui'ch, Wojtyla
affinned the analogia entis, the analogy of being, which deteimines the direct relation
of God to humanity through the concept of being. This commonality of existence gives
humans access, thiough reason, to the nomiative order that is based in the
exemplaiiness of God.^  ^Wojtyla explained this process:
The good is the object of the will, whereas the cognitive apprehension of 
the good—its objectification—is, according to St. Thomas, an object of 
reason. Both of these faculties work closely together with one another 
{utraque ad actum alterius operatur): the will wills so that reason may 
Imow; reason, in turn, knows that the will wills and what the will wills.
A result of this co-operation of reason and the will is that the good and 
the tine somehow mutually include one another.
Thus, Wojtyla established the close tie between reason and morality. The
analogia entis makes possible this capacity for hiunan reason to attain
knowledge of the nonnative moral order by working in conjunction with the
will. In the following essay, we will explore the metaphysical assumptions that
continue to undergird Wojtyla’s moral thought, even as he incoiporates
phenomenological insights.
Reason and Revelation as Significant for Ethics
Wojtyla’s essay, “Etliics and Moral Theology” demonstrates his dependence 
upon Thomist assumptions in establishing his social ethics.W ojtyla defined ethics to 
mean “a science that deals with morality in its normative, not just descriptive, aspect 
and that aims at ‘objectifying’ norms, and thus above all at ultimately justifying 
them.”^^  He divided moral theology into two fomis. Positive theology, involves the 
exegesis of the doctrine of Cluistian morality contained in the revelation of scripture
In a subsequent essay, Wojtyla wrote, “From this follows the resemblance to God of all creatures in 
being; this resemblance has its own gradation. Both the resemblance as such and its gradations are 
gathered together and known in the mind of God as exemplars: the Creator sees in Himself the highest 
exemplar out of wliich bemgs are created and knows tliem in His image, that is to say, inasmuch as they 
imitate liis essence, which is the fnst object o f his knowledge. It is here that we find the nucleus of the 
normative order. “/ / fondamento metafisico e fenomenological dell norma morale sidla base delle 
concezioni di Tommaso d ’Aqiiino e di Max Schelerf 111-12. Translated by Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla, 
76.
Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla, 76.
Wojtyla, “Ethics and Moral Theology,” in Person and Community, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 
101-106. Essay published in 1967.
^^EMT, 101.
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and tradition. Speculative theology is an interpretation of revelation '‘"by means o f a
particular philosophical system. Thomas Aquinas offers an example of this type of
theology by his use of ancient philosophy as the tool for inteipreting the data of
revelation. This “philosophisation” is significant because it is “an intellectual synthesis
that goes far beyond the threshold of exegesis (positive theology), hideed, as an
interpretation that thi'ows light on the data of revelation and insightfully airanges them
by means of metaphysical categories.”^^  Aquinas’ work, as a fruit of its times, must
also be viewed from the perspective of the subsequent development in philosophy.
Wojtyla cliai acterised his own move beyond the philosophy of being toward the
philosophy of consciousness, “Together with the emergence of the philosophy of
consciousness and the development of the cognitive tools proper to it (e.g., the
phenomenological method), new conditions are taking shape for enriching the concept
of the human person in teiins of the whole subjective, ‘conscious’ aspect, which had in
some ways been levelled in metaphysical “naturalism.”^^  This shift towards philosophy
of consciousness coincided with a move fr om explaining morality teleologically to
explaining and justifying morality on the basis of values and nonns. However, the
following quotation demonstrates that the move was not an attempt to rethinlc or leave
behind Thomist assumptions. Rather, operating from them, Wojtyla worked to delve
more extensively into his examination of the human person:
What is the relation between norms contained in revelation and the 
norms of natural law, between “revealed virtues” and “natur al virtues”?
Are any of these norms exclusively “revealed,” such that they could not 
be larown without revelation? The possibility seems to exist of ariiving 
at a purely philosophical understanding and acceptance of the entire 
moral content of the evangelical message, especially the precept that 
persons are to be loved by reason of the dignity vested in them. After all, 
according to revelation, par ticularly the teachings of St. Paul, the content 
of revealed precepts can also be known and is in fact loiown without 
revelation, in a natural way. Tliis is also confirmed by general 
experience, which, in turn, stands at the basis of the current widespread 
call for dialogue. Obviously, such a purely rational interpretation of 
revealed norms involves a certain “compression” and “abbreviation” of 
them. A piuely philosophical interpretation is not adequate, hr order to
EMT, 101. [Italics mine.] 
^®EMT, 102.
EMT, 104.
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arrive at a wholly adequate interpretation, we must turn to theology and 
draw upon the full content of revelation.^®
He followed this passage with an ar gument that moral theology and dogmatic theology
must be intimately cormected.
Upon first reading, it appears that Wojtyla was asking the question, “Are there
norms which are revealed and norms which are known to the human without revelation,
tluough natuial law?” However, the argument that he proceeded to malce does not
answer this question and appears self-contradictory when his question is inteipreted in
this mamier. Upon closer reading, I interpret Wojtyla’s question to be, not one
regarding the impact of revealed norms upon natural norms, but the question of the
feasibility of justifying revealed norms apart fiom revelation. He was asking, ""Can
revealed norms he justified by natural law? ” Beginning with this question, the passage
can be inteipreted more coherently. First, he answered that the possibility exists and he
cites the teachings of St. Paul and general experience, to show how revealed precepts
can be known in a natural way. Then he argued that piuely philosophical interpretation
of revealed norms is not adequate because without revelation we would know nothing
of God’s plan for salvation or of the intervention of the Incarnate God in human affairs.
Thus, “not knowing this, we would also not be able to interpret adequately the moral
contents of revelation (e.g. the precept of love) that are ‘in principle’ accessible to
reason.”  ^^ Thus, he answered the question, ""Can revealed norms be justified by natural
/aw?” in the negative. Theology provides the context for inteipreting revealed norms.
This essay is of great importance for interpreting Wojtyla’s philosophical
foundation for social ethics for several reasons. First, Wojtyla was not rethinking the
foundation for moral norms. From a protestant perspective, the question of the relation
between revealed norms vs. natural norms, should call into question the feasibility of
natural law or Imowledge about moral norms apart from scripture. However, Wojtyla so
readily accepted the Thomist assumption that the analogia entis gives the human the
capacity to know natural norms that he, seemingly, did not even notice this tension
which has been such a soiuce of debate in protestant circles. Rather, he embraced the
conception that natural law does have access to tmth to a certain degree. This human
capacity includes basic moral intuitions but excludes the salvifrc content of revelation
and some of the moral content that can only be interpreted in light of theology.
“  EMT, 105.
EMT, 105.
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Second, this essay demonstrates the Thomist foundation for Wojtyla’s 
understanding of reason. While he sought to probe the human person more deeply 
thiough the philosophy of consciousness, he did not lay aside the philosophy of being. 
He clearly began with the analogia entis and he accepted natural reason as a basis for 
etliics. Wojtyla believed not that the phenomenological method should replace 
Thomism but that it opens up a new means to probing metaphysical reality. For 
instance, in a later essay, he argued that the personalist affiimation that humans effect 
ethical action compels one to recognise the analogia entis, the ontological consistency 
between the Divine and the human person.^^ Wojtyla employed this method in The 
Acting Person, the synthesis of much of his philosophical career.
Finally, he believed that such speculative theology is limited, indicating a 
limitation on the analogia entis. He said that philosophy and reason may only go so far 
because they cannot adequately interpret the moral nonns revealed by God. '^^  Though 
the precept of love can be Icnown thi'ough reason, philosophy is a good tool for “getting 
to the bottom” of this precept. While the moral contents of revelation are “in principle” 
accessible to reason, the meaning of revealed normative contents can be adequately 
inteipreted only theologically.
Wojytla’s Philosophical Anthropology
Having explored the Thomist assumptions from which Wojtyla was working to 
develop a moral theology, we now turn to explore more fully the implications of his 
personalist antluopology for his moral theology. The essay, “Thomistic Personalism,” 
highlights key concerns which paved the way for The Acting Person.^^ In this essay, 
Wojtyla contrasts the Cartesian dichotomy of body and soul, which essentially results 
fr'om identifying personhood with consciousness, with a more integrated Thomist 
definition of person. This definition forms the basis for Wojtyla’s conception of 
persons and shapes his entire antluopology and ethical progi*amme. In Thomist 
anthropology, the human person is an individual (individua substantia) comprised of
Wojtyla, “The Problem of Separation of Experience from Acts in Ethics,” Person and Community, 33 
and “The Person: Subject and Community,” Person and Community, 236. See also Buttiglione, 79.
The Acting Person, xx.
This presupposition is illustr ated in the architectonic of Aquinas’ Sumrna Contra Gentes. In Books 1-3, 
Aquinas “dealt with divine things according as the natural reason can arrive at the knowledge of divine 
things tluough creatures.” Sumrna Conti-a Gentes, IV, ch. 1, para.4.
Wojtyla, “Thomistic Personalism,” Person and Community, 165-175.
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both body and soul. The soul is a spiritual substance whose natural properties are 
reason and freedom. The faculties of the soul work to perfect the person. The body 
contains the cognitive and appetitive faculties that contribute to the shaping of the 
psychological and moral personality.^®
Wojtyla accepts this description as the philosophical basis of his anthropology. 
Yet he argues that the Cartesian turn to consciousness has provided insight into an 
aspect of the subjectivity of the human person which Aquinas failed to develop fully. 
Thus, in his desire to speak of the lived experience of the person, Aquinas assumes that 
the person is an ontological reality whose being finds consistency with God’s being.^^ 
Yet Wojtyla wanted to incorporate into his imderstanding of persons the foiinative 
nature of human action. He believed that an examination of the consciousness and 
values would point toward the eternal or tianscendent reality of personhood.^^
Consciousness and Efficacy
Because he believed that human experience discloses the person, Wojtyla 
examined the human’s experience of self in action.^® Tluough phenomenological study, 
he examined the consciousness of the human.^  ^He argued that man, himself, is the 
origin of his acting and the experience of efficacy is the awareness of being the agent 
and creator of the action being perfoiined.^^ Yet man is not only the agent of action but 
also the recipient in the sense that “something-happens-in-man” when he acts. Thus, 
ethical experiences are not only intentional contents of experience but they actually
^^TP, 167-9.
He wi’ites, “[Thomas] shows us the particular faculties, both spiritual and sensory, thanks to which the 
whole of human consciousness and self-consciousness— the human personality in the psychological and 
moral sense— takes shape, but that is also where he stops. Thus, St. Thomas gives us an excellent view 
of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it would be difficult to speak in his view of the 
lived experience of the person.” TP, 170-171.
He does not want to concede to the post-Cartesian mistake of locating what substance there is in 
personliood as formed in consciousness.
TP, 175.
'^^ AP.xx.
For more on his examination of human consciousness, see AP, 25-65 or summary by Beigel, 10-12.
68-69.
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form persons.^^ For example, begimiing with the value of courage and behaving 
courageously in accordance with that value creates a courageous person.
In phenomenological analysis, this differentiation of human action tends to 
divide the human. So Wojtyla utilised the metaphysical field of man’s ontological 
structure (as the source of man-person) to synthesise the efficacy and the subjectiveness 
of man. '^  ^These two aspects of human action prove to be of pivotal importance for 
Wojtyla’s ethics. First, analysing the experience of efficacy provided vital insight into 
human freedom in action. He identified fr eedom as the decisive moment of the 
experience of efficacy. Freedom constitutes the structuie of “man-acts.” ®^ Second, 
himian experience o î subjectiveness served to explain the formative nature of human 
action. Wojtyla wi’ote, “It is man’s actions, his conscious acting, that make of him what 
and who he actually is. This form of human becoming thus presupposes the efficacy or 
causation proper to man.” ®^ Thus, tins phenomenological approach clarifies the 
stractures in which the choice of a good action serves to both create a good and to foiin 
the person as good.
The Transcendence o f the Person^'^
Wojtyla examined the relation between the will and the person in which “the 
will manifests itself as a feature of the person and the person manifests himself as a 
reality with regard to his dynamism that is constituted by the will.”^^  He calls this 
relation self-determination. Yet only tluough a structure of self-possession in which the 
person fully possesses and governs himself is self-detennination possible.^^
Wojtyla showed the coimections between the freedom of the will as self- 
deteiinining and the transcendence of the person in action. The stiucture of self-
111 Person and Community), “Act and Lived Experience,” 95-96; “The Problem o f the Will in Analysis 
of Ethical Act,” 8-17.
74-75.
100.
^^AP, 98.
In The Acting Person, Wojtyla’s argument for the franscendence of the person focuses on the will. In 
the essay, “Act and Lived Experience” he argues that both feelings and cognition also indicate the 
franscendence of the person. See discussion in Sclimitz, 49.
^^AP, 105.
In a side note, Wojtyla explains that the person as creature may also be seen as belonging to God but 
this relation which medieval philosophers refer to as persona est sui iuris does not overshadow self-
p o s s e s s i o n . 106.
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determination provides greater insight into Wojtyla’s concept of freedom for “in every 
T will’—the self is the object, indeed the primary and neaiest object.”'^ ® Thus, tlie 
stmcture of self-determination in each genuine “I will” reveals the person’s 
transcendence in action/^ Wojtyla explained this assertion by defining transcendence 
as going over and beyond a tlueshold or boundary. “In every action, the person 
transcends his stractural boundaiies, his natui e and its drives, by malcing himself a 
somebody tluough the action.”'^  ^Wojtyla named this indicator of human freedom 
vertical transcendence!^^ Because the person is fi*ee and determines himself, he ascends 
over his own dynamism in vertical transcendence.' '^^
Freedom indicated a special self-reliance that goes together with self- 
determination. Wojtyla wrote, “To say that man ‘is fi*ee’ means that he depends chiefly 
on himselffor the dynamisation o f his own subjectP^^ Free will manifests itself in the 
ability to choose.'*® However, Wojtyla differentiated this fi'eedom from Kant’s 
autonomy by describing the intrinsic relation between human freedom and an objective 
order of the good and the tme. Wojtyla’s free will has the freedom for  objects or values 
but dependent upon tmth.'*  ^The fr eedom of the will presupposes a reference to tmth for 
“it is the essential siuTender of the will to tmth that seems finally to account for the 
person’s transcendence in action, ultimately for his ascendancy to his own 
dynamism.”'*^ A “moment of truth” is contained in every authentic choice of decision 
making for “if choice and decision were to be without their inlierent moment of truth, if 
they were to be perfoimed apart from that specific reference to truth, moral conduct
108-9.
111.
""Beigel, 16.
In contrast to horizontal experience which he explains as “transgressing the subject’s limits in the 
dhection of an object— and this is intentionality in the “external” perception or volition of external 
objects.” ZIP, 119.
""^P. 124.
"^^P, 120.
^^AP, 132.
AP, 132 and Beigel, 17-18. Elsewhere, Wojtyla argued tliat the will is a potentiality for the good 
because of the capacity for free will and because it is a specifically rational faction on human nature and 
in the concrete person. Reason plays a norm-setting role by submitting different goods to the will in light 
of the objective norms rooted in reality. “The Problem of the Will in Analysis of the Ethical Act,” Person 
and Community, 8-17 and “Act and Lived Experience,” Person and Community, 95-96.
"®^P, 138.
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most chai'acteristic for the man-person would become incomprehensible.”'*® However, 
despite this moment of truth, humans too often fail to choose the “real good,” and this 
choice of the will leads to the experience of guilt or sin.^ ® Thus, the freedom he 
describes is a fi'eedom in reference to truth and good because truth is the basis for the 
person’s transcendence in action.®*
The perfoi*ming of an action not only shapes the human but brings personal 
fulfilment. The structure of self-possession, of man’s willing and acting, serves as the 
basis for morality. In other words, ethics camiot be bracketed out or treated as an 
existential moral reality. Morality is founded in anthropology for it conceives of 
humans as responsible subjects of their actions that aie realised tluough themselves.
The roots of morality grow out of the person while also fulfilling the person. Only in 
such a cycle can morality be concretised. Though Wojtyla rejected an existential moral 
reality, he did not dismiss the tmth of moral nonns that deteiinine rightness and 
wrongness. However, these ar e expressed in human experience through the creative 
role of the conscience which “shapes the norms into that unique and unparalleled form 
they acquire within the experience and fulfilment of the person.”®^ Tluough responsible 
and good action informed by tmth, the human fulfils himself.
Intersubjectivity by Participation
Having first examined the individual person, Wojtyla then turned to investigate 
the significance of his findings for persons in community. Man’s existence together 
with others brings an additional aspect of human action that must be considered. 
Wojtyla aimed to explain the social character of human natui'e. He introduced the 
definition of participation, having a share or taking part in something, and seeks to 
investigate how a person, when he acts together with other people, retains the value of 
his own action while sharing in the realisation and the results of commimal acting. A 
human’s existing and acting together with other persons enables him to achieve his own 
development through participation. Wojtyla conti asted this idea of participation with 
Individualism, in which the individual is the supreme and fundamental good and others’
49 AP, 139. 
139.
AP, 146. 
^^AP, 165.
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interests aie seen as limitations, and Totalism, which subordinates the individual to the
community in a coercive fashion. He claimed that the intellectual conception of
humanity underlying both systems is impersonal:
Every human being must have the right to act, which means “freedom in 
action,” so that the person can fulfil himself in performing the action.
The total fi eedom of action, which results from its personalistic value, 
conditions the ethical order and simultaneously determines it. On the 
other hand, the moral order instils into human actions—in particular, 
those within the orbit of acting “together with others”—those 
determinants, and thus also limitations, which are the consequence of 
purely ethical values and nonns.®®
Wojtyla argued that the conunon good is the foundation of authentic human 
communities. Pai'ticipation emerges as a property of the hmnan person fiom the reality 
constituted by common acting and common being.®'* Because Wojtyla defines human 
persons in teims of general humanity, he does not make the claim that participation in 
the Other is grounded in human essence.®® This point is of vital importance for the later 
dialogue with Karl Baifh. Rather than grounding paiticipation in the material reality of 
hmnan persons, the human capacity entails potential for participation in the Other 
which he may fi'eely choose. In so choosing participation, the human forms himself and 
contributes to the common good.®®
Wojtyla named two virtues that promote authentic participation and build up the 
common good: solidarity and opposition. Solidarity indicates a constant willingness to 
accept and realise one’s shar e in the community. The attitude of solidarity seeks the 
benefit of the whole even when the common good requires the sacrifice of one’s own 
share. The attitude of opposition means that one will not withdraw his membership in 
the commimity but that he will seek the good of the commimity by contesting that with 
which he does not agree. These two attitudes provide the basis for dialogue, a theme 
constant throughout Jolm Paul’s social writings. Dialogue seeks to bring out what is 
right and true and to eliminate partial, preconceived, or subjective views and attitudes.
In the essay, “The Person: Subject and Commmiity,” Wojtyla sought to identify 
the “special value” of cornrnmrity that conesponds to the person’s fiilfilment tluough
AP, 332.
339-340.
“Participation or Alienation?” in Person and Community, 201.
56 Person and Community, 203. Cf. Samuel Gregg, Challenging the Modern World: Karol Wojtyla/John 
Paul H and the Development o f Catholic Social Teaching, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 1999), 201-211.
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act.®^  He argued that this special value is the communio personarum, or the 
“communion of persons.” This communion takes place in interpersonal relationships as 
persons face one another in “I-thou” relationships.®^ The I  and thou enable one another 
to develop by discovering the other and oneself in the other. The fullest experience of 
inteipersonal community occurs when the I  and thou reveal themselves and mutually 
affiim tluough word and act the dignity and transcendent value of the person.®®
hi the social dimension of the coimnunity, persons stand together in the pursuit 
of the common good, the good of society. The I  and thou relationships of the 
inteipersonal community become the we relationships in the social commimity as the I  
and the thou find their mutual relation in the common good, in accordance with the 
natiual law. The core of the social conmiunity is this relation of many f  s to a common 
good.®®
Conclusion to Section One
Section One has traced the shape of Wojtyla’s mature philosophical 
anthropology. First, I argued that the analogia entis underlies the anthropology of 
Wojtyla and creates a bridge for Wojtyla to move easily between his philosopliical and 
theological understanding of personliood. Because the human exists, he shares the 
being of God and, by implication, he canies the seed of goodness, which gives him 
epistemological access to the truth and moral law. Pliilosophy provides a means of 
ascertaining the same truth that theology reveals. On account of human limitation, this 
truth may need to be completed by revelation. However, on account of the analogia 
entis, the seed of human goodness provides access to knowledge of the self and the 
moral law through philosophical, as well as theological inquiry.
Second, we analysed Wojtyla’s philosophical move beyond Thomist 
metaphysics into phenomenology as a basis for exploring the dignity of the human
Wojtyla, “The Person: Subject and Community,” m Person and Community, 219-263. See also 
Beigel’s summaiy on 25-28. Wojtyla adopts this language from Martin Buber, la n d  Thou, trans. Walter 
Kaufmaim, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, Ltd, 1970.
PSC, 240-244.
PSC, 245-246.
PSC, 247 and Beigel, 27. Because this work is focusing upon the grounding of social ethics in the 
ontological aspect of personhood as the key point of dialogue, we will not be addr essing John Paul’s 
understanding of the common good in fuller detail. David Hollenbach deals with such concerns as the 
notion of the common good impmges on issues of social justice and human rights in The Common Good 
and Christian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.) While exploring this notion in 
comparison with Barth would prove fruitful, it is not within the scope of this work to do so.
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person. While many of the Thomist metaphysical assumptions, such as the analogia 
entis, the good, and natural law, remain integral to Wojtyla’s thought, he seeks to 
incorporate a philosophy of consciousness into the philosophy of being. He explores 
hiunan consciousness for clues to the dignity of human persons manifest in hiunan act, 
transcendence and self-fonnation. The human reveals her dignity by talcing a very 
active role in her own fomiation through her acts that are humanising because they are 
in accordance with moral law. In the social sphere, human dignity entails a potential for 
pai'ticipation with the other. Active engagement with one’s community by acting in 
solidarity with the neighbour and seiTing the common good is an intrinsic part of the 
development of the individual. In this mamier, then, Wojtyla’s philosophical 
antluopology seeks to affinn human dignity by working from a Thomist starting point 
and incoiporating phenomenological insights with classical metaphysics and moral 
theology in a manner that challenged the political structm*es of conununist Poland.®*
Wojtyla’s Theological Foundations for the Dignity of Persons
Wojtyla believed that the human intellect could attain a certain level of 
Imowledge about human dignity tluough reason. However, the truth of human dignity 
finds its fullness in theological revelation.®  ^While the capacity of humanity to 
transcend political oppression by acting in accordance with the common good reveals 
the dignity of hmnan persons in society, Wojtyla believed that the fullness of human 
dignity is revealed in Christian theology: the transcendence of God the Creator, the 
self-gift of Christ the Son, and the hope of the human life in God. This section will 
trace the source of human dignity in Wojtyla’s theological anthr opology. The final part
®* This diesis does not incorporate tlie perspectives on Thomism developed in Catholicism subsequent to 
Wojtyla’s work, traced in Fergus Kerr’s After Aquinas, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.)
Wojtyla believed that the tiuth that we were made in the image and likeness of God “alone gives 
meaning to our existence, and only in this truth do we find the answer to the questions of who we are and 
why we are alive.” {The Word Made Flesh, trans. Leslie Wearne, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1984.), 57.] Iii5ïg/î o f Contradiction he wrote that “man cannot be understood without Christ 
and that it is impossible to educate him, to develop his human nature and his vocational life without 
Christ” (137). In addition, he wrote of the limitations of phenomenology in imderstanding human 
development: “The person can be described and analysed under many aspects, but in the end any human 
method is ineffective when dealing with tlie reality of personliood.. . .  We must not limit oiuselves to 
consideration o f the phenomena of development, but must try to find their source, tlieir hidden causes. 
We must investigate tlie origins of these phenomena and what underlies them, and the basis of ways of 
thinking, deciding and choosing. . . .  The person in development is described definitively in the first 
chapter of the book of Genesis: ‘God created man in his own image and likeness’ (1:27).” The Way to 
Christ, (New York: HarperColliiis, 1994), 89-90.
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of this section will di'aw out the implications of Wojtyla’s understanding of human 
dignity for his interest in political and economic justice.
Four books are especially helpful for intei*preting the theological imderpinnings 
for his anthropology. In 1970, Cardinal Wojtyla published o f Renewal: The
Implementation o f the Second Vatican Council as a working study seeking to present 
the content of Vatican II in its pastoral intent. Tliis work holds significance for our 
study because Wojtyla’s summaiy of the Coimcil indicates his own concerns to put 
foi*ward a Cliristian understanding of persons and the action that both forms Christian 
consciousness and results fiom Christian consciousness. A second work, The Word 
Made Flesh, contains key homilies preached between 1959 and 1978. Wojtyla also led 
several retr eats for University students, two of which are retained in The Way to Christ. 
In 1976, Wojtyla was invited to give a series of lectur'es to the Pope and Roman curia at 
the annual Lenten retreat. These lectur es are now published in Sign o f Contradiction 
and they describe the shape of Wojtyla’s Cluistological anthropology.®® hi this section, 
the theological basis and shape of Wojtyla’s anthropology will be examined, as he 
develops it imder four themes: the Transcendence of God the Creator, Clirist the Son, 
Clirist Reveals Man, and the Historical and Eschatological Consciousness of the 
Church.
The Transcendence of God and the Dignity of Humanity
Wojtyla emphasised the transcendence of God in order to contradict the denial 
of God and the subsequent stripping of human transcendence posed by atheistic 
humanism.®'* In a fashion similar' to St. Jolm of the Cross, Wojtyla described God’s 
personhood as entirely other, majestic and tr anscendent above creation, sought by 
humans in faith and Imown in silence. This transcendent God is also the God of 
covenant with his creation. In love, God created the world and the good. This love 
pei'vades the earth, reveals the Father, and gives rise to the creation of man in the image 
of God. Both sharing in creation, the human mind and the world share the same 
sti-uctures so that reflection upon the ontology of the imiverse moves in step with 
reflection upon the “axiology of the world, refection upon the good and its values.”®®
Wojtyla, trans. Mary Smith, Slough: St. Paul Publications, 1979. 
SC, 10. Cf. WMF, 5 and 104.
5C, 20-21.
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The transcendence of God and his creation of humanity reveal the depth of 
human dignity in four ways. First, God’s covenant of love, which he established 
thiough his creation, reveals the dignity of hmnanity because the human person has 
been created in the image of God and because she is beloved. Wojtyla writes, “Each 
person is imique and draws his whole gi*eatness from heing rooted in his relationship 
with God, because he was created in the image and likeness of God, and also fi'om the 
fact that God himself has a special relationship with each individual person.”®® 
According to Wojtyla, the essential elements of the covenant include human dominion 
over the eai th and the truth in which humanity was established. This truth limits the 
human creature within the confines of good and evil.
The transcendence of God the Creator and his work in creation also entails self­
revelation to his creatures. Because he is Creator, God provides humans with evidence 
of himself in creation so that “human reason can by its own powers anive at the 
knowledge of God.”®^ This evidence indicates the revelation of God in which he calls 
for humans to respond in faith. Wojtyla wrote, “Human reason is capable of knowing 
God, the principle of all that exists, by the Tiatmal light’, but it is clear that knowledge 
of the Creator and the work of creation already involves God’s revelation of himself.”®^ 
Third, the itinerarium mentis in Deurn^^ emerges from the depths of created 
things and through it the human discloses his dignity by transcending or going beyond 
himself. The world’s imderstanding of the human contradicts this transcendence:
The tragedy of atheistic humanism—so brilliantly analysed by Pere De 
Lubac—is that it strips man of his transcendental character, destroying 
his ultimate significance as a person. Man goes beyond himself by 
reaching out towards God, and thus progresses beyond the limits 
imposed on him by created things, by space and time, by his own 
contingency.^®
Wojtyla posed that the transcendence of the majestic God finds its image in the human 
spirit as the human longs to seek God and to realise the hond linldng God and
WC, 133.
SC, 46.
^  Journey of the mind towards God, (Bonaventure.) Cf. WMF, 9: “following the deepest call of the heart, 
man feels the need to go beyond himself.”
SC, 16. H. De Lubac, Athe’isme et seme de l ’homme, Paris, 1969. By contrast, Ray Anderson argues in 
Historical Transcendence that God’s reaching towards humanity is actually the transcendence of God. 
Grand Rapids: Berdmans, 1975.
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liumanityJ' While Wojtyla argued for the transcendence of humanity from a 
philosophical perspective, as discussed in the previous section, this theological basis for 
transcendence (the fact that hiunans were created by a franscendent God toward whom 
they may reach) provides the fuller insight into human dignity.
Finally, God’s work as Creator attributes dignity to the human act. Human activity 
in creation is both dependent and autonomous. The significance of creation for human 
activity in the world is the prescription to manlcind to acknowledge God as maker and 
to conquer the earth and mle the world with justice and holiness.^^ Wojtyla defined the 
rightful autonomy of creation as man’s ordering of “all things in truth” in dependence 
upon God.^  ^He quoted GS 36: “If by the autonomy of eaifhly affairs is meant the 
gi adual discovery, exploitation, and ordering of the laws and values of matter and 
society, then the demand for autonomy is perfectly in order: it is at once the claim of 
modern man and the desire of the creator.” "^^ He contrasts this rightful autonomy with a . 
false autonomy that does not depend on God and forgets his Creator. This negation of 
God results in the negation of creatui'e and leads to a distortion of the cognitive and 
active powers of humanity.
In siun, God’s creative act and his care for creation attributes dignity to that 
which he created. Building upon his philosophical affrnnations, Wojtyla is able to 
explore the fullness of human dignity in transcendence, act, and reason based upon the 
doctrine of God, the transcendent Creator. God affirms human dignity by offering 
dominion over his creation within the confines of tmth and moral law. The capacity of 
human reason to know moral tiuth and the transcendental character of the human who 
seeks God reveals the full dignity of humanity. Finally, dignified human action is that 
which remembers God the Creator because it fonns the human person in the likeness of 
God.
SC, 11; WMF, 94; WC, 3-12.
3 4 ,5C, 32-33 and 48.
SC, 50. He quoted GS 36, “By the very nature of creation, material being is endowed with its own 
stability, truth, and excellence, its own order and laws. These men must respect as he recognises the 
methods proper to every science and technique.”
SC, 49. Cf. GS 36.
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Christ the Son Restores Human Dignity
As the Son of God, Jesus Christ restores dignity to humans through his 
incarnation and tluough his redemption. First, humans find their dignity in the mystery 
of the incarnation because it expresses the love of the Father/^ Wojtyla writes, 
“Contemporary people in this last quarter of the twentieth century, whose human 
dignity has been ignored and infringed in so many ways, come to Cluist’s stable in 
Bethlehem to ask who they are and why they are in the world, bringing with them their 
existential anxiety. And when they come to Bethlehem, like each of us they find the 
reply in the manger on the straw: T have given them power to become children of 
God.’”^^  Human dignity has been so compromised that people no longer understand 
that they are made in the image of God.^  ^Tlu'ough his incarnation, Jesus brought us 
back to this truth. Thus, Jesus “defined and ordained this dignity when he, the Son of 
God and coexisterrt with the Father, became one of us—a nian.”^^  By becoming hmnan, 
he raised humanity to a dignity ‘beyond c o m p a r e . H e  helps us to become fully 
human by giving us the power to become childr en of God.^ ® The son becomes part of 
the human family and enables us all to share in his divine sonship. Through him the 
new human family comes into being in imity.^^
Second, the covenant, shattered by original sin, is rebuilt by redemption tlu'ough 
Jesus Christ, the Son of God.^  ^People are divided in themselves because they often 
refuse to aclaiowledge God as the source, upsetting the relationship that links them to 
their final end and breaking the right order that should reign in their relationship to the 
self and to others .The himian is unable to overcome this sin except thr ough the 
fieedom and strength given him in Clirist. Wojtyla wrote, “Redemption is fiom sin
”  sc, 102.
WC, 57.
SC, 32-33.
WC, 58. Wojtyla also wrote, “The incarnation o f the Son of God emphasises the great dignity of 
human natiue; and the mystery of the redemption not only reveals the value of every human being but 
also indicates the lengths to which the battle to save man’s dignity must go.” SC, 102.
Ca", 22.
WC, 57.
WMF, 30. Thus, tlie God of infinite majesty comes near in Clnist to those who are part o f the covenant 
comnimiity, the Church, which serves as “a kind of sacrament of sign and instrument of intimate miity 
with God and the unity o f mankind.” SC, 26.
SC, 25-6.
GS. 13; SC, 76-77.
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which degrades man, and in this redemption—in its essence and effects—we find the
fundamental and inexhaustible means by which man is restored to his proper value.” "^^
Wojtyla called this redemption universal, in the sense that all people aie involved in the
paschal mystery of Clirist.^^
In Sign o f Contradiction, Wojtyla described the high price of Chiist’s
redemption through the eyes of Mary who watched the obedience of Jesus to his
heavenly Father. “In all that Jesus did and taught there was new and complete
revelation of the great heart—the Father; but the heart thus revealed had all the
profoundly human characteristics that he had inherited from his mother.”^^  Christus
factus est pro nobis oboediens usque ad mortem, revealing the love of God toward the
world.^^ Wojtyla quotes the words of Paul which indicate the significance of Clirist’s
obedience, “As one man’s fall led to condemnation for all men, so one man’s work of
justice leads to justification and life for all.”^^  This loving obedience stands in stark
contradiction to man’s disobedience. Both obedience and disobedience stem from the
will, from freedom: “will and freedom face to face with the divine will.”^^  Wojtyla
addressed the impact of this disobedience upon the world by describing the history of
injustice between humans, communities, and nations. Yet tltrough obedience, Clnist
brouglit justice. In a strikingly similar manner to Baith, Wojtyla named the only
solution to social injustice: obedience to God. Wojtyla wrote,
Jesus Christ took upon himself the burden of this problem and solved it 
by going to the root of it, Man first became imjust when he became 
disobedient to the Creator. For that reason, Clnist became obedient imto 
death, thus bequeathing to mankind his own justice to seiwe as an 
inexhaustible fount of justification before God. In the past, and even to 
this day, there have been so many programmes promising ‘healing’ for 
the world and proclaiming the arrival of ‘tine’ justice in men’s dealings 
with one another. But none of these can be regarded as complete unless 
it is linlced with the justification before God—which is the main
SC, 77.
“All this holds tme not for Christians only but also for all men of good will in whose hearts grace is 
active invisibly. For since Christ died for all, and since all men are in fact called to one and tire same 
destiny, which is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to all tire possibility o f being made 
partners, in a way known to God, in tire paschal mystery.” GS, 22; SC, 79-80.
SC, 69. This passage indicates the Clrrist’s iirlreritance of humanity ascribes significance to Maiy.
SC, 82. Clnist was made obedient for us imto death.
SC, 83 from Romans 5:18-19. 
83.
45
foundation of all justice—that we attain thanlcs to the obedience of 
Chiist, obedience unto death.
Tluough his death and resuiTection, Clnist redeemed humanity from sin, 
contradicted the problem of injustice, and entered into fullest and deepest solidarity 
with the entire human family, especially with those who have been victims of violence, 
injustice, and cmelty.^' Through the cross, all hiunans have been redeemed and 
“conceived afresh” to follow God’s plan.^  ^And finally, in the cross “lies the full truth 
about man, Iris wretchedness and his grandeur, his worth and the price paid for him.”^^  
According to Wojtyla, Cluist restored human dignity tluough his gift of self.
The theme of Cluist as Gift resonates throughout Wojtyla’s pastoral works because of 
its profound ethical implications. In love, the Divine One came, revealed God, gave his 
life for humanity, and retmiied to the Father. Through his gift of love, the love that is 
part of the inner mystery of God, Cluist built the church, imparted the Holy Spirit, and 
continues to build the Kingdom of God thr ough his church. The chinch, in obedience to 
the model of Christ, also acts as guardian and protector of justice and peace in all 
human activities including mariiage and the family and the cultinal, economic and 
political worlds, along with the international scene. Wojtyla wrote, “In all these fields 
we must always rediscover the law of gift. With this principle as a basis it will be 
possible to overcome all that has engendered and still does engender the anti-Love,” the 
amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei^^ The vision of Wojtyla can been seen in this 
prayer: “Lord, may that Love which is a gift embrace us and transform us—and with 
us, and by means of us, embrace and ti ansfbrm everything there is.”^^  Thus, the human 
realises himself and restores dignity to humanity thi'ough self-abandorunent to God and 
through the giving of himself to another.
SC, 84. 
5C86.
90
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SC, 87.
SC, 89.
The love of self that leads to disregard for God, SC, 56-58.
Wojtyla, Sources o f Renewal: The Implementation o f Vatican II, (San Francisco: Harper and Row,
1980), 60-61.
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Christ Reveals Human Dignity
According to Wojtyla, Clnist as the Redeemer who reveals God’s plan of love 
provides the answer to the question, “Wliat is man?” He quoted Gaudium et Spes, “In 
reality it is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly 
becomes clear. For Adam, the first man, was a type of him who was to come, Christ the 
Lord. Clnist the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of 
his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling.”^^
Clnist reveals the mystery and dignity of humanity thi'ough his tlnee-fold 
mission as prophet, priest, and king. First, Christ as prophet proclaims the divine tmth 
and shows the dignity of humanity to be bomid up with tmth. By nature truth belongs to 
God himself; yet it also constitutes an essential dimension of human knowledge and 
existence. Wojtyla notes two reasons why human dignity is bound up with the tmth of 
the gospel message. It shows the human to be “superior to the rest of the universe” 
because the intellect makes the human person a sharer in the light of God’s mind.^  ^In 
addition, the gospel awakens man to a stronger awai'eness of his dignity. “Whoever 
follows Christ, the perfect man, becomes himself more of a man.”^^  Thus truthful 
thinking and tmtlrful living are the “indispensable and essential components” of human 
dignity. The chmnli must battle for the dignity of the human, which upholds the tmth 
of faith and moral norms of life.
The mystery of the human person is also revealed in the priesthood of Clnist. 
For hmnans, whether part of “the common priesthood of all the faithhil implanted in 
the soul of every Christian by baptism” or of the hierarchical priesthood, priesthood is 
based upon the self-giving of Clnist, upon “Christ himself who unceasingly offers 
himself to his own Father and who is above time; Christ who, in his unceasing self­
giving to the Father, binds himself to each of us as an individual and to manldnd as a
SC, 75. GS 22, See also, iSC, 117. GS, 22 confirms “It is therefore tlnongh Clnist, and in Clnist, that 
light is thrown on the riddle o f suffering and death which, apart fr om his Gospel, overwhelms us.” SC, 
80.
SC, 118.
SC, 118. Quotation from GS, n.41.
119.
Especially close to Wojtyla’s heart, “the dignity of the human person has to be defended; but that 
dignity must not be made to consist in unbridled exercise of one’s own fr eedom,” as in the case of 
campaigners in favour of abortion. He argued passionately that the Church must fight on the side of 
humanity, in support of freedom tliat is exercised justly and responsibly and preserves tlie mystery of 
man found in Christ. SC, 124-5.
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whole; Chiist who makes us one with himself and offers us to the Father as his mystical 
hody.” ®^^ The priesthood displays human dignity because it involves freedom and it 
entails an act of the will to be for God and o t he r sWo j ty l a  quotes Gaudium et Spes, 
“True fr eedom . . .  is to the highest degree a sign of the divine image m man. God 
willed to leave man ‘in the hands of his own counsel’, so that he might spontaneously 
seek his creator and attain fr eely, tluough adherence to him, to full and blessed 
perfection. Hence man’s dignity requires him to act in accordance with conscious and 
fr ee choices, to be motivated and guided by liis personal convictions and not by blind 
impulse or pressiue.”^^"^ Hmnan dignity is displayed in tliis fr eedom of the human 
person to give of himself, to share in the priesthood of Cluist, and through this sharing 
to witness to the profound mystery of hmnanity.^^^
Finally, hmnan participation in Christ’s Jdngship reveals the dignity of humanity. 
“The "Munus regaZe,”’ Wojtyla wrote, “is not the right to exercise dominion over 
others; it is a manifestation of the ‘Idngly character’ of man. This kingly character is 
embedded in the structure of the human personality.” ®^^ By this, Wojtyla means that the 
spiritual element of hmnanity gives persons dominion over the earth, nature, and the 
world. Thus, this kingliness is closely tied to the ‘praxis,’ the activity, or the work of the 
human in the world.
On a deeper level, Wojtyla claims that “all human work, and all that it produces 
in any field of endeavoiu, shapes the human personality; but it does so not because of 
the objective value of what it produces but because of its own moral worth.” ®^^ In other 
words, every human has a conscience that enables him to distinguish between good and 
evil. According to Wojtyla, a person’s obedience to conscience, to the miderlying good 
in his nature, or to the divine law of love that lies within him is the key to his moral 
grandeur and the basis of his kingliness or dominion over himself and the world. ^ ®^ 
Linked closely with the dignity manifested in the hmnan conscience is tlie dignity of
WMF, 84.
SC, 130, 132.
131. G5, 17.
SC, 132.
SC, 138. Note tlie phenomenological echoes.
SC, 139.
SC, 144. Wojtyla also develops tills theme in The Way to Christ: “The greatness of the person in 
development is linlced on the deepest level to his conscience.” WC, 91.
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human freedom to choose between good and evil/®® Wojtyla goes so far as to argue that 
even sin testifies to the greatness of hiunans because it displays the human capacity to 
choose and because God continues to go out toward humans as a Father seeking his 
prodigal son/^® Thus, even in the case of sin or disobedience, the sacrament of Penance 
(the turning to God and confession of sin) manifests the kingly aspect of the human, hi 
Clnist, men and women ai*e enabled to meet with God thi'ough confession and put their 
tmst in God in the certainty of forgiveness.* ^  *
The church paiticipates in the Kingdom of God by communicating divine life to 
men and reflecting that light over the earth. Wojtyla repeats that one of the chief tasks 
of the chinch in the modern world is the safeguai'ding of man’s personal dignity and 
freedom.**  ^Wojtyla emphasised freedom in reaction against “the attack of atheism, 
which does not bother about himian freedom and which creates social oppression.”**^  
Jesus had complete interior freedom, and he came “to brmg freedom to humanity and to 
each individual who has been deprived of it or is suffering from repression or is being 
officially urged to reject Christ. He came in order that people might regain fr eedom and 
hence human dignity, so that in this dignity they might rediscover that God who has 
spoken to us tlnough Jesus Clnist and who has shown us unlimited love in him.”* *"*
The Christian Eschaton and the Fulfilment of Human Dignity
Finally, humans discover their dignity in the hope of the eschaton. Wojtyla 
quoted from Lumen Gentium, “The final phase of time has come upon us, for the 
making-new of the world has been iiTevocably decreed and in a real way is anticipated 
in this present world.”* *^  He likened the human journey to a pilgrimage towards God in 
which the “sacrum,” the sacral values are the highest and most definitive sphere of 
human life and self-flilfilment. Thiough the medium of the sacrum the whole of human 
life is raised “above.”**®
WC, 92.
WC, 93.
144-45. 
Sources, 169-170. 
Sources, 170.
WC, 120.
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Wojtyla contrasted Clnistian eschatology with the secular eschatology of
temporality and materialism. He questioned positive evaluation of the progress of
hmnanity as giowing material gains have coincided with enormous moral shortcomings.
Gaudium et Spes provides the true criterion for evaluating progress: “A man’s worth lies
more in what he is than in what he possesses In contrast, om* “century of progress”
has become the age of totalitarianism’s death camps or liberalism’s sickening
prosperity, which has given rise to drug addictions, murder, and new social problems.
With regar d to the end of life, Wojtyla again emphasised the ti*anscendent nature
of the hmnan: “The seed of eternity inlierent in man, who cannot be reduced to mere
matter, rebels against death.”**® Every human person contains this life that Clnist
brought and grafted on to hmnanity so that even in death, humans belong to the Lord.
Wojtyla takes a personalist view of death in which man’s death becomes the ratification
of his life and of the choice he has made.**®
He links the explication of sin with this mystery of death. *^® It is necessary to
turn to divine revelation in order to understand the reality of sin. Wojtyla defines sin as
the denial of God, the evil that is consciously and freely willed, and the evil that springs
fr om the will of a person who is not able or willing to prevent it.*^ * Wliereas God
creates and develops the good, particularly in the moral order, sin destroys the order and
the good in the human herself and in creation. *^  ^The pmification of men and women
from sin is effected by temporal punishment such as suffering or humiliation, which
ultimately seiwes to restore justice and good order. This law of purification reveals the
temporal and the eternal aspects of humanity. Wojtyla wi*ote,
The imier stmcture of the hmnan personality shows how deeply rooted 
this law is within man. .. .Conscience not only decides whether om 
actions are good or bad but also approves or disapproves of us. When it 
disapproves it chastises and tonnents us with pangs of remorse. *^^
Thus, in the suffering of this life, salvation is bom.*^ "*
GS, n.35.
159.
5C, 160-161.
“The mysteiy of death and the mystery of sin are insepai able from one another,” SC, 163.
WC, 41-42.
Cf. SC, 164-5.
168-9.
SC, 169. Wojtyla gives the example of Job’s suffering thi'ough which he found tlie Lord. In the 
following section, Wojtyla discusses purgatory.
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Pmgatory provides for the hmnan’s need to be spiritually prepar ed for union 
with the living God in grace. It is the darkness in which attachment to the world and 
attr action to sin give way to conversion to God, purification fi*om attachment and 
preparation for meeting God, as described by St. John of the Cross in The Dark Night o f 
the Soul.
Wojtyla names this final meeting with God the mystery of the final 
consimimation. According to the plan of salvation revealed in scripture, all things are 
consmmnated in Christ. The cross marks the beginning of this divine work of salvation, 
justification, and sanctification, which also provides the outline for the eschaton in 
which Clxrist malces all things subject to the Father. While the Trinitarian mystery, the 
unity of the godhead remains divinely transcendent, the trinity also becomes the 
ultimate dimension in the affairs of humans and the world when God becomes “all in 
all.”*^® Included in this consummation is the final judgement that has been entr usted by 
the Father to the Son. Yet even in this final judgement, the '"amor sui usque contemptum 
DeC will still be present, Wojtyla writes, for “that type of love will reap its own har vest 
of definitive condemnation.”*^® Thus, the glory of God is humanity alive because of his 
enduring love.*^^
Human Dignity in the Political and Economic Spheres
Thr oughout this examination of Wojtyla’s argument for the dignity of hmnan 
persons based upon the doctrine of God, the doctrine of Christ, and the Cliristian 
eschaton, we have begun to sketch the lines between his theological anthr opology and 
his social ethics. In this closing section, we will tr ace tire social impact of Wojtyla’s 
concern to maintain the dignity of human persons in the politico-economic spheres of 
society.
According to Wojtyla, the affirmation of himian dignity characterises the 
Chr istian mission to the world: “The mission of the Chm'ch is oriented to human 
dignity and gi'eatness, and talces on a special significance in our times, when so many 
facts (and not just theories) militate against human dignity and gi'eatness; these facts 
may or may not be close to us, and they may relate directly to our lives or to the life of
125 SC, 175-77.
SC, 181. The love of God towards disdain of self.
127 SC, 183.
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the woiid.”*^® We will examine three primary facets of preserving human dignity in the 
social sphere: practising solidarity, upholding the moral law, and promoting dialogue 
and fellowship.
Practising Solidarity
In opposition to the Marxist notion that religion alienates the human from 
himself, Wojtyla argued that the Clmstian attitude toward human identity is expressed 
in solidarity. As a community united in Clnist, guided by the Holy Spirit, and pressing 
towards the Kingdom of the Father, Christians bear the message of the loving salvation 
of Clnist intended for all men and women. Upon this mission of participation, 
Clnistian solidarity with humanity is founded.
The method or attitude of expressing this solidarity that Wojtyla suggested takes 
place by accepting the conditions of humanity in the modem world and understanding 
the questions of modem human persons.*®® The social situation of the modem world is 
an increasing imbalance between affluent and underdeveloped nations. Wojtyla quoted 
Gaudium et Spes regarding the tensions “between international bodies set up in the 
interests of peace and the ambitions of ideological indoctrination along with national or 
bloc expansionism. In the mist of it all stands man, at once the author and the victim of 
mutual distrust, animosity, conflict, and woe.”*®*
In contradicting such dehumanisation, “the incarnation emphasises the great 
dignity of human nature; and the mystery of redemption not only reveals the value of 
every human being but also indicates the lengths to which the battle to save man’s 
dignity must go.”*®^ In consequence for society, Clirist stands in contradiction to the 
unjust economic and social structur-es and acts as a “sign of liberation for people who 
are denied freedom of conscience and religious fr eedom, or who have tliose fi'eedoms 
drastically curtailed at crucial points. He is in every way a reproach to affluent, 
acquisitive consumer societies.”*®® Preser-ving human dignity means that economic 
development must remain at the serwice of humankind. Hmnans must seek to eliminate
WC, 133.
Wojtyla quoted GS, I in Sources, 274. 
Sources, 276, 280.
Sources, 277 quoted from GS, Preface. 
SC, 102. Cf. WMF, 57 and 120.
SC, 108.
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huge disparities, provide work that is rewarded equitably and allows for rest, and allow 
for the ownership of private property.*®'* In the international community, Christians 
must devote themselves to the cause of peace, to economic co-operation, to the ceasing 
of the aims race, and to the problems of the developing nations.*®® Thus, in the same 
way that Chiist identified with humanity, the church is responsible to extend itself into 
this world of inequality, conflict, and distmst to promote human dignity in politics and 
economics.
Upholding the Moral Law
Secondly, Clnistians preseiwe human dignity by upholding the moral law. The
dignity of the human requires that she glorify God rather than serve the evil inclinations
of her heart. Wojtyla quoted Gaudium et Spes:
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid 
upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love 
and to do what is good and to avoid what is evil, tells him inwardly at 
the right moment: do this, shim that. For man has in his heart a law 
inscribed by God. His dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he will 
be judged. . . . Tlirough loyalty to conscience Clnistians are joined to 
other men in the search for tmth and for the right solution to so many 
moral problems which arise both in the life of individuals and fr om 
social relationships. Hence, the more a coiTect conscience prevails, the 
more do persons and groups tiuii aside fr om blind choice and try to be 
guided by the objective standai'ds of moral conduct.*®®
For Wojtyla, the root of this moral conduct and societal order is chaiity: the
moral law is fulfilled in the love of God and one’s neighbour.*®  ^Charity is closely tied
to human fifeedom. Freedom does not entail exemption fr om law, but the preservation
of humanity thi'ough the promotion of human rights, not only by human law but also in
obedience to the moral law of Clirist.*®® Wojtyla argued that fleedom camiot be
safeguarded tlirough human law but tlirough the gospel of Clnist. The gospel
“aimoimces and proclaims the fieedom of the sons of God, it rejects all bondage
resulting from sin, it scmpulously respects the dignity of conscience and its fieedom of
134 Sources, 301-303.
Sources, 307.
Sources, 280. Quoted from GS 16. 
Sources, 282.
Sources, 171. Quoted from G5, 41,
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choice, it never ceases to encourage the employment of human talents in the service of 
God and man, and finally, it commends everyone to the chaiity of all,”*®®
Humans have a duty both to their neighbom* nearby and to the world. Thus, 
Wojtyla opposes the crimes against himianity such as subhuman living conditions, 
degrading working conditions, slavery, and prostitution, in which people are treated as 
mere tools for profit rather than fi*ee and responsible persons. He quotes GS, “All these 
and the like are criminal: they poison civilisation; they debase the perpetrators more 
than the victims, and militate against the honour of the creator.”*'*® Therefore, the 
defence of human dignity and the promotion of a just society entails upholding the 
moral law. He affirms the council’s conclusion: “There is no better way to establish 
political life on a tmly human basis than by encouiaging an inward sense of justice, of 
good will, and of semce to the common good, and by consolidating the basic 
convictions of men as to the tme nature of the political conmiunity and the aim, proper 
exercise, and limits of public authority.”*'**
Promoting Dialogue and Fellowship
Wojtyla promoted the call of the second Vatican coimcil for dialogue at the 
level of personal fellowship through respect for the dignity of men and women as 
persons. He wrote, “Cliristian revelation greatly fosters the establisliment of such 
fellowship and at the same time promotes deeper understanding of the laws of social 
living with which the creator has endowed man’s sphitual and moral nature.”*'*® 
Wojtyla viewed the Vatican council as an attempt, thi'ough dialogue, “to help [persons] 
to a keener awareness of their destiny, to malce the world'conform better to the 
surpassing dignity of man, to strive for a more deeply rooted sense of universal 
brotherhood, and to meet the pressing appeals of our times with a generous and 
common effort of love.”*'*®
GS, 41; Sources, 170.
Sources, 285. Quoted from GS, 27. 
Sources, 305. Quoted from GS, 73. 
Sources, 286. Quoted from GS, 23. 
Sources, 309. Quoted from GS, 91.
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Conclusion to Section Two
This section traced the foundation for Wojtyla’s concept of human dignity by 
examining his theological reflections. First, as the Creator of human persons, God instils 
dignity to persons because they ar e his special creation, loved and established in 
covenant with him. In his ti anscendence, he reveals himself to persons through creation 
and human reason, and he draws humans toward himself through their own 
transcendence. And fiuther, God’s creation reveals the dignity of hmnanity tlirough 
action and self-formation. Secondly, Clirist the Son reveals human dignity because he 
restores that which was lost tluough the fall of man, because his incarnation is the 
highest affiiiiiation of humanity, and because hmnans paiticipate in his vocation as 
prophet, priest, and king. The Chiistian hope in eschaton also reveals the “seed of 
eternity inlierent in man,”*'*'* which gives dignity to the life and death of the human 
person. This theme of dignity is a key to Wojtyla’s political and economic ethics. The 
hmnan person must be valued above political and economic demands by the practice of 
solidarity, the upholding of human rights by the moral law, and the promotion of 
dialogue and fellowship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Wojtyla’s distinctly theological affirmations of human dignity 
correspond with his philosophical discoveries in the realm of human act and 
consciousness. From the theological side, Wojtyla affirmed the dignity of human 
persons as it is revealed by the ti anscendence of God the Creator, the restoring work of 
Christ the Son, and the eternal natm e of himianity. He employed philosophical tools in 
order to move toward this final theological affirmation of dignity, by pointing toward 
transcendence and by locating human dignity in self-deteimination and in human 
action, in participation with the common good. From both the philosophical and 
theological sides, Wojtyla argued that tlie seed of dignity, goodness, and life, in 
humanity which finds its base in the analogia entis enables humans to work toward a 
just society by living in accordance with the moral law or the common good. Good 
human action fonns not only the individual but also society in accordance with the 
moral law, creating a just society, promoting charity towai'd the neighbour, and thereby 
upholding the dignity of human persons.
æ ,  159.
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At this early stage, Wojtyla infused his Thomist metaphysical and theological 
presuppositions with phenomenological discoveries in order to argue for the just 
treatment of hmnans in society. This influence can also be seen in his subsequent moral 
theology. The following chapter will examine the implications of anthropology for 
political and economic justice in the matm e work of John Paul II.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR 
THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF POPE JOHN PAUL II
Wojtyla’s election to the papacy in October 1978 brought great hope to the 
people of his oppressed homeland. As John Paul II, he played a pivotal role in felling 
communism in Poland and Eastern Europe, and he has enhanced the ongoing work of 
the Catholic church for justice and peace through his consistent defence of the human 
person in his speeches and encyclicals.* His work as Jolm Paul® demonstiates his 
ongoing conviction that political and economic ethics must derive from a Cliristian 
miderstanding of personhood.
As a young man, Wojtyla witnessed the destmction of hmnan life by oppressive 
political ideologies and regimes. He argued for the dignity of human persons over 
against such regimes tlnough Ins plays, his pastoral work, and later through his 
philosophical and theological anthiopology. The previous chapter sought to 
demonstrate that a Cliristian understanding of personhood formed the starting point for 
his social ethics, and it began to explore the major themes that supported his social 
doctrine. This chapter will examine in gi'eater detail the theological anthropology of 
John Paul that undergirds his approach to social etliics. By doing so, we hope to outline
* Although Pope John Paul II may not be the primary author of liis encyclicals, his speeches, and liis 
sermons, let it be assumed that the work that is signed in his name or the words spoken by liim are 
composed of his primary theological assumptions, personalist concerns, and social emphases. One reason 
for inti'oducing the thought o f Wojtyla in Chapters One and Two was to address this concern regarding 
the authenticity of John Paul’s works. The sceptical reader will find a surprising continuity between 
Wojtyla and Jolm Paul. The primary assumptions, concerns, and emphases of Wojtyla are further 
developed in the writings attributed to John Paul II.
 ^Reference to Pope John Paul II as John Paul will be made for the remainder of this work. A new book 
on this topic of John Paul’s philosophical antlnopology will be available following the completion of this 
thesis: Jolm McNemey, Footbridge Toward the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophical Thought o f  
John Paid //, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003).
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the distinctive shape that Catholic anthropology provides for social ethics and to 
delineate the primary reasons that a just social ethic needs to appeal to theological 
antln opology. A Clnistian doctrine of God, of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, Jolm Paul 
would argue, provides unique insight into the depth of human dignity. This dignity 
holds profound implications for the political and economic spheres of human life. Brief 
examination will be given to the significance for political and economic systems, law, 
work, and impoverished persons in societies.
This chapter will systematically examine the significance of John Paul’s 
theology of personhood for his social doctrine. Section One will examine Jolm Paul’s 
doctrine of God, his doctrine of Chiist, and his doctrine of the Holy Spirit as they 
provide the theological basis for his antlnopology, especially his concern to explore the 
dignity of human persons. Section Two will analyse the social doctrine of Jolm Paul as 
it is expounded in his moral theology and in his writings on political and economic 
justice. The final conclusion will draw together the findings of these thi-ee chapters on 
Wojtyla/Jolm Paul II.
Theological Basis:
The Doctrine of God and the Dignity of Persons
John Paul finds basis for the dignity of hmnans in his doctrine of God in four 
distinct areas: the dignity of reason, the Trinity and moral law, God’s work as Creator, 
and God’s Kingdom. We will examine these four aieas as they reveal the full dignity of 
human persons. In addition, we will begin to explore the moral and social implications 
of this dignity.
The Dignity of Reason
An investigation of the human capacity for faith and reason forms a 
prolegomena of sorts to John Paul’s doctrine of God. According to his catechesis, the 
dignity of humans is deeply comiected to their capacity to reason and to ascertain 
tmth.® As we examined in the previous chapter, the doctiine of the analogia entis 
affirms the human person as free and intelligent, with the capacity to laiow God, tmth, 
and goodness. This doctrine finds its expression in Jolm Paul’s affirmation of the
 ^John Paul, God, Father and Creator: A Catechesis on the Creed. Vol. 1. (Boston: Pauline Books and 
Media, 1996), 54.
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capacity for humanity to loiow God thi'ough reason. Although human sin has 
“impaired” the hmnan capacity “by an aversion to the One who is the somce and origin 
of truth,”'* the power of human reason can ultimately be tmsted to lead humans toward 
God.® He opposes the contemporary abandoning of the search for tmth because it 
obscures this “true dignity of reason.”*’
Jolm Paul explores the relation between faith and reason further by examining 
the relation between theology and philosophy. He argued that the tmth attained tlirough 
natmal reason by philosophy and the truth based upon faith in revelation are neither 
identical nor mutually exclusive. On the one hand, they are not identical: Philosophical 
knowledge depends upon sense perception and experience and it advances by the light 
of the intellect alone. According to John Paul, the human is capable of knowing God by 
reason alone. He said, “Alongside the ‘I believe’ [of faith] we find a certain T loiow.’ 
This T loiow’ concerns the existence of God and even, to a certain extent, his essence. 
This intellectual loiowledge of God is systematically treated by a science called ‘natural 
theology,’ which is a philosophy of natme and springs from metaphysics, that is, the 
philosophy of being.”® The quest for this order of knowledge arises fiom the desire 
within every human to loiow the tmth and to understand the meaning of life.
Unlike philosophy, faith is based upon God’s testimony in his self-revelation of 
salvation for the world. The Second Vatican Council defined faith as a “pai'ticulai' 
response on the part of mankind to God’s revelation of liimself.”  ^The Constitution on 
Divine Revelation states, “Before this faith can be exercised, man must have the grace 
of God to move and assist him; he must have the interior helps of the Holy Spirit, who 
moves the heart and converts it to God.. . .  The same Holy Spirit constantly perfects 
faitli by his gifts, so that Revelation may be more and profomidly imderstood.”®
On the other hand, theology and philosophy are not mutually exclusive. John 
Paul wrote:
The relationship between theology and philosophy is best constmed as a
circle. Theology’s somce and stai'ting-point must always be the word of
^FR, 22.
^FR, 56.
" FR, 47.
 ^God, 40.
^Sources, 19.
^DV,5.
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God revealed in history, while its final goal will be an understandmg of 
that word which increates with each passing generation. Yet since God’s 
word is Truth, the human seat'ch for tmth—philosophy, pursued in 
keeping with its own rules*®—can only help to understand God’s word 
better. It is not just a question of theological discoui'se using this or that 
concept or element of a philosophical construct; what matters most is 
that the believer’s reason use its powers of reflection in the search for 
tmth which moves from the word of God towards a better imderstanding 
of it.**
The tmth of revelation completes and perfects the truth attained through reason. And 
philosophy provides the thought-sti*uctm*es for the imderstanding of faith.*® For 
example, moral theology requires a sound philosophical vision of hmnan natm'e and 
society.*®
Ralph Mclnerny points out one problem wiüi John Paul’s approach to faith and 
reason, especially in his encyclical, Fides et Ratio, is that, prior to any formal 
philosophising, John Paul assmned certain norms which provide a reference point for 
measming particular philosophical systems.*'* For example, he condemns frdeism and 
radical traditionalism because they distrust reason’s natmal capacities. In addition, he 
condemns rationalism and ontologism for attributing to natmal reason a loiowledge, 
which only the light of faith could confer.*® He condemns these systems based upon his 
philosophical commitment to the analogia entis and the Thomist philosophy of being. 
Within this system, the hmnan person is affiiined as fr ee and intelligent, with the 
capacity to loiow God, truth, and goodness. In addition, frmdamental moral norms 
provide a basis for social doctrine. In this encyclical, these ‘rules’ or norms provide that 
basis by which to assess other systems. Upon what basis may Thomistic metaphysics 
claim superiority over other philosophies? How does one know that the human reason
Aquinas would characterise these elements: (1) the principle of contradiction, (2) the principle of 
finality, (3) the principle of causality, (4) Human person as free and intelligent, (Ù  with the capacity to 
know God, truth, and goodness, (6) fundamental moral norms. Ralph Mclnerny, '‘Fides et Ratio " a paper 
presented at The Thomistic Seminar for the Jacques Maritam Centre, (Notre Dame: University of Notie 
Dame, 1999), section 2, page 3.
FR, 73. Cf. God 217: “Therefore, if methodical investigation within every branch of learning is carried 
out in a genuinely scientific mamier and in accord with moral norms, it never truly conflicts with faith. 
For earthly matters and the concerns of faith derive fr om the same God.”
^^FR, 77.
FR, 68.
FR, 4. In 'Fides et Ratio,'" part 2 page 4. See also Cyril O’Regan, “Christian Scholarship . . .  For 
What?” a paper presented at an International, Interdisciplinaiy Conference, session: the Problem of 
Catholic Scholarship, University of Notre Dame, September 27-29, 2001.
^^ FR, 52.
60
of Aquinas may provide a foundation forjudging other philosophical assumptions? In 
the areas where metaphysics and rationalism critique one another, upon what basis can 
John Paul claim that one is right and one is wrong? Does he make tliis claim upon the 
basis of previously assumed nouns such as the principle of contradiction? Does this not 
lead to a circular argument that one may only find her way out of through the light of 
revelation?
A second critique fi om the Protestant perspective of Alvin Plantinga addresses 
the problem of sin. Plantinga wi'ote, “What the Catholic view neglects here, according 
to this Reformed rejoinder, is the fact that non-Christian philosophy is not merely 
handicapped by the ‘inherent weakness of human reason’; it is rather that philosophers, 
like humanity in general, are fallen, and in need of conversionC^^ According to 
refoiined doctrine, the fall both separated humans from God and destroyed their 
capacity to gain loiowledge about God apart fr om God’s generous revelation. John Paul 
refeiTed to the effect of sin upon reason as an impairment caused by the hmnan’s 
aversion to God. “All men and women were caught up in this primal disobedience, 
which so womided reason that fr om then on its path to full tmth would be strewn with 
obstacles.”*® The ascent of the creatme to God made possible through “the careful and 
persevering reading of the witness of created things” by hmnan reason has become 
more difficult.*^ Plantinga critiques Faith and Reason for underestimating the place of 
sin, apostasy, and the rejection of Chiistian tmth by non-Clnistian philosophers. He 
writes.
It isn’t that the result of sin, with respect to om* intellectual capacities, is 
just that we lost a supematmal addition to our natural faculties, those 
natural faculties themselves frmctioning more or less as before. It is 
rather tliat (a) our natural faculties themselves suffered substantially 
fr om the results of sin, so that om* ability to Imow omselves, others, and 
God has been damaged, and (b) by virtue of our comiption, we are 
inclined to set ourselves against God.*®
Plantinga also critiques John Paul’s optimism regai'ding the possibilities for
philosophical inquiry. Plantinga offers for evidence the incompatibility of most of
Alvin Plantinga, “Philosophers respond to Pope John Paul IPs Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio," 
Christianity Today International/Books and Culture Magazine 5, no. 4 (July/August 1999):32.
” FR, 22.
God, 43.
Plantinga, "Fides," 36.
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modem philosophy with Christian theism. According to Plantinga, these philosophies 
are not incomplete approximations to Chiistian tmth; they are antithetical to it.®®
In his critique Plantinga did not acknowledge that John Paul addiessed this 
incompatibility in his discussion of the warning of Paul to the Colossians: “See to it 
that no one takes you captive tlirough philosophy and empty deceit, according to human 
tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the imiverse and not according to 
Cluist.”®* John Paul argued that these words are appropriate when applied to esoteric 
superstition that is widespread today. He agreed that one must “sound the alarm when 
confronted with a cultural perspective that sought to subordinate the tmth of Revelation 
to the inteipretation of the philosophers”®® and he did critique systems of thought which 
aie opposed to God, such as Niliilism. Where Jolm Paul would differ from Plantinga is 
in his assumption that humans have the capacity to loiow God and tmth and the effect 
that this assumption has on his approach to anti-Cluistian philosophies such as 
Mai'xism. As seen in the previous chapters, Wojtyla sought to diaw the truths from 
these pliilosophical systems, sought to listen to the questions being asked in these 
systems, and he sought to influence these systems, such as phenomenology, with the 
tmths of revelation.
These critiques provide insight in two aieas. First, a frmdamental difference 
between Protestant and Catholic epistemology is based upon two different 
interpretations of the fall and the capacity or incapacity of hmnanity which resulted. 
Second, while Plantinga does neglect certain nuances of John Paul’s interaction with 
anti-Cluistian philosophies, his critique brings a needed realism to the optimism which 
dominates Fides et Ratio, with regard to the compatibility of Clnistian and non- 
Chiistian philosophies. Mclnerny’s criticism questions Jolm Paul’s basis for evaluating 
these systems, hi conclusion, the relation between faith and reason is gi'ounded in the 
notion of the analogia entis, in which humans can know tmth about God without his 
self-revelation. This relationship with truth demonstrates the true dignity of humans and 
forms the basis for John Paul’s utilisation of natural law.
Plantinga, "Fides," 35. 
FR, 37.
37.
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The Trinity and Moral Law Reveal Dignity
In the previous section, we explored John Paul’s foundation for human dignity 
in the capacity for human reason to ascertain truth by philosophical inquiry and 
theological revelation. The remainder of this work will focus upon the implications of 
divine revelation for human personhood and social doctiine because revelation 
“completes and perfects” the ti'uth laiown tluough reason.®® John Paul believed that 
“man caiuiot be manifest in the frill dignity of his natui'e without reference . . .  to 
God.”®'* God’s self-revelation also reveals the mystery of humanity.
Wliat does God reveal about himself? He reveals that he is Triune and that he is 
holy. According to John Paul, God reveals himself in scripture as Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. God’s fatherhood is manifested in merciful love and expressed in divine 
providence.®® Cluist is the Son of the living God, who is one with the Father and 
reveals the Father to humankind. Jolui Paul affmned the Nicene-Constantinopolitan 
Creed by saying that the son is “God fr om God, Light from Light, true God from true 
God, begotten, not made, one in Being with the Father,.. "®^ The Holy Spirit proceeds 
fr om the Father and the Son. The tiiime God exists in the unity of oneness while three 
distinct persons.
Second, God revealed himself to be holy. Jolui Paul identified the moral law 
with the will of the triime God. He defined God’s holiness as “absolute ‘separation’ 
fr om all moral evil, and the exclusion and radical rejection of sin and, at the same time, 
it is absolute goodness.” God himself is holiness because his will is identified with the 
moral law. “This law exists in God himself as in its eternal source, and therefore it is 
called Eternal Law.”®® God made himself laiown as the source of this moral law 
tluough the old covenant and the teachmg of Cluist. The human achieves dignity by 
living in accordance with this law, law which is known to all tluough reason.®^
With the exception of Avery Dulles’ Splendor o f Faith: The Theological Vision o f Pope John Paul II, 
(New York: Crossroad, 1999), veiy little work has been done on Jolm Paul IPs theology. Wliile Fides et 
Ratio and his moral encyclicals attracted more scholarly interaction, the level o f engagement with the 
shape of his theology (except for Mariology) remains relatively low.
"“DM, 1.
God, 158.
God, 168.
God, 190-191. Cf. Augustine, LexAeterna and Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 93, a. 1.
VS, 42. Cf. GS, 17.
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God’s revelation shows tlie superiority of the law of love, for he himself is love. 
According to John Paul, “Love means precisely this—to will the good, to adhere to the 
good. From this eternal will of the Good there gushes forth the infinite goodness of God 
in regal'd to creatuies and, in particular, in regal'd to man. Love is the origin of God’s 
clemency, of his readiness to give freely and to pardon.”®® Likewise, in the greatest 
commandment, “You shall love” the human finds a “precise expression of the singular 
dignity of the human person” because it reveals the goodness of true humanity implied 
by this essential duty.®®
God the Creator Gives Dignity
The fact that humanity is created by God, in the image of God, reveals the 
imique dignity of human persons. This section will first examine the significance of 
God in himself, God as being. Then we will tuin to God’s loving creation of the world 
and the extension of his being to hmnan persons. By his special creation of humans in 
his image, God has conferred a profoimd dignity to humanity. We will examine the 
moral implications of this dignity.
The Being and Mystery o f God
In his catechesis on God, Jolm Paul examines the first article of the creed, “I 
believe in God the Father almighty, creator...” This article affirms belief that God has 
made himself known to human persons; he is a personal God who has “revealed 
himself and made known the hidden purpose of his will.”®* This behef in God 
expresses the conviction that God exists, for only one who really exists can reveal 
himself.®® John Paul said, "He who is expresses the very essence of God, which is self-
God, 192.
VS, 13. John Paul explained regarding this commandment, “”We find a precise expression of the 
singular dignity of the human person, ‘the only creatine that God has wanted for its own sake’ (GS, 24). 
The different commandments of the Decalogue are really only so many reflections of the one 
commandment about the good of the person, at die level o f tlie many different goods which characterise 
his identity as a spiritual and bodily being in relationship with God, with his neighbour and with the 
material world. As we read the Catechism of the catholic Church, “the Ten Commandments are part of 
God’s Revelation. At the same time, they teach us man’s hue humanity. They shed light on the essential 
duties, and so indirectly on the fundamental rights, inherent in the natiu e of the human person.’” 
Catechism o f the Catholic Church, (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1994), No. 2070.
G o d ,m .D V ,2 .
The existence o f God is accessible to human reason because God makes himself visible thr ough his 
works The Psalmist writes, “The heavens proclaim the glory of God” (Ps. 19:2). In addition, the 
existence of God thr ough faith has a rational character which reason can investigate. God,. 114-116.
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existence, subsistent Being.”®® Because he is subsisting being {esse subsistens), God 
cannot not be, he is necessary being. The things that receive existence from God are 
contingent beings. Being does not constitute their essence.®'* As the absolute fullness of 
Being, God is completely transcendent in regard to the world; he is the God of infinite 
majesty before whom humans bend in humility and adoration.®®
Jolm Paul said, “The essence of God—which is the divinity—is found to be 
outside every category of genus and species which we use in our definitions. So the 
essence of God cannot be enclosed in any definition. If, in our thought about God, with 
the category of ‘being,’ we use the analogy of being, with this we bring out the ‘non­
resemblance’ much more than the resemblance. We bring out the incompaiability much 
more than the comparability of God with the creatme.”®^ As discussed in the previous 
chapter, in the tradition of the Catholic chinch, the analogia entis provided the basis for 
humans to gain loiowledge about God. In this doctrine, however, John Paul emphasised 
the difference and the inability of the human to totally comprehend God in his majesty. 
Pie wrote, “The human intellect, inasmuch as it possesses a certain idea of God, and 
although it has been elevated significantly, tlirough the revelation of the Old and New 
Covenant, to a deeper and more complete loiowledge of his mystery, is unable to 
comprehend God adequately and exhaustively.”®® Thus, while the analogy of heing 
gives humans access to knowledge of God’s existence and to his essence (to some 
degree), the revelation of God in scripture is necessary for a more complete knowledge, 
because of the “non-resemblance” of God’s majesty. Yet even scripture does not 
provide the complete knowledge of God, for while he is loiown he is also 
incomprehensible. ® ^
God's Extension o f Himself in Love
According to Jolm Paul, God has revealed himself as eternity and as the fullness 
of life, the Spirit who is immense and invisible. He wi'ote, “As an infinitely perfect 
spirit he is the absolute fullness of Truth and Goodness, and he desires to give himself.
God, 117.
God, 120.
God, 121.
123.
God, 123.
God, 125. Echoes Karol Wojtyla’s studies of St. John of the Cross.
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Goodness extends itself: bonum est diffusivum W .”®® He extended himself to 
hmnanldnd thi'ough covenant: first with Adam and Eve, then with No all, with 
Abraliam, and finally in Jesus Chi'ist/® He extended himself first in creation and then in 
redemption because God is Love. According to Jolm Paul, “tlie truth that God is love 
constitutes the apex of all that has been revealed.”'**
God’s creation demonstrates his wisdom moved by love. He created heaven and 
earth; everything existing outside of God has been called into existence or made of out 
nothing by him. Because the creature has been created by God, God is in the creature 
and the creature is in him. Yet this immanence does not diminish God’s 
transcendence.'*®
Creation is the work of the Trinity, the creation of the world is the work of 
Love. John Paul said, “A created gift, the universe springs from the Uncreated Gift [the 
Holy Spirit], fiom the reciprocal Love of the Father and Son, from the Most Holy 
Trinity.”'*® The revelation of the wisdom and of the love of God is the first and principle 
end of creation.'*'*
The Imago Dei as the Basis for Dignity
Witliin this beloved creation, humans have special dignity because they are
created in the image of God. The human is the creatm e who God chose for himself, in
his openness to integiation and social coimnunion.'*® John Paul explains,
Man is created for immortality. He does not cease to be the image of 
God after sin, even though he is subjected to death. He bears in himself 
the reflection of God’s power, which is manifested especially in the 
faculty of intelligence and free will, Man is an autonomous subject. He
God, 135. Bnom Summa Theologia I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2.
God, 140-141. JP writes, “The God of the covenant is the God ‘who gives himself in a mysterious 
way— the God of revelation and tlie God of grace. He not only makes himself known to man, but he 
makes him a sharer in the divine nature (2 Pet 1:4).”
God, 144.
“As Creator, God is in a certain sense ‘outside’ of created being and what is created is ‘outside’ of 
God, At the same time the creature fully and completely owes to God its own existence (its bemg what it 
is), because the creatme has its origin fhlly and completely from the power of God. Tluough this creative 
power (onuiipotence) God is in the creature and tlie creature is in him. However, this divine immanence 
in no way diminishes God’s transcendence in regard to eveiything to which he gives existence.” God, 
202 .
God. 211.
215.
DP, 43.
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is the source of his own actions, while maintaining the characteristics of 
dependence upon God, the Creator (ontological contingency)/^
Thus, the human person is the glory of the Creator and he has been created to become a
mouthpiece of God’s glory. According to John Paul, the imago Dei is the basis of the
special dignity of human life and the foundation for human morality.'*®
The Moral Significance o f the Imago Dei
hi relation to creatines, the imago Dei means that the human is called into 
existence as subject; she is endowed with intellectual consciousness and freedom. Each 
human has within herself an essential relation to tmth that deteiinines her character as a 
transcendent being. She is capable of discernment between tmth and non-truth.
In addition, the hmnan has freedom of her will. John Paul said, “Human acts 
bear within themselves the sign of self-deteimination of will and of choice. The whole 
sphere of morality derives fr om tliis. Man is capable of choosing between good and 
evil, sustained in this by the voice of conscience, which impels him to good and 
restrains him from evil.”'*^ Thus the divine image inscribes both fr eedom and tmth in 
the stmctm e of the human person and fr om these aspects of hmnanity, the sphere of 
morality is derived.
In liis discussion of tmth and fi'eedom in Veritatis Splendor, John Paul argued 
that there could be no morality without freedom. “Genuine fi'eedom is an outstanding 
manifestation of the divine image in man. For God willed to leave man ‘in the power of 
his comisel’ (Sir. 15:14) so that he would seek his Creator of his own accord and would 
freely anive at full and blessed perfection by cleaving to God.”'*®
Does John Paul’s notion of freedom mean that a human person determines what 
is morally right or wi'ong according to “his own comisel”? Certainly not, for Veritatis 
Splendor reacts against tliis very sepai ation of morality from theology.®® hi that
God, 223.
“"DP, 36. See also VS, 13 and God, 224. Essential to the elements of the image of God in humanity are 
“the capacity for self-knowledge, the experinece of man’s own being in the world, the need to fill his 
solitude, his dependence on God.” God, 223.
God, 232-3.
GS, 17; VS, 34.
In his essay, “Natural Law and Catholic Moral Thinldng,” Russell Hittinger tiaced the connection 
between moral doctrine and theology in the early Catholic church, up to its discomiection in die modem 
era. He argues that tlie primary purpose of Veritatis Splendor was to reconnect the foundations of moral 
theology with theology. In A Presei-ving Grace, Michael Cromartie, ed., (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1997), 2-26.
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encyclical, Jolm Paul ai*gues that heedom is dependent upon truth. God alone decides 
what is good and what is evil. A human person is free because he can understand, 
accept, and obey God’s commands.^^ Thus, Jolm Paul believes that there is a hatuial 
moral law authored by God. These moral norms are “rational—thus universally 
understandable and commimicable.”^^  The human person does not establish moral 
norms for himself. Rather, he participates in the eternal law of God.
John Paul defined the natural law as “nothing other than the light of 
understanding infused in us by God, whereby we understand what must be done and 
what must be avoided—God gave this light and this law to man at creation.”^^  
Elsewhere he explained the connection of natural law with creation, “The natural moral 
law expresses and lays down the purposes, rights, and duties which are based upon the 
bodily and spiritual natiue of the human person. Therefore this law camiot be thought 
of as simply a set of nouns on the biological level, rather it must be defined as the 
rational order whereby man is called by his Creator to direct and regulate his life and 
actions and in particular to make use of his own body.” "^^ The human’s genuine moral 
autonomy means the acceptance of this moral law and obedience to it. Does this law 
imply moral heteronomy? John Paul argues that it does not because (1) the norms am 
not imposed but infused in liis being and (2) each human is held responsible for his own 
self-detennination.
Praxis: Participation in God’s Kingdom
One final emphasis of Jolm Paul’s Doctrine of God is God’s divine providence 
established in the coming of his Kingdom. According to Jolm Paul, divine providence 
refers to the presence and activity of God in the world and in tlie history of every 
creature. Scripture is the supreme document of God’s providence because it manifests
VS, 35. “Revelation teaches that the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to 
man, but to God alone. The man is certainly free, inasmuch as he can understand and accept God’s 
commands. And he possesses an extremely far-reaching freedom, since he can eat “of eveiy tree of the 
garden”. But his freedom is not imlimited; it must halt before the ‘tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil,’ for it is called to accept the moral law given by God. In fact, human freedom finds its authentic and 
complete ftilfilment precisely in the acceptance of that law.”
VS, 36.
PiS, 40. Quoted from Thomas Aquinas, in Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decern Legis Praecepta. 
Prologus: Opuscula Theologica, II, No. 1129, Ed. Taminen. (1954), 245.
VS, 50. Quoted from The Congregation for the Doctiine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human 
Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation Donum Vitae (Feb 22, 1987), Introduction  ^3; AAS80 
(1988), 74.
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God’s intervention in nature by creation and by redemption, loving man and calling 
him to paiticipate in His plan. One aspect of God’s providence is his “conservation”, 
namely by “maintaining in existence all that has had being from nothing.”^^  Secondly, 
divine providence canies out an eternal plan of wisdom and love by governing the 
created world and “the ways of human s o c i e ty .H e  has given creatures autonomy 
thi'ough their “dominion” over the world. By participating in the Creator’s dominion, 
man becomes “in a certain sense ‘providence’ for himself, according to the beautiful 
expression of St. Th o m as .T h u s ,  humans have a pailiculai* responsibility before God 
and creatures, especially their fellow humans.
Jolm Paul then posed the question, “If God is present and operating in 
everything, how can man be fi'ee?” He calls this meeting point of God’s plan with 
human fr eedom a mystery. The human person is called upon to develop the world 
tlnough her work. Her ethical work, in pai*ticular, brings the Kingdom of God to 
fulfilment in the created world. However, God pennits human sin which opposes his 
plan and which is the consequence of the abuse of created fi eedom.^^
God resolved this abuse by choosing human persons to participate in the 
sonship of Christ by grace, even before he willed creation. God “desires all men to be 
saved and to come to the Icnowledge of the truth. Thus, his divine providence is 
expressed in the eternal plan of salvation.
How is evil understood in light of tliis divine providence? John Paul 
distinguished physical evil (natiual disasters or physical disability) from moral evil. 
Moral evil depends on free will and implies guilt. While God does not will evil, he 
tolerates it in view of a greater good.^® This good is redemption and salvation through 
the cross of Clnist. As will be discussed in greater detail in further sections, CMst 
embraced the suffering of hmnanity caused by evil and he overcame evil itself. Divine 
providence must be understood within the whole context of God’s predestination and
God. 244.
God, 250, quoted from 2)773.
God, 252. Of. Summa Theologica I, 22, 2, ad 4. 
God, 257-60.
God, 263-4. Quotation from 1 Timothy 2:4.
“  God, 270-272.
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salvation and its realisation in human history. God has eternally intended to realise the
Kingdom of God in the history of this world, upon the basis of Clnist.
These beliefs have cleai* implications for the human person’s task as
“investigator and ruler of the forces of natuie.”^^  As the world evolves and human
persons seek to progress, the problem of sin “jumbles” the order of values and the
world ceases to be a place of true brotherhood. Thus, the human needs to aclmowledge
God and to will the moral progi ess of humanity in order to create a “more human”
world. Jolm Paul quoted from Gaudium et Spes:
While earthly progress must be cai'efully distinguished fram the growth 
of God’s Kingdom, to the extent that the former can contribute to the 
better ordering of human society, it is of vital concern to the Kingdom of 
God. For after we have obeyed the Lord, and in his Spirit nurtiued on 
earth the values of human dignity, brotherhood and fi eedom, and indeed 
of all the good finits of our nature and enteiprise, we will find them 
again, but freed of stain, burnished and transfigured, when Christ hands 
over to the father: ‘a kingdom eternal and universal, a kingdom of truth 
and life, of holiness and grace, of justice, love and peace.’ On this earth 
that kingdom is already present in mystery. Wlien the Lord returns it 
will be brought into full flower.
God’s Spirit directs the unfolding of time and he acts in history. With the help of God’s
grace, each human co-operates in this growth of the Kingdom, towards the liistorical
and eschatological fulfilment of the plan of divine Providence.^"*
Conclusion: The Doctrine of God and Human Dignity
In conclusion to this section on God the Father, Jolm Paul argued that a 
profoimd dignity is confen ed upon humanity on account of the imago Dei. This 
doctrine, built upon the concept of God’s triune being, first means that humans ai*e 
capable of knowing the truth and distinguishing between good and evil tlirough natiual 
reason. This reason is not independent fi'om revelation as Jolm Paul explained, “man is 
able to recognise good and evil thanks to that discenmient of good from evil which he 
himself cairied out by Divine Revelation and by faith, through the law that God gave to 
the chosen people.”*’^
God, 111.
God, 283.
GS, 39.
God, 287-288.
VS, 42.
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Second, the imago Dei means that human are autonomous; they may “freely do 
good or avoid evil.”^^  The legitimate autonomy of creation, however, involves 
obedience to the will of the Creator, the origin of moral law. He quoted from Gaudium 
et Spes:
If by the autonomy of earthly affairs we mean that created tilings and 
societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which must be 
gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men, then it is entirely 
right to demand that autonomy. Such is not merely required by modem 
man, but harmonises also with the will of the Creator. For by the very 
circumstance of their having been created, all things are endowed with 
their own stability, tmth, goodness, proper laws, and order.
The human pai'ticipates creatively in the legitimate autonomy of earthly things to the
extent that he seeks to “discover, exploit and order” the laws and values of the
cosmos.^^ Humans practice legitimate autonomy tlirough obedience to the Creator and
in accordance with the laws endowed by him, which are accessible to human reason.
Thus, people create a “more human” world by working in obedience to the moral law
and, by implication, in participation with God’s divine providence.
Theological Basis;
Raised to a Dignity Beyond Compare in Jesus Christ
According to John Paul, the imago Dei reveals the intrinsic dignity of humanity 
and brought humans into participation with God’s providential reign, in service to 
humanity. Yet the incarnation, death, and resun ection of Jesus Chiist has raised 
humans to a dignity beyond any comparison. Jesus Christ, the son of God became a 
human person of history. The incarnation of the son of God established human dignity; 
his mission of salvation affimied human dignity; and the redemption wrought by him 
brought humans into a familial relation with God, as daughters and sons, participants in 
the sonship of Jesus Clnist and people who live in the likeness of Clnist’s human 
model. This second section will explore these implications of the person and work of 
Clnist for John Paul’s anthropology. First, however, we examine the problem that
VS, 42.
GS, 36; Affirmed by John Paul in God, 216-217.
God, 219; Cf. GS, 36. Must discuss later what Barth was opposing when argued tliat humans are only 
autonomous in Cln ist and compare this to IP’s understanding of autonomy.
® God, 218. JP wrote, “Therefore, if methodical investigation within every branch of learning is carried 
out in a genuinely scientific manner and in accord with moral norms, it never truly conflicts with faith. 
For earthly matters and the concerns of faith derive fr om the same God.”
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necessitated Clnist’s life and work and that perpetuates acts of injustice: the problem of 
human sin.
The Mystery of Sin
According to John Paul, “sin robs man, in various ways, of the decisive element 
of his true dignity—that of the dignity and likeness of God.^ ** Scripture describes the 
first sin in the story of creation. In the visible world, each human received his existence 
as a gift— “as the ‘image and likeness of God,’ a rational being, endowed with intellect 
and will.” *^ The human person was originally innocent and righteous because he 
possessed sanctifying giace and supernatural gifts fr om God.^  ^From the beginning, the 
Creator revealed himself as (1) God of the covenant, of friendship and happiness and 
(2) the source of good and the source of distinguishing between good and evil.^  ^
However, the human, by his fr ee choice, rejected the truth of God’s command; in pride 
he rebelled against the trutli of his existence, the subordination of creature to Creator; 
by yielding to the temptation to be “like God,” the hmnan became slave and accomplice 
to rebellious spirits. "^* Jolm Paul explained the concept of sin as the choice of self over 
God, '"contemptus Dei, rejection of God, contempt of God, hatred of everything 
comiected with God or that comes fr om God.”^^
What does Jolm Paul understand to be the impact of sin upon individuals and 
society?
1. The Universality of Sin in Human History. Through the original sin of Adam, sin 
“invaded” the whole world and infected all of humanity.
2. The Hereditaiy Character of Sin. This sinful situation is repeated fiom generation to 
generation in personal and social life. “The sin of Adam, which by origin is unique and 
transmitted by generation and not by way of imitation is present in all and proper to 
each.”^^  Because of Adam’s sin, man is “conceived and born without sanctifying grace.
™ Jesus, Son, and Saviour: A Catechesis on the Creed. Vol. 2. (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 
1996), 69.
Jesus, 23.
Jesus, 24.
”  Jesus, 25; Genesis 2:16-17.
Jesus ,30-31.
”  Jesus, 31.
Jesus, 33.
77 Jesus, 45.
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It is precisely this ‘initial state’ of man, linlced to his origin, that constitutes the essence 
of original sin as a legacy.”^^
3. The Interiority of Sin. The root of sin is in the interior of the person, in his 
conscience and in his heart. “Examining his heait, man finds that he has inclination 
toward evil too, and is engulfed by manifold ills which cannot come from his good 
Creator.”^^
4. The Human Person’s Loss of Sanctifying Grace. Jolm Paul wrote, “Man in the 
begiiming (in the state of original justice) spoke to the Creator with friendship and 
confidence in the whole tmth of his spiritual—corporeal being, created in God’s image. 
But now he has lost the basis of that friendship and covenant. He has lost the grace of 
sharing in God’s life the good of belonging to him in the holiness of the original 
relationship of subordination and sonship.According to John Paul, “Original sin in 
Adam’s descendants does not have the character of personal guilt.” *^ Rather, tlirough 
the privation of sanctifying gi'ace, human nature has been diverted fi'om its supernatural 
end, and the holiness and justice in which they were constituted fiom the begiiming was 
lost.^ ^
5. The Mortal Consequence of Sin. The result of their sin was the pimishment of death 
as we now laiow it.^ ^
6. Implications of Sin for Human Morality. The deterioration of the human’s physical
nature is paralleled by the deterioration of his spiritual faculties, the darkening of the
intellect’s capacity to know truth and the wealcening of free will to choose tlie good.
John Paul explained:
According to the Church’s teacliing, it is a case of a relative and not an 
absolute deterioration, not intrinsic to the human faculties. Even after 
original sin, man can loiow by his intellect the fundamental natuial and 
religious tmths, and the moral principles. He can also perform good 
works. One should therefore speak rather of a darkening of the intellect 
and of a weakening of the will, of ‘wounds’ of the spiritual and sensitive
^ Jesus, 46.
Jesus, 36; Quoted from GS, 13. 
Jesus, 40.
81 Jesus, 45. 
Jesus, 41, 45. 
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faculties, and not of a loss of their essential capacities, even in relation 
to the Icnowledge and love of God.^ "*
According to John Paul, this doctrine, affiimed by the Council of Trent, opposes the
Lutheran account of sin. “The Council of Trent teaches that as a result of Adam’s sin,
man has not lost free will. He can therefore perform acts which have an authentic moral
value—good or evil.”^^  Why, then, was Christ necessary? Jolm Paul explained
“Without Clirist’s help, fallen man is incapable of directing himself to the supernatmal
goods which constitute his total fulfilment and salvation.”^^
Because of sin, human nature bears a “spark of sin,” or “concupiscence” which
inclines the human person to evil and is the source of the inclination to personal (or
actual) sin. John Paul explained that the “spark” of sin “continues in man justified by
Clnist, therefore even after holy Baptism.”^^  The contrast between the moral dimension
of the Catholic doctrine of sin and Barth’s Protestant interpretation will be compared in
greater detail in the final chapter. Of most importance for our present purposes is John
Paul’s emphasis that after the fall, humans retain free will. Sin is an act of the person,
“a conscious and free act—which is opposed to the moral norm (to God’s will), to the
law, to the commandment, and ultimately to conscience.”^^
7. The Social Dimension of Sin. Because of the “spark” left by original sin, many
personal sins are committed. These form an “envirormient of sin” which creates
conditions for new sins and attracts other himians to sin. Hmnan initiatives, institutions,
cultm'es, and social environments ar e also “infected” by this sin. They bear* the imprint
of sin.^  ^Thus, every hmnan sin is a social sin because it affects others in the same way.
Jolm Paul located the solution to this problem in Jesus Christ, the Son and the
Saviour. His writings concern themselves with the person of Clirist in his identity, with
the mission of Clnist in bringing salvation to the world and with Clnist’s redemptive
work. We will look at these tlnee aspects of Clnist as they affirm human dignity.
Jesus, 51-52. 
Jesus, 52. 
Jesus, 52. 
Jesus, 52. 
Jesus, 63, 
Jesus, 64.
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The Identity of Christ: True God and True Human
In affimiation of the Nicene Creed, John Paul believed that Christ recognised 
himself as the true God and the tme Man. He proclaimed himself to be God.^ ** John 
confirmed his full divinity in the prologue to his gospel in which he declared Christ’s 
divine pre-existence.^* As God the Son who is con-substantial with the Father and the 
Holy Spirit, Christ claimed divine attributes such as truth, life, redeemer, judge, 
lawgiver, object of faith, and forgiver of sins.^^
According to Jolm Paul, Jesus is also the true human. Tlnough incarnation, he 
took flesh and human nature. He grew and became strong, suffered fatigue, torture, and 
death, and he returned to life in his own human body through the resmTection. As 
Gaudium et Spes confirmed, “By his Incarnation the Son of God has united himself in 
some fasliion with every human person. He worked with hmnan hands, he thought with 
a human mind, acted by human choice and loved with a hmnan heart. Born of the 
Virgin Mary, he has truly been made one of us, like us in all things except sin.”^^
According to Jolm Paul, the incarnation reveals the gr eat dignity of humans. 
First, his assmnption of hmnanity (rather than his absorption of humanity) united Christ 
with each hmnan, raising humans to “a dignity beyond compare.” "^* Second, though he 
was without sin, Jesus sought the company of simiers because of his love for humanity 
and his mission to bring salvation to the world. He voluntarily emptied himself so that 
he could restore himians to their original dignity.^^ We tmn now to examine his mission 
more fully.
The Mission of Jesus Christ in History
From his birth into human history, Jesus became the fulfilment of God’s plan of 
salvation for his people, Israel, the people of which Jesus is a son. Jesus fiilfilled the 
messianic prophesies and the covenant of God in the history of salvation; he brought 
about the transition from the “old” to tire “new” by bringing the law to fulfilment.^*^
See T am’ statements of Jolm 8, Mt. 28, and Luke 24. 
Jesus, 212.
Jesus, 216-243.
GS 22; Jesus, 300.
Jesus, 310-312.
Jesus, 105-106.
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Clnist marked this transition as the messiali (the “anointed” sent by God), fulfilling the 
thr eefold office of the old covenant: King, Priest, and Prophet. Thus, Christ fulfilled the 
messianic plan outlined in the Old Testament by coming “as tme man among men,” a 
son of Israel.^^
Yet tliis human person, Jesus, was also the Son of God, chosen by God and 
entmsted for a particular mission.^^ He is a representative of God and a Son of God, not 
in the metaphorical sense but in a natural sense. As the divine Son, Jesus revealed the 
Father.^^ God himself speaks of himself through the Son. The prologue of Jolm’s 
gospel provides the decisive point of faith: “The Word became flesh and came to dwell 
among us.”***** Jolm Paul used the Nicene confession to affirm his “faith in the Son of 
God, who is ‘one in being with the Father’ as eternal Word, eternally ‘begotten,’ ‘God 
from God and Light from Light,’ in no way created.”**** Thus, the Son existed in 
intimate union with the Father, in unity of essence, and sent into the world for a 
particular mission and ministry.
The mission with which Christ was entnrsted concerned the salvation of 
humanity. This saving mission was carried out in the power of the Holy Spirit. John 
Paul wr ote, “Jesus Christ the Son of God, who was sent into the world by the Father, 
became man by the power of the Holy Spirit in the womb of Mary, the Virgin of 
Nazareth. As man, he fulfilled his messianic mission unto the cross and resinrection, in 
the power of the Holy Spirit.”***^ After frilfilling this mission, he retiuiied to the Father 
and he sent upon the church the same Spirit. Thus, his mission revealed the Trinity, the 
mrity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, in the history of Israel and humanldnd.
Christ's Mission as Prophet
hr his description of the mission of Christ on behalf of humanity, John Paul 
focused upon his prophetic and Idngly offices,***^  As prophet, Clirist came to proclaim
Jesus, 145. 
Jesus, 146. 
Jesus, 150-152. 
Jesus, 164. 
Jesus, 165.
102Jesus, 196.
While the priesthood of Christ does play a role m Jolm Paul’s description o f the mission of Chiist, he 
only mentions the priesthood twice in his catechises on redemption and he does not link the priesthood 
with human dignity. Thus, I would disagree with Avery Dulles’ statement that the priesthood plays a
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the Good News so that people could believe in him and be saved. The good news is
God’s gift of grace and truth, it is Clnist himself. John Paul wrote, “Those who
believed in him followed what he preached, but still more they followed the preacher.
They followed Jesus because he offered the ‘words of life’”***"* He testified to the truth
of God and God’s love for humanity, realised in Jesus Christ. Regarding this prophetic
revelation of Clnist, Jolm Paul quoted Dominum et Vivificantem:
He perfected revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work of 
making himself present and manifesting himself: thr ough his words and 
deeds, his signs and wonders, but especially through his death and 
glorious resmTection from the dead and final sending of the Spirit of 
tmth. Moreover he confirmed with divine testimony what revelation 
proclaimed, that God is with us to free us fr om the dar kness of sin and 
death, and to raise us up to life eternal.***^
Thus, Christ fulfilled the prophetic office tlnough his proclamation of God, manifest in
his incarnation, life, death, and resmTection.
Christ's Mission as King
In his kingly office, Christ amromiced and established the Kingdom of God.
John Paul explained that with his “‘obedience unto death,’***^ Jesus began a new phase 
of the economy of salvation, whose process will end when God will be ‘all in all.’***^ 
Therefore the Kingdom of God has tr*uly begun to be realised in the history of humanity 
and of the world.”***^ hr the tradition of the Catholic church, John Paul linked the 
Kingdom of God to the paschal mystery in which sin was conquered and Clirist became 
victorious over Satan’s power in the world and in hmnan lives.***^  For Christ not only 
announced the Kingdom, he also eliminated the essential obstacle to its realisation: 
sin.**** He liberates humanity from the evil of sin, rooted by heredity in hmnanity.
sti'ong role in Jolm Paul’s understanding of the redemption. Due to limitations on space and the relatively 
small role Jolm Paul attributed to it, we will not include an examination of the priesthood of Christ. 
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Through his death and resurrection, salvation talces its beginning and the liberation of 
the Kingdom of God has begun its realisation in hmnan history.***
This Kingdom extends to all people and it is not political, but its growth takes 
place in the field of human hearts.**  ^According to John Paul, liberation in the social 
and political sense is not the tine messianic mission of Clnist. However, without the 
work of Clnist in the heart, without the liberation fiom sin and egoism, liberation in the 
socio-political sense is not possible. “Not merely external change of structures brings 
about a tiTie liberation of society, as long as man is subject to sin and lies, as long as the 
passions hold sway, and with them exploitation and the various forms of 
oppression.”**^
The constitutional basis for this Kingdom is the New Law, the law of love. All 
are called and invited into this Kingdom but each person is responsible for accepting or 
refusing the invitation, for his conformity or lack of conformity with this law.**"* Thus, 
the Kingdom of God requires this new justice; it requires commitment expressed in the 
doing of God’s will.**^
The Kingdom of God is now present in the world tlmough the followers of 
Chiist, tlnough the church.**  ^Clnist handed over the Kingdom that he had established 
to the apostles and gave them the authority to make disciples, affirming their dignity by 
this mission.**  ^The significance of this Kingdom for the economic and political 
spheres will be developed at a later point in this chapter. Having examined the person 
of Chiist and the mission of Chiist, we now turn the third theme that reveals the 
smpassing dignity of humanity: Clnist’s work of redemption.
The Mystery of Redemption
The redemption wrought by Clnist restored dignity to humanity because it fieed 
himians from the destructive nature of sin and restored meaning to human life, as life
Jesus, 393-4.
Jesus, 350-351.
Jesus, 399.
Jesus, 353.
Jesus, 134.
Jesus, 255,369.
DM, 16 and Jesus, 376, Jolm Paul claims tliat the Cliiu'cli-Kingdom o f God is endowed witli a 
ministerial and sacramental structure.
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with God.**  ^John Paul named two dimensions of redemption; divine and human. The 
divine aspect focuses upon the depth of God’s love and mercy expressed in the sacrifice 
of the Son. This dimension is of importance for our study because it reveals the 
significance of the cross for the human person and hmnan justice and because it reveals 
the new way of life opened up to humanity tlirough the resmTection that followed. In 
our examination of the divine dimension, we will pay special attention to the concepts 
of justification and participation because they are key doctrines that will differ with 
Protestant conceptions of justice and morality. The second dimension echoes Wojtyla’s 
early personalist interests because it deals with human assimilation of this new 
reality.**** The human discovers her dignity by realising her unity with God in Clnist. 
We now turn to examine these two dimensions.
The Divine Dimension o f Redemption
The primary theme of the divine dimension of redemption is the love and mercy 
of God the Father revealed in Jesus Clirist the Son. God, made manifest in Chiist, 
selves as the reference point for the dignity of the human; the human camiot be fully 
understood apart fr om Clnist. What tmths of the redemption are vital for imderstanding 
the human person? How does Chiist’s redemption affect the human person as she 
relates to society? First, Clnist reveals God’s love and mercy in a new way. This love 
restores dignity to humans. Secondly, this merciful redemption grants participation in 
the life of God.
The Significance of the Cross: Mercy and Justice
“Why Chiist’s cross?” Jolm Paul asked. Clnist’s sacrifice fulfilled God’s design
of love. Because he loves the world, he gave himself for the sins of the world. “The
‘price’ of our redemption” Jolm Paul explained, “is likewise a further proof of the value
that God himself sets on man and of oui* dignity in Christ.”*^** The cross also reveals the
love that overcomes justice:
It is a question of love which surpasses justice. Justice can investigate 
and catch up with the transgi'essor. If an iimocent person who is holy,
""DP, 10.
"^Beigel, 40. And DM, 7.
120 DP, 20.
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like Christ, is sentenced to suffering and death on a cross to fulfil the 
Father’s eternal design, it means that, in sacrificing his Son, God goes in 
a certain sense beyond the order of justice. He reveals himself in the 
Son, and, tlnough him, all the riches of his mercy— dives in 
misericordia^^ ^—as if to introduce, together with his crucified and risen 
Son, his mercy, his merciful love, in the story of the relations between 
God and man.*^^
God’s mercy was manifest in the Old Testament. And the Old Testament teaches that 
love is “greater” than justice in the sense that love is primaiy and fundamental. Love 
conditions justice and justice seives love.*^  ^However, the cross of Chiist introduces the 
mercy of God to a new degree because God has given his very self for the sin of 
humanity.
Clnist came “to give his life as a ransom for many.”*^"* As the one who had
committed no sin, he gave his life as a substitution for humanity, to free all fr om sin. hi
what sense is this substitution redemptive? Jolm Paul contrasted his interpretation of
substitution with the Refoimed imderstanding:
What confers on substitution its redemptive value is not the material fact 
that an iimocent person has suffered the chastisement deseived by the 
guilty and that justice has thus in some way been satisfied (in such a 
case one should speak rather of a giave injustice.) The redemptive value 
comes instead fr om the fact that the iimocent Jesus, out of pure love, 
entered into solidarity with the guilty and thus transfomied tlieir 
situation fr om within.
In other words, Jolm Paul’s interpretation of the cross takes a very different form than
Protestant Cliristology. For John Paul, when Clnist took on the sin of humanity out of
pure love, the catastrophic situation of sin “is no longer under the sign of opposition to
God.”*^  ^On the contrary, the situation caused by sin becomes a sign of docility to the
love that comes from God. Thus, the substitution of Clirist overcomes “every negation
and contrariety linlced with human sin in every dimension—interior and historical—in
which this sin has weighed on the relationship of man with God.”*^  ^In this maimer,
love conditions justice and justice selves love.
Cf. Eph 2:4.
Jesus, 426.
DM, 4.
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Jesus, 445.
Jesus, 445.
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Jolm Paul’s interpretation of the parable of the prodigal son sheds further light 
on this relation of justice and mercy. When the son seeks to return to the father’s house 
as a slave, he has recognised that, in accordance with the nomis of justice, he no longer 
has any right as a son but that his father may receive him as a servant. Through his 
actions, he was deprived of his dignity as a son according to the norms of justice. 
However, when the son retmned the father rejoiced because he saw that the good of his 
son’s hmnanity had been saved. The father’s mercy has the interior form of love. "This 
love is able to reach down to every prodigal son, to every human misery, and above all 
to every form of moral misery, to sin. When this happens, the person who is the object 
of mercy does not feel humiliated, but rather found again and ‘restored to value. 
Therefore, love overcomes and conditions justice. Through the love extended by God to 
humanity, manifested in the uttermost expression of love—gift of self—injustice has 
been overcome and the dignity of the human has been restored. Tlirough his mercy,
God justifies the human person by restoring to justice that salvific order which God 
willed fi'om the begiiming.*^**
In conclusion to the question, “Why the cross?”, Jolm Paul located its 
significance in the immensity of God’s love made manifest through it.*^ * Jolm Paul 
quoted Aquinas, “In this way man laiows how much God loves him, and man on his 
part is induced to love him in return; in this love consists the perfection of human 
salvation.”* I n  other words, the oveiwhelming love of Clnist initiates a relationship of 
love tlnough which the human enters a new relation with God, re-establishing the 
dignity that was lost by sin.*^ ^
Participation
The resinrection of Chiist, in which the cross reaches its full significance, 
opened a new way of life for humanity. Jolm Paul differentiated between the order of 
creation and the order of redemption:
DM, 5.
DM, 6.
DM, 7
“Without Cluist’s suffering and death, God’s love for humanity would not have been manifested in all 
its depth and immensity.” Jesus, 442.
Jesus, 442. Quotation from Aquinas, Summa Theol, III, q. 46, a. 3.
DM, 6.
81
God, as Christ has revealed Him, does not merely remain closely linked 
with the world as the Creator and ultimate source of existence. He is 
Father: He is linked to man, whom He called to existence in the visible 
world, by a bond still more intimate than that of creation. It is love 
which not only creates the good but also grants participation in the very 
life of God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.*^ "*
Tlnough the cross, the human becomes a sharer in the tmth and life, which is in God
and comes from God. Through the cross and resmTection, God fulfilled the covenant of
love by adopting as his children, not only Israel, but all nations and peoples.
While Clnisf s death liberated humans from sin, the resurrection effected tliis
fr eedom and the dignity of adoption into a new life.*^  ^This adoption brings an tme
freedom to the person, “not merely on the level of legal access to the inheritance, but
with the real gift of divine life which the tln ee Persons of the Trinity infuse into
nian.”*^  ^Participation in the new life enables men and women to become brothers and
sisters of Clnist, not by nature, but by the gift of grace, “since this adoptive sonship
gives a tme and real participation in the life of the only-begotten son, who is revealed
fully in his resurrection.”*^  ^Ultimately, the resmTection of Clnist is the source for our
future resmTection.*^^
Because Chiist has given his life in love for humans, humans are called to
participate in this divine life by giving of themselves to God.*"*** For instance, in the
same way that Chiist showed mercy and hmnans obtained the mercy of Chiist, hmnans
also give mercy back to Chiist in the “wonderfril exchange.” For Christ said, “As you
did it to one of the least of these.. .you did it to me.”*"** John Paul challenges, “Could
man’s dignity be more highly respected and emiobled, for, in obtaining mercy, He is in
a sense the one who at the same time ‘shows mercy’?”*"*^
DM, 7.
DM, 7.
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Because of this doctrine of pai ticipation, Jolm Paul placed such an emphasis on 
Clnist as the model for human life. By Imowing Chiist as model, humans discover what 
sonship looks like so that they might become like Clnist. However, vital to 
imderstanding this participation as effected by the paschal mystery is the fact that 
mercy begins with God; life begins with Chiist; the Trinity is the source of man’s moral 
life.
Jolm Paul was not working out of a punitive inteipretation of salvation, in which 
Chiist took the wrath of God onto himself and transformed the human believer from an 
unjust state to a just state. Jolm Paul’s interpretation of redemption does not require this 
drastic inteivention by God in wliich Clnist transfoiins human nature from a state of sin 
in which a hiunan could not choose God. Because Jolm Paul believed that sin did not 
damage a human’s capacity to choose God, the transformation which is required by 
redemption is more subtle and interior than Barth’s. The transformation comes tlnough 
God’s gift; of self, God’s merciful love that transforms man by pulling him out of 
himself. For Jolm Paul, the mercy of God changes humans by restoring the value that 
was maiTed by sin and selfislmess. God’s mercy “promotes and draws good from all 
the forms o f evil existing in the world and in man,”*"*^ When Jolm Paul emphasises the 
model of Cluist, therefore, he is not calling men and women to obey God or to do what 
Jesus did in order to earn salvation or obtain the favour of God. He not only believes 
that morality means obedience to God’s law but he also believes that the source of 
obedience is from God—fr om his creation and redemption, fr om his original image and 
fr om the image restored and given new dignity in Clirist. Unlike a more Protestant 
view, however, the mind and will of the human do not require complete re-creation in 
order to bring moral tiansfbrmation. Rather, transformation takes place thi'ough 
participation in the life and mercy of Clnist. The gift of Cluist’s self teaches humans to 
transcend the sin and evil of this world by giving of themselves to God and to one 
another. Tlu’ough this gift of self, individuals and societies are transformed.
The Human Dimension o f Redemption
In the mystery of redemption, “man finds again the greatness, dignity, and value 
that belong to his hmnanity,” the human person becomes “newly ‘expressed’ and in a
DM, 6.
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way, is newly created” because she becomes one with Chiist.*"*^  As the human draws 
near to Chiist, she assimilates the reality of the Incarnation and Redemption and she 
becomes amazed in adoration of God and deep wonder at his humanity.*"*  ^This 
amazement expresses the certainty of faith and it mysteriously gives life to the human 
as she recognises how precious and valuable she is, that God would give himself for 
human persons. John Paul explained, “The Redemption that took place through Chiist 
has definitively restored his dignity to man and given back meaning to his life in the 
world, a meaning that was lost to a considerable extent because of sin,”*"*^ Therefore, 
by revealing the dignity of the human in this new way, Chiist reveals man to himself.
Thi'ough his Incarnation and Redemption, Cluist has united himself with each 
person. God has chosen humans fiom eternity and destined all humans for gi'ace. The 
chui'ch is responsible to display the union with Christ by living in miity and to proclaim 
the mystery of Cluist, “in revealing the divine dimension and also the human dimension 
of the redemption, and in struggling with unwearying perseverance for the dignity that 
each human being has reached and can continually reach in Cluist.”*"*^ The church 
embraces this struggle by sharing in Chiist’s triple mission, his triple office of prophet, 
priest, and king.
As sharers in the mission of the prophet Cluist, believers seiwe divine truth in 
the church and its proclamation in the world. The prophetic role of the church must be 
earned out in faith with complete fidelity to the troth of God.*"*^  Through this troth, 
persons learn to matui e in love and justice as well as their sense of responsibility for 
this troth.*"*** In his discussion of the priestly mission, Jolui Paul emphasised the 
Euchai'ist and Penance thiough which we unite ourselves with Cluist and gi'ow to 
spiritual maturity and unity with all Chiistians.*^**
Finally, Jolui Paul located the service aspect of the Christian life in participation 
in the kingly office of Christ. Becoming a sei*vant requires the maturity of kingship
10.
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over ourselves and possession of the virtues that make this mastery possible. Through 
kingship, the Christian seeks to build up the Body of Cluist by the um*eserved giving of 
one’s whole person to Cluist and, with Cluist, to humanldnd.*^* This kingship also 
entails a dominion of the human over the visible world, a dominion that all people have 
in Christ. John Paul located in this kingly function important implications for the 
economic and political realms of society.
Anthropological Implications of the Doctrine of Christ
In conclusion, John Paul’s Chiistology lays a basis for his antluopology. First, 
Cluist solves the problem of the human inclination to sin that resulted from the fall. 
This sin constantly tempts the human to tiun away fr om God and to seek an illusory 
fr'eedom apart from the truth. Yet the human still retains some light of God the 
Creator and she continues to ask the question, “Wliat must I do? How do I distinguish 
good from evil?”*^"* In Jesus Christ, God united himself with humanity because of his 
love for humans and his value on the dignity of human life. This great love di*aws 
human into relation with God, into truth, and into goodness. Through his love, Christ 
di'aws the good out of man and teaches humans to transcend the sin and selfishness of 
the world by giving themselves. Thi'ough the obedience of love and giving of 
themselves to God and to others, humans are transfoimed into the likeness of Christ. 
John Paul places a stiong emphasis upon Christ as the model so that humans can learn 
what they themselves should do so that they might draw nearer to God, choose the 
good, and live in relationship with him. Like Chiist, believers have been given the 
vocation of kingship over themselves and the world. This dominion is carried out after 
the model of Clirist: thi'ough self-giving and upholding the dignity of human persons 
which was so profoundly affiimed in Chiist.
RH, 21. 
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Theological Basis:
Holy Spirit, Giver of Life and Love
In the same way that humans may lose their dignity by separating themselves 
from God tlnough evil acts, Jolm Paul believes that their sense of dignity can be 
realised tlnough their moral fomiation.*^^ He attributed to the Holy Spirit a primary role 
in the moral foimation of personliood. Thus, following a brief summary of his 
pneimiatology, we will explore the Spirit’s role in moral formation with special regard 
to the conviction of sin. The third part will analyse the live giving aspect of the Spirit’s 
role in moral foimation.
The Spirit of the Father and Son, Given to the Church
During his final discourse at the last supper, Clnist promised the disciples that 
he would send “another counsellor” (parakletos) when he left them. Clnist explained, 
“The Counsellor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach 
you all things, and bring to yoin remembrance all that I have said to you.”*^  ^Jesus 
taught them that the Spirit would reveal tmth, would be a witness in the spreading of 
the gospel, and would guide the disciples. Jolm Paul explained, “Thus, in the Holy 
Spirit-Paraclete, who in the mystery and action of the church unceasingly continues the 
historical presence on earth of the redeemer and his saving work, the glory of Cluist 
shines forth, as the following words of John attest: ‘He [the Spirit of truth] will glorify 
me, for he will take what is mine and declaie it to you.’”*^  ^Jolm Paul emphasised that 
the Spirit does not simply replace Christ; Chiist continues to be present and active 
through the Holy Spirit in the world.
As this verse demonstrates, the Spirit is a divine person who is vitally connected 
with the Father and with the Son. The one God revealed himself as Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. Like the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit is a divine person. “With the 
Father and the Son, he possesses creative power, and especially sanctifying and life- 
giving power in the supernatural order of grace. The Holy Spirit was involved in the
155 DM, 6-7 andDF, 16.
Jolm 14:26, DL, 3.
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original creative work of God’s self-giving, in Creation. Jolm Paul wi ote, “The biblical
concept of creation includes not only the call to existence of the very being of the
cosmos, that is to say the giving of existence, but also the presence of the Spirit of God
in creation, that is to say the begimiing of God’s salvific self-communication to the
things he creates.”***** Cluist also linlced the Holy Spirit with the mystery of
Redemption, “the new begimiing of God’s salvific self-communication.”**** The
presence of sin in the world contradicted the Spirit of God in creation. When Cluist
departed, he sent liis presence tluough the Spirit, tluough whom God communicated
with the human in a new way. “And that you aie children is proven by the fact that God
has sent into our heaiis the Spirit of his Son who cries: ‘Abba Father!”’***^
The Holy Spirit played a vital role in the mission of Chiist. According to Jolm
Paul, the conception and birth of Cluist ai e the greatest work accomplished by the Holy
Spirit. The power of the Holy Spirit brought about the union of divine nature and
human nature in the one Person of the Word-Son. Jolm Paul explained
The hicamation of the Holy Spirit laid the foundations for a new 
anthropology which sheds light on the greatness of human natiu'e as 
reflected in Chiist. In him, human nature reaches its highest point of 
union wMi god, ‘having been conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit 
in such a way tliat one and the same subject can be Son of God and Son 
of man.’*^^
Thus, the Spirit, the uncreated Gift, the breath of life and love brought divine life in 
Clirist. The Spirit is the ongoing source of the participation in divine life by humanity.
The Spirit was the author of the sanctification of Clirist and he continues to 
sanctify humanity. Through the Incarnation, a new holiness entered the world. “By the 
power of the Holy Spirit, the holiness of the Son of Man constitutes the principal and 
lasting source of holiness in human and world history.”***"* John Paul described the 
continued activity of the Spirit in the life and mission of Chiist, culminating in the 
raising up of Clnist in the Holy Spirit. “Clnist, who was Son of God fi'oni the moment 
of his conception in Mary’s womb by the power of the Holy Spirit, is ‘constituted’ as
12.
" ‘ DF, 13.
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Spirit, 206 and 209. Quotation from Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 2, a. 12, ad 3. 
Spirit, 211-213.
87
the source of life and holiness in the resuri'ection, ‘full of sanctifying power,’ by the 
action of the same Holy Spirit.”***^
Clirist then gives the Spirit to the apostles and all of humanity; this Spirit gives 
life tlnough Clnist’s sacrifice on the cross. John Paul explained, “The Holy Spirit 
infuses new life into the Clnistian within the eschatological perspective of the future 
resurrection. There is a continuity between Clnist’s resmTection, the new life of 
Clnistians freed from sin and made sharers in the paschal mystery, and the future 
reconstitution of the body-soul union in the resurrection of the dead.”***** Following 
Clnist’s resmTection and ascension, the Spirit was sent to sanctify the church so that 
believers could have access to the Father through Clnist.*^  ^In this mamier, the Spirit 
played a vital role in the mission of Clnist by giving the life of union with the Father in 
Chiist and giving humans participation in this divine life with the Father, through the 
Son, in the Spirit.
The Spirit and Sin
Wliat are the implications of this pneumatology for the moral formation of 
humans? When Jesus promised to send the Holy Spirit, he explained, “And when he 
comes, he will convince the world concerning sin and righteousness and judgement: 
concerning sin, because they do not believe in me; concerning righteousness, because I 
go to the Father, and you will see me no more; concerning judgement, because the mler 
of this world is judged.”***^ This convincing serves salvific pmposes for “conversion 
requires convincing of sin.
According to Jolm Paul, sin involves the opposition of the will of the human 
person to the will of God so it takes place first in the will and conscience. At the root of 
sin is a radical rejection of the truth thi'ough unbelief. Because God alone is the source 
for deciding good and evil, a rejection of the truth entails the human’s claim to become 
an independent som'ce for deciding about good and evil. The Spirit knows this
Spirit, 251. 
Spirit. 253. 
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dimension of sin in human persons and at the same time, the Spirit “is for man the light 
of conscience and the source of the moral order.”*****
Jolm Paul explained that the “image and likeness” to God given to the human 
person not only entails rationality and freedom as constitutive properties of hmnan 
natme. In addition, humans have the capacity of having a personal relationship with 
God, “the capacity of having a covenant which will take place in God’s salvific 
communication with man.”*^* The “image” means a “call to friendship in which the 
transcendent depths of God become in some way opened to participation on the part of 
man.”*^  ^Hmnan persons are called to paiticipate in love and truth and in union with 
God who is eternal life. But through his disobedience, man separated himself from this 
participation, he turned fr'om God and from true freedom. And tlnough the influence of 
the “father of lies,” there remains a constant pressm*e on humans to reject God.
The “convincing concerning sin” involves the revelation of the suffering that sin 
entails. Thi'ough liis presence in the sacrifice of the Son of Man, the Holy Spirit enters 
human and cosmic suffering with a new outpouring of love that will redeem the 
world. *^  ^The Holy Spirit acts as love and gift thi'ough the sacrifice of Chi'ist.
The “convincing concerning sin” also involves the conscience of the hmnan.
The conscience, placed in each person by the Creator, instincts the human person by 
commanding what is good and forbidding evil. John Paul locates the law of God, the 
objective norm, or the moral law in this “secret sanctuaiy” called conscience. He wi'ote, 
“The conscience is the ‘voice of God’ even when the human recognises in it nothing 
more than the principle of the moral order which it is not hmnanly possible to 
doubt.”*^"* The Holy Spirit strengthens the hmnan person to obey her conscience and to 
wrestle to cling to what is good.*^^
In conclusion, the Holy Spirit convinces the world of sin through the 
conscience. The conscience describes a capacity within each hmnan person to hear
D K 36.i70
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God, to relate to God, to know the good and to respond in obedience. Thus, the Holy 
Spirit is involved in the moral foimation of humans through the capacity John Paul 
calls conscience. We will come back to this vital capacity in Jolm Paul’s moral 
theology.
The Spirit and Life
While the Spirit convinces humans of sin, he also renews hiunan life. The 
mystery of the Incarnation opened in a new way the soiu ce of divine life in the history 
of humankind: the Holy Spirit. The Word became flesh by the power of the Holy 
Spirit.*^ ** According to Jolm Paul, “the filiation of divine adoption is born in man on the 
basis of the mystery of the Incarnation., therefore tlnough Clirist the eternal Son. But 
the birth, or rebirth, happens when God the Father ‘sends the Spirit of the Son into our 
hearts.’”***^ The divine filiation is planted in the human soul by the Holy Spirit tlirough 
sanctifying grace. This sanctifying grace is the principle and soiu'ce of man’s new, 
supernatural life. The Holy Spirit, the uncreated gift, is the source of this “supernatural 
adoption.” This uncreated gift, residing in the human heait, initiates the created gift 
whereby humans become partakers of the divine nature. As an adopted child, the 
Spirit remakes and recreates the human person in the likeness of Cluist, giving 
humanity a dignity beyond compare.***^
By giving us this relationship with the Father and by strengthening us in the 
iimer person, the Holy Spirit enables the human to find herself more fully by giving 
herself. In the following quote, Jolm Paul explained what he calls the siun of Clnistian 
antluopology:
[Clnistian anthr opology is] that theory and practice, based on the 
Gospel, in which man discovers himself as belonging to Clnist and 
discovers that in Cluist he is raised to the status of a child of God, and so 
understands better his own dignity as man, precisely because he is the 
subject of God’s approach and presence, the subject of the divine 
condescension, which contains the prospect and the very root of 
definitive glorification. Thus it can truly be said that ‘the glory of God is 
the living man, yet man’s life is the vision of God’ : man, living a divine
176 DV, 52.
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life, is the glory of God, and the Holy Spirit is the hidden dispenser of 
this life and this glory.
This anthropology has implications for individuals and communities for when “people 
discover this divine dimension of their being and life,” thi'ough the influence of the 
Holy Spirit, they are enabled, by grace, to free themselves from false imderstandings 
and domineering pressures of humanity and society. They discover the commandment 
of love, written on their heai'ts by the Holy Spirit.*^* And they find freedom and self- 
fulfilment in relationship with the Triime God and by giving of themselves to God and 
to others.
Theological Basis: Conclusion
This theology of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit selves as the 
foundation for the moral teaching of John Paul. God reveals himself to humanity as the 
one who alone is good, who detennines good and evil, and who becomes the model for 
moral action. He inscribed on the human heart the law, the duties and rights of 
humanity, to show love to himself and to other humans. His gracious acts of love 
toward himians illicit this moral response of love.*
Jesus Chi'ist intériorisés the demands of the law and invites people to follow 
him, giving believers a share of his own life of obedience expressed in love. Jolm Paul 
wi'ote, “Following Cluist is thus the essential and primordial foundation of Cluistian 
morality.”*^"* Cluist’s way of acting and his teaching constitute the moral mle of the 
Cluistian life. This rule is summed up in the new commandment to love. Love indicates 
the sacrificial gift of self for another. *^  ^No human could ever frilfil the law of his own 
accord, however, and this is why is it necessary to receive “life in the Spirit” thiough 
Cluist. John Paul wrote, “Only in this new life is it possible to cairy out God’s 
commandments.”* He quoted Augustine to summaiise his position, “The law was
60.
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given that grace might be sought; and gi'ace was given, that the law might be 
fulfilled.” Thus, in the Son and tluougli the Spirit, God calls the human into a life of 
participation with his own life and draws the human person into obedience tluough his 
loving gift of self.
Social Doctrine:
John Paul’s Moral Theology
John Paul’s encyclicals are broadly classified into two categories; theological 
encyclicals and social encyclicals. His social doctrine builds upon his theological 
assumptions that we have just delineated in section one of this chapter. This second 
section will examine Jolui Paul’s social doctrine in his moral theology and in his social 
encyclicals dealing with political and economic justice, hi particular, we will look at 
the influence of Jolui Paul’s pervading theme regarding human dignity and the 
implications it has for morality in the social sphere.
Moral Theology and Natural Law
Jolui Paul explained the obedience to which God calls fr eely the human. God
cares for humans “from within,” thi'ough reason “which by its natural loiowledge of
God’s eternal law, is consequently able to show man the right direction to take in his
free actions.”*^  ^He expounded this idea of law:
In this way God calls man to paiticipate in his own providence, since he 
desires to guide the world—not only the world of nature but also the 
world of hiunan persons—thiough man himself, tluough man’s 
reasonable and responsible care. The natural law enters here as the 
liimian expression of God’s eternal law. Saint Thomas wi'ote, ‘Among 
all others, the rational creatine is subject to divine providence in the 
most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a shai'e of providence, being 
provident both for itself and for others. Thus it has a shai'e of the Eternal 
Reason, whereby it has a natinal inclination to its proper act and end.
This participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called 
natinal law.*^^
According to John Paul, natural law, accessible tlnough reason, finds its foundation in 
the eternal law of God and its authority is universal, extending to all humans. In
VS, 23. 
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addition, natural law expresses the dignity of the person and it lays the foundation for 
hiunan rights and duties
Conscience and Moral Acts
The conscience plays a vital role in the moral judgement of hiunans because it 
applies this imiversal knowledge of the good; it confronts humans with the law. The 
conscience, Jolm Paul stressed, does not decide good and evil.'^’ The relationship 
between the human’s freedom and God’s law is lived out in the conscience because the 
law is not imposed on the conscience but the law teaches and summons the human to 
love good and avoid evil. The conscience applies the law to particular c a s e s . T h e  
freedom of the human, Jolm Paul explains, “is not only the choice for one or another 
particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a setting of 
one’s own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately for or 
against God.”^^  ^The conscience di*aws the human to cleave to God in fieedom. For this 
reason, the conscience determines the dignity of the human; it is “the most secret core 
and sanctuary of a man, where he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his 
depths.”'^ "*
According to John Paul, the relationship between human freedom and God’s 
law, which has its centie in the moral conscience, is manifested and realised in human 
acts. For through his acts, “man attains perfection as man, as one who is called to seek 
his Creator of his own accord and freely to arrive at frill and blessed perfection by 
cleaving to him.”^^  ^Echoing The Acting Person^ Jolm Paul explained that human acts 
are moral acts because “they express and determine the goodness of the individual who
ra, 5i .
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performs them.”^^  ^Humans create themselves tlu'ough their decisions because 
deliberate choices give moral definition to the person who perfoiins them.
Likewise, the formation of society finds its basis in moral norms. John Paul 
wrote, “These norms in fact represent the unshalceable foundation and solid guarantee 
of a just and peaceful human coexistence, and hence of genuine democracy, which can 
come into being and develop only on the basis of the equality of all its members, who 
possess common rights and d u t i e s . M o r a l  nouns serve to protect the dignity of 
every human being and they preserve the social fabric for its development. With this 
foundation established, we now turn to explore Jolm Paul’s application of this moral 
theology for the political and economic spheres of society.
Social Doctrine:
The Dignity of Persons as the Criterion for Political and Economic Justice
The foundational theme thi'oughout Jolm Paul’s social encyclicals, wiitings, and
speeches is the same theme which has dominated his writings from his pre-papal days
until the present: the dignity of the human person. Jolm Paul wrote:
Today the Church’s social doctrine focuses especially on man as he is 
involved in a complex network of relationships within modern societies.
The human sciences and philosophy are helpfiil for interpreting man’s 
central place within society and for enabling him to understand himself 
better as a ‘social being.’ However, man’s true identity is only frilly 
revealed through faith, and it is precisely from faith that the Church’s 
social teaching begins.
John Paul believes that the contribution of the church to the state and the economy is
“her vision of the dignity of the person revealed in all its fullness in the mystery of the
Incarnate Word.”^^  ^Thus, Jolm Paul analysed and critiqued political and economic
systems based upon these criteria of human value and freedom, which derive fr om his
theological commitments.^®^ According to John Paul, the human person must be the
highest value of society. The human does not exist for the sake of political or economic
VS. l l .  
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advancement. Rather, society exists for the sake of the humans who make up that 
society; it seiwes the human person by upholding human rights and advancing human 
responsibilities.
Jolm Paul emphasises this theme of the primacy of the human person in the 
social sphere using his conception of solidarity. He asserts that true solidarity 
recognises and upholds the personhood of the o t h e r . J o h n  Paul explains, “Solidarity 
seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the specifically Chi istian dimension of total 
gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation. One’s neighbour is then not only a human 
being with his or her own rights and a fundamental equality with everyone else, but 
becomes the living image of God the Fatlier, redeemed by the blood of Jesus Chiist and 
placed under the permanent action of the Holy S p i r i t . J o l m  Paul locates the potential 
for such a bond of miity between persons in the model of the tiiune life of God.^ ®^
The Human Person in the Political Sphere
Humans work toward this solidarity in the context of the state. According to 
John Paul, the state must facilitate the life of the people and “ensure the normal 
development of man’s spiritual and temporal activities.” ®^"^ The piupose of the state is 
this service to the common good by upholding the mle of law.^ ®^
Pope John Paul opposed the totalitaiian state because of its opposition to the 
mle of law in favour of rule by the power and violence of a few individuals. He argued 
that totalitarianism aiises fiom a denial of objective truth. Without objective tmth, no 
foundation exists for guaranteeing just relations between people. “If one does not 
aclcnowledge transcendent tmth, then the force of power takes over, and each person 
tends to make use of the means at his disposal in order to impose his own interests or
SRS, 39. Cf. Gregg, 205-12.
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his own opinion, with no regai-d for the rights of others.” ®^^ John Paul located the root 
of modem totalitaiianism in the denial of the transcendent dignity of the human person 
who is made in the image of God and is the subject of rights that no one may violate. 
Thus, the atheism of modem totalitarianism led to a denial of the transcendence of the 
human person, the reality of moral law to which all persons are subject. Eventually this 
denial led tan incuiable systemic injustice which brought its eventual demise.
John Paul favours what he called “authentic democracy,” which is a democratic 
system that ensures the participation and freedom of citizens while submitting itself to 
the tme and objective law of God.^ ®^  He echoed Pope Leo XIII in his support for three 
powers of society: legislative, executive, and judicial. By this balancing of power, the 
mle of law is upheld and the fr*eedom of all is protected. He critiques the present 
agnosticism and relativism that adheres to tmth and is detemiined by the majority. He 
wiites, “If there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and 
convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a 
democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.” ®^^ 
Thus, the Clnistian must witness to truth as the foimdation for freedom and justice in 
society.
At both the national and intemational level, John Paul calls for govermiiental 
stmctures to be in place that will uphold the human rights which are intrinsic to the 
dignity of the human. ^ ®^ In an addi ess to tlie Presidents of European Union Parliaments, 
Jolm Paul said, “Society acknowledges that it is at the service of its members and their 
natmal aspiration to find fulfilment as individuals and social beings. This aspiration, 
part of the nature of the person, coiTesponds to inlierent rights of the person, such as the 
right to live, to physical and mental integrity, to freedom of conscience, thought, and 
religion. ”^^®
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The Human Person in the Economic Sphere
The responsibility of the church in the economic sphere, according to Jolm Paul, 
is not to propose particular economic systems but to lay down principles and criteria 
that can guide human action toward the authentic progress of society by safeguarding 
the dignity and rights of all persons/^ ^  Thus, while he has explored the justice of 
economic systems, evaluating them based upon their value for the moral development 
of the human person, the most vital topic for Jolm Paul has been the issue of work.^^^
Just Work
Why did Jolm Paul place work at the centre of the social question?^ He did so 
because his theological and philosophical antlnopology. Echoing his earlier arguments 
in The Acting Person, Jolm Paul contended that work or labour plays both and objective 
and a subjective role in society. He understands work as a “transitive” activity: “an 
activity begiiming in the hiunan subject and directed towaids an external object.”^’"* 
Work in the objective sense expresses the dominion or kingship of humanity over the 
earth.
Yet the activity of work also contains a subjective sense because the human is
the subject of work. Jolm Paul explained,
Man has to subdue the earth and dominate it, because as the “image of 
God” he is person, that is to say, a subjective being capable of acting in 
a plaimed and rational way, capable of deciding about himself, and with 
a tendency to self-realisation. As a person, man is therefore the subject 
of work. As a person he works, he perfonns various actions belonging to 
the work process; independently of their objective content, these actions 
must seiwe to realise his humanity, to fulfil the calling to be a person that 
is his by reason of his very humanity.^
Thi’ough work, the human person not only exercises dominion over nature but 
he also fulfils the kingship of Christ in relation to himself. Echoing his philosophical 
treatises, John Paul confirmed that centi ality of work to the social question rests in the 
foimative nature of work upon the human person and upon society. He affiiined the 
words of Gaudium et Spes:
^"Dulles, 131.
He wrote, “Human work is a key, probably the essential key, to the whole social question.” LE, 3.2. 
ES, 2.1.
ES, 4.3.
LE, 6.2. Cf. GS, Ch. 1.
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Just as human activity proceeds from man, so it is ordered towai'd man.
For when man works he not only alters things and society, he develops 
himself as well. He learns much, he cultivates his resources, he goes 
outside of himself and beyond himself. Rightly understood, this kind of 
gi'owth is of greater value than any external riches which can be 
garnered. . . . Hence, the iiomi of human activity is this: that in accord 
with the divine plan and will, it should harmonise with the genuine good 
of the human race, and allow people as individuals and as members of 
society to piu'sue their total vocation and frilfrl it.^ ^^
Justice in Economic Systems
John Paul employed tliis nomi in his evaluation of economic systems. He 
critiqued both Socialism and Capitalism on this basis. He argued that Socialism 
considers the human person as an element, a molecule within a social organism. The 
system subordinates the human person to the functioning of the socio-economic 
mechanism, reduces the human to a series of social relationships, and removes the 
concept of the person as the autonomous subject of moral decisions.^^^ While advocates 
of the fr ee market defend their system for achieving gi eater satisfaction of material 
human needs, they encounter a similar danger of reducing the human to the sphere of 
economics and the satisfaction of material needs.
Economics must recognise, safeguard, and promote the primacy of the person, 
Jolm Paul argued.^^  ^He warned that the present movement toward a consumer-based 
society carries great dangers because it ensnares people in a “web of false and 
superficial gi*atifications rather than being helped to experience their personhood in an 
authentic and concrete way.”^^® The person concerned solely with possessing or 
enjoying camiot be free but becomes subject to the consumerist drive of s o c i e t y . H e  
does not recognise the transcendent value of the human person, the gi andeur given by 
God and redeemed by Chiist. Rather, by viewing others merely as a means to 
productive and profitable ends, he cuts himself off from a relationship of solidarity and 
communion with others. “Indeed,” Jolm Paul wi'ote, “it is through the free gift of self
LE, 26.5. From GS, 35. Cf. SRS, 30.
CA, 13.
CA, 19.
John Paul II, “Economy Must Respect Primacy of the Person,” L ’Ossejyatore Romano N. 3 (19 
January 2000), 9.
''°C^,41.
Wealthy civilisations find themselves enslaved to an abuse of freedom, “an abuse linked precisely 
with a consumer attitude uncontrolled by ethics” in which material goods are given greater value than 
humanity and the accumulation of goods causes great social ills. RH, 16.
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that man truly finds himself. This gift is made possible by the human person’s essential 
‘capacity for transcendence.
However, John Paul did not condemn capitalism in total. He recognised the 
need for business to earn a profit and the value of the fr ee market for allowing humans 
to participate in the economy. He affiimed the implementation of the capitalist system 
in the attempt to rebuild developing economies “JjTby ‘capitalism’ is meant an 
economic system which recognises the fundamental and positive role of business, the 
market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as 
well as free human creativity in the economic sector.”^^  ^He affirms the positive value 
of the mai'ket and of enteiprise as long as it is oriented toward the common good.^ "^^
Economic Development
With regard to poverty and economic development, Jolm Paul argued that the 
principle obstacle to development is human sin. hi the same way that fomiation has a 
moral character, the causes of undevelopment are ultimately moral.^^^ Humans create 
and participate in stmctiues of sin that enable injustice tlirough selfishness, abuse of 
power, and moral evil. Over against these haiinful structuies, God’s will provides the 
foundation for the ethic of love and the value for human life. Christ supplies the model 
for charity and self-giving. Thus, Jolm Paul calls for the exercise of solidarity in society 
by recognising one another as persons. The strong should feel responsible to care for 
the weaker and share what they possess. Those who are weaker must also give what the 
can for the good of all. This solidarity, this life-giving going beyond oneself, is not only 
the path to development, but it also the path to justice and peace between peoples and 
nations.
^CX,41.
CA, 42.
G4, 43.
SRS, 35. John Paul wrote, “Development which is merely economic is incapable of setting man free, 
on the contrary, it will end by enslaving him further. Development that does not include die cultural, 
tr anscendent and religious dimensions of man and society, to the extent that it does not recognise tire 
existence of such dimensions and does not endeavour to direct its goals and priorities toward the same, is 
even less conducive to authentic liberation. Human beings are totally free only when they are completely 
themselves, in the fullness of their rights and duties. The same can be said about society as a whole.” 
SRS, 46.
'^^ S^RS,'i9.
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Conclusion to Chapter Three
In this chapter, we have investigated the theological foundations for social 
justice in the writings of John Paul II. We have explored the key role of antluopology 
for the social doctrine of John Paul, with special focus on the dignity of humanity, botli 
in its theological dimensions as well as in its ethical implications. The creation of 
humanity in the image of God established the dignity of all humans. However, this 
dignity was maned by sin and needed the restoring work of Jesus Chiist. The coming 
of the Son of God as man raised humanity to a dignity beyond compare. His life taught 
humans how to live morally and by his death and resunection he raised humans to a life 
of participation with God. The Spirit facilitates this ongoing relationship between 
humans and God by enabling people to live and to give of themselves to others in the 
model of Jesus Cluist. At the same time, God establishes his Kingdom on earth as 
humans in the church participate in his rule.
In the thought of Jolm Paul, the dignity of humanity founded upon tliis 
revelation of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit became the criterion by which 
economic and political systems could be judged and the criterion by which they must 
be formed. Though there will be no ‘perfect’ system of government or economics, 
Christians must work to promote those that support the rights of humans and promote 
the moral upbuilding of society. In this manner, John Paul relates just social ethics to a 
Chi istian understanding of personhood. For in God the Father, Jesus the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit, Cluistians discover the true meaning of humanity and the depth of human 
dignity. In addition, they discover a deeper sense of their personal dignity by living in 
accordance with the law founded in God. Cluistians finally promote a just society by 
living in participation with the reign of God being established on this earth, proclaiming 
his truth, living by his laws, and giving of themselves for their fellow humans.
Conclusion to Part One:
The Anthropological Social Ethics of John Paul II
While Jolm Paul could easily agree with the various “secular” documents 
defending the dignity and the rights of humanity, we have argued in these thi ee 
chapters that his basts for such agi'eement is uniquely theological. In other words, the 
whole basis for John Paul’s social doctrine is his theological antluopology. Although 
philosophical inquiry can start one down the correct path, Jolm Paul believes, one
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camiot aiiive at a full understanding of the human person in society apart from the 
Chiistian doctrine of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit.
Fully comprehending human persons means recognising the intrinsic dignity of 
humanity, received in the imago Dei, raised to new meaning by Jesus Christ, and 
renewed in the Holy Spirit. From Wojtyla’s early childhood experience with the pain of 
death, the hoiTor of war, and the demoralisation of oppression, Wojtyla witnessed the 
resilience of specific persons who were able to rise above such destruction. The faith of 
his father, the spirituality ofTyi anowsld, and the love of the priests and bishops who 
became his new family fostered Wojtyla’s hope in humanity. His Thomistic training 
offered new insight into human dignity, revealed in the human capacity for 
transcendence both with regaid to truth and with regal'd to the “germ of eternity”^^  ^in 
each hiunan person which longs for communion with God. Thomism gave Wojtyla the 
weapons to fight against the materialist and naturalist ideology that prevailed in Poland 
by reminding his flocks of this transcendent reality. His work in phenomenology gave 
him the tools to explore the human person more deeply and to argue that the existence 
of the consciousness and the foimation of human consciousness tluough good acts 
entails a higher good, the common good toward which humans in society must strive. 
Finally, his mature theological work as Jolm Paul II affirmed his belief in the 
suipassing value of human persons and confinned the critical criterion by which 
political and economic systems must be judged: the criterion of human dignity.
Within these tlu ee chapters, we have examined some of the key assumptions 
that underlie Jolm Paul’s optimistic humanism. First, the doctrine of the analogia entis 
lies behind his epistemology, his doctrine of God and of sin, his moral theology, and his 
hope for justice in society. Because humans share in the being of God, they have 
dignity and they possess (to some degree) a ‘human goodness’ that gives them access to 
natural law and an authentic fieedom to choose good or evil. This key assumption 
means that neither epistemic access to tmth nor the capacity to behave justly were 
rendered useless by human sin. Rather, by means of natm*al law all humans can know 
some degi'ee of moral tmth and can behave in accordance with this tmth. Thus, Jolm 
Paul takes a very optimistic stance regarding the possibilities for human justice tlu'ough 
work with the UN and dialogue with those who stand outside of the Cluistian faith.
A plu'ase taken from de Lubac, Catholicism, 202.
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Secondly, John Paul assumes that Christ’s justification before God, “is the main 
foundation of all justice.”^^  ^By giving of himself, Christ overcame justice with mercy; 
he revealed the love of God for humanity in a radical new way. This overwhehning 
love and mercy of God in Christ initiated a relationship of love thr ough which the 
human enters a new relation with the Father. In Cluist, the dignity that was lost by sin 
is re-established and human persons have been adopted to live in a redeemed relation of 
participation with God. According to Jolm Paul, the life and death of Jesus are a 
powerful new model for Cluistians in their relation to society. Christians live in this 
new morality of love tluough the help of the Holy Spirit and with the highest goal 
consisting in the act that corresponds with solidarity, the gift of self on behalf of the 
other.^^^
The third key assumption regards God’s providential establishment of his 
Kingdom, into which humans have also been brought to participate. By participating in 
the dominion of the creator, humans experience their own autonomy and responsibility 
before God. In Christ, humans have been become sharers in the mission of God to 
establish his Kingdom by proclaiming divine truth which entails affirming the dignity 
of humanity, declaring the justice of God, and asserting the moral law in society. The 
kingly mission calls Cluistians to practice solidarity by giving of themselves in service 
to others tluough dominion over the self and through umeserved giving of one’s whole 
person to Cluist and to humankind.
These key assimrptions of John Paul II, will serve as a starting point for 
dialogue with Protestant theologian, Karl Baiih. Before engaging in this dialogue, 
however, we must now turn to examine the theological foundations for social justice in 
the writings of Karl Barth. Like John Paul II, and perhaps more vehemently, Karl Barth 
argued that human justice must derive from a theological interpretation of human 
personliood. We will now investigate Barth’s anthropology both in its early 
development and in its mature form, as it engages and informs his social ethic.
sc, 84. 
SRS, 39 .
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PART TWO: 
KARL BARTH’S CHRISTOLOGICAL SOCIAL ETHICS 
CHAPTER FOUR 
KARL BARTH AND THE HUMILITY OF HUMANITY
The inti'oduction to this work suggested that the wealmess of the UN 
Declaration on human rights lies in an incomplete imderstanding of the complexity of 
the human persons in society. I proposed that the “inherent dignity” of the human 
person may be more fiilly gr asped through a Christian understanding of humanity. For 
this reason, while social programs may benefit society, they may fall short of 
establishing the justice and peace for which the UN or other social agencies aim.
Part One presented the theological antluopology of John Paul II in support of 
this claim. As a representative of the Catholic str and of Christian thought, John Paul 
argues that the fullness of human persons can only be gr asped in Cluist. The creation, 
redemption, and sanctification of humanldnd in Christ have vital implications for social 
programs. In Pari Two of this work, we tiun to examine a representative of Protestant 
theology, Karl Barth. Like John Paul, Baiih also seeks the basis for social ethics in his 
theology. However, emerging from a radically different historical and theological 
context, Barth’s ethics developed along different lines and his anthropology addressed 
different concerns.
Wlrereas Wojtyla was born in difficult times and faced tragedy at a young age, 
the Switzerland of Barth’s eaiiy years was hopeful and relatively prosperous. Wojtyla 
gr*ew up following the affliction of WWI and he experienced with his nation tire 
oppression of the Germans and the communists. In contrast, when war did come, Barth 
lived in the land of the aggressor. One may thinlc that John Paul’s suffering with his 
oppressed Poland would have led him to a much more pessimistic view of humanity 
and the possibilities for social justice. Yet it was Barth who pronounced the “Nein!” 
and condenuied humanity to the judgement of God. Barth rejected the optimistic view
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of personliood that dominated his context. He encoimtered humanity at its most 
optimistic and he observed the destruction wrought by such hubris. His disillusiomnent 
compelled him to seek a point of coixection, a critical criterion for the hubris that 
expressed itself in the glorification of humanity.
First, Baith spoke the “Nein” of God’s judgement. ^  He emphasised the 
sovereignty and the Word of God as separated from and over against human 
creatureliness. Then Barth found in Cluist the point of contact, the God-man who 
becomes the critical judge of hmnanity yet who also becomes the Yes of God toward 
humanity, the affirmation of God’s covenant, and the souice of God’s redemption. In 
humanity, Barth would argue, there does not exist a seed of goodness by which humans 
may freely choose to live ethically. Chiist reveals the judgement of God against 
autonomous human action. Cluist exposes the problems of human pride, sloth, and 
untruthfulness that destroy humanity and personal freedom. Yet the God-man Christ 
also reconciles hiunan persons by his justification and sanctification. With the Holy 
Spirit, he redeems persons and enables them to overcome the effects of sin. Thus, this 
Cluistological dialectic of judgement and hope provides a key for Baith’s 
antluopology, out of which his social ethic emerges.
This chapter will focus on tlie judgement side of Barth’s dialectic for humanity, 
tracing why it emerged in an historical context that deified humanity and how 
Cluistology became a critical criterion for assessing social ethics. Tluough his grace 
toward humanity and his judgement against sinful humanity, Chiist served as the 
critical criterion for determining “real humanity” and human justice in the political and 
economic spheres. Chapter Five will trace the theme of personliood in Barth’s doctrines 
of God and Creation, examining the key concepts that underlie his social ethics. In 
Chapter Six, we will examine the significance of Cluist’s reconciliation for establishing 
social justice. In this maimer, Part Two will demonstrate Barth’s own critique of 
attempts to ground ethics in an understanding of personhood which is independent of 
theology and we will examine the central beliefs which shape his Christological social 
ethics.
* Barth later recalled the No of his early years, “It was due to the inner and outer circumstances of these 
years that the divine No of judgement, now understood as a No directed both to the present position and 
to all possible and attempted religious and cultinal development, had to be expressed more loudly, and 
certainly more clearly heard than die gracious Yes that we believed we genuinely heard, and genuinely 
wished to express, from the end, the real end, of all things.” CD II. 1.634.
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The Deification of the Human Person 
in Theological Liberalism and Religions Socialism
While working as a pastor in Safenwil from 1911 to 1921, Barth began thinldng 
more seriously about the connection between theology and social ethics.^ His special 
interest in the members of his church opened his eyes to the political and economic 
injustice of his day. He recalled, “In the class conflict which I saw concretely before me 
in my congregation, I was touched for the first time by the real problems of real life.”  ^
The stmggles of the working members of his congi egation caused Bai'th to ask 
questions regarding the social implications of his Chiistian faith, questions for which 
the liberal theology of his day could not provide answers.
Barth began to question the political conservatism supported by the theology of 
his esteemed professors such as Hemnami and von Hamack. While Wilhelm Hemnann 
expressed concern for the working classes, his analysis of social problems focused 
upon individual relations with no interest in stmctural or institutional fonns of evil.'^
 ^Fiiediich-Wilhelm Marquardf s controversial thesis that Barth’s socialism was the primary influence 
upon the shape of his theology brought attention to the interrelation of Barth’s social concerns and his 
theology. [See Theologie and Socialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Barths, (Munich; Clir. Kaiser Verlag,
1972) and “Socialism in the Theology o f Kai l Barth” in Karl Barth and Radical Politics, George 
Hunsinger, ed., (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), 47-76.] However, subsequent critiques of 
Marquardt’s work have exposed the fallacies o f his driving thesis. Bberhard Jüngel argued that 
Marquardt’s socialist interpretation is “imaginative,” “imdisciplined,” and “preposterous” because it does 
not take the text of Barth’s writing seriously. He wrote, “Surely there is something like an ‘institutionally 
reflective form’ to theological concepts— but tliis should not, above all in light o f the theology of Karl 
Barth, even be an issue.” [Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, tians. Garrett Paul, (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 14.] Jiingel argued in this book that Barth achieved this theology of freedom 
tluough his methodology that was radically independent of any authority or ideology other than Cluist.
He demonstrated that Barth’s theology was a “theology of freedom, speaking of the sovereign freedom of 
a gracious God and of the justified fi eedom of the human bemg who receives grace” (20). [See also the 
comparative study of Jüngel and Marquardt by Alexander McKelway, “Karl Barth and Politics,” 
Perspectives in Religious Studies 15, no 1 (Spring 1988), 269-281.] A second critique by Marcus Barth, 
while affirming Mai'quardt’s insight into the importance of his father’s concern for social and economic 
righteousness, rejected “Marquardt’s simplification of these most complex issues” on account of his 
“primitive, undialectical thmking.” [Marcus Barth, “Cmxent Discussion on the Political Character of Karl 
Barth’s Theology,” in Footnotes to a Theology, Martin Rumsheidt, ed., (Canadian Corporation for 
Studies in Religion, 1974), 82-85. See also Bruce McCormack’s critique in Karl Barth’s Critically 
Realistic Dialectical Theology, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 184-203.] Tliis work will take tlie side 
of Marquardt’s critics by acknowledging Bai th’s social concerns and recognising that his socialism 
forced him to rethink his theological premises. Yet as Jüngel argued, Barth’s mature theology was 
dependent upon the authority of God’s revelation in Cluist and his social ethics arose from within this 
basis. See for instance, Barth’s shift in his view of the state from Romans to liis later CD. In addition, the 
structure of Barth’s Dogmatics and his introduction to his special ethics in CD HI.4 displays Barth’s own 
concern to seek first a theological foundation which is not determined by prevailing ideology, before 
considering the ethical consequences.
 ^Karl Bartli, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bidtmann: Letters 1922-1966, trans. and ed. by Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, (Edinbiugh: T&T Clark, 1982), 154.
Adolf von Harnack and Wilhelm Herrman, Essays in the Social Gospel, G.M. Craik, ed., Maurice , . 
Canney, tiaiis., (London: Williams and Norgate, 1907): 145-225.
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Adolf von Hamack taught that the Kingdom existed as something inward rather than 
outward, consisting in the union of the individual soul with God.^ Hamack wrote, 
“True, the Kingdom of God is the rule of God; but it is the rule of the holy God in the 
hearts of individuals . . .  It is not a question of angels and devils, tlnones and 
principalities, but of God and the soul, the soul and its God.”  ^Baith’s pastoral work 
caused him to question Hainack’s teaching that the gospel of Jesus was concerned with 
the souls of individual humans and had nothing to say to the political or economical 
organisation of society or to the struggle for social justice.
Though Barth accepted this conservatism for a time,^ the confrontation with 
conditions of the working class j aired his sensibilities. During the first summer of his 
pastorate he caiefully studied Werner Sombart’s Sozialismus und Soziale Bewegtmg. 
This work acquainted Barth with socialism and convinced him of the connection 
between the gospel and socialist demands.^
The Religious Socialist Critique of Bourgeois Liberalism
When Eduard Thumeysen introduced Barth to Hermaim Kutter, Barth was 
stimulated by dialogue with others who were thinldng along similar lines.^ Barth later 
recalled that his encounter with the Religious Socialism of Kutter and his disciple, 
Leonliard Ragaz, illuminated the drastic reduction of the gospel by liberal theologians.
 ^McCormack, 90.
® Adolf von Harnack, What is Christianity?, trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders, (New York: Haiper 
Torchbooks, 1957), 56.
’ When he was in training as an assistant pastor in Geneva, Barth regarded “social misery as a necessary 
fact of natine in the midst of which faith held forth a strong but impractical hope.” Barth, “Evangelium 
und Sozialismus” (original manuscript in Karl Barth-Archiv, Basle). The citations taken from Friedrich- 
Wilhelm Marquardt, Vei-wegenheiten: Theologische Stucke aus Berlin (Munich: Clu\ Kaiser Verlag,
1981), 473, quoted and translated in McCormack, 80.
* Barth wrote, “It was tlu ough S. that I became acquainted with socialism and was driven to more 
exacting reflection and study of the matter. Since fliat time, I have held socialist demands to be an 
important part o f the application of the gospel, though I also believe that they caimot be realised without 
the gospel.” McCormack agrees with Marquardt’s assumption that S. is Sombart but argues that Barth 
did not read Sombart in 1906 as Marquart claims. Barth’s copy of Sombart was not printed until 1908 
and Bardi himself recalled reading Sombart after his arrival in Safenwil. See McComrack, 80,n.7. 
Though McCormack is probably coixect regardmg tlie coimections Barth made between his own liberal 
theology and socialism at this time, Barth had previously obseived socialism as it related to Cluistian 
faith tluough his earlier exposure to socialism in his father’s work and the political climate of 
Switzerland dming his childhood. Thus, perhaps he did recognise some tension between his own 
institutional ethical concerns with the conservative and individualist ethics o f his professors during his 
university years.
 ^Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. Jolui Bowden, 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 73-75.
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Kutter argued that the churches had falsified the message of Chiist by turning the 
gospel into a harmless, inward spirituality. Both Kutter and Ragaz called churches to 
repent, to renounce “the dead God of the boiu'geois classes,” and to renew their faith in 
the living God of the Bible. Socialism, Kutter proclaimed, was nothing less than the 
“hammer of God” calling churches to repentance.^® Ragaz took this idea a step farther 
by regarding socialism as a preliminary manifestation of the Kingdom of God.
While Bai'th could not embrace Religious Socialism so readily, he 
enthusiastically committed himself to the socialist ideals and later credited Kutter and 
Ragaz for opening his eyes to “the fact that God might actually be wholly other than the 
God confined to the musty shell of the Chi istian-religious self-consciousness, and that 
as such he might act and speak.” Barth’s involvement in the trade union movement in 
Safenwil eventually eained him the niclcname, “The Red Pastor.”'^
WWI and Barth’s Disillusionment with the Prevailing Anthropology
The 1914 war policy of the Kaiser became the decisive factor in Bai'th’s total 
break with liberal theology, his disillusiomnent with the promise of socialism, and his 
seai'ch for the God who is not merely a product of the human attempt to deify himself 
or to justify his own actions. In July of that year, the international crisis involving the 
great European powers rapidly intensified, including the Austro-Russian rivali*y in the 
Balkans, Franco-German mutual resentment and distrust, and the Anglo-Gennan 
rivalry. As the crisis escalated and German involvement and aggression indicated the 
certainty of war, the Social Democrats and the liberals united behind the Kaiser in 
support. By the time that war began, the Kaiser received almost unified support from 
society and intellectuals alike. A gi oup of ninety-thi ee of the most distinguished 
Gennan intellectuals, some of the gi eatest figures in world literature, music, painting, 
philosophy, science, and theology issued a manifesto in support of the war, proclaiming 
that “the German army and the German people are one.”^^
McCormack, 84.
“ Barth, The Humanity o f God, (Riclimond: Jolm Knox Press, 1960), 40.
Busch, 83. In the Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews, 2001, Stanley Hauerwas told the 
story of his visit to Safenwil. While visiting, Hauerwas inquired of the townspeople, “Do you remember 
Karl Barth?” “Ah, yes,” they replied, “the Red Pastor.”
Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany, (London: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1966), 316.
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In a letter to Brunner, Barth recalled the eye-opening challenge to his
theological beliefs and his socialist activity of this time;
A change came only with the outbreak of World Wai' I. This brought 
concretely to light two aben ations: first in the teaching of my 
theological mentors in Gennan, who seemed to me to be hopelessly 
compromised by their submission to the ideology of the war; and second 
in socialism. I had credulously enough expected socialism, more than I 
had the Christian chmch, to avoid the ideology of the war, but to my 
honor I saw it doing the very opposite in every land.*"^
On the theological front, Barth was shocked by the issuing of the manifesto that
supported the war policy of the Kaiser. Included on that list were many of Barth’s
foiiner professors including Hamack and Hermann. Barth reflected that “a whole world
of exegesis, ethics, dogmatics, and preaching, which I had hitherto held to be
essentially trustworthy, was shaken to the foundations, and with it, all the other writings
of the German theologians.”^^  For Barth, the outbreak of the war was “a double
madness,” for “we had more or less definitely expected that socialism would prove to
be a kind of hammer of God, yet all along national war fronts we saw it swinging into
line.”"*
Disillusioned by the violence of Gennan cultui'e as supported by socialism and
angered by the inability of Cluistian theologians to speak a word of correction, Barth
began to realise that in Gennan culture and in Cluistian theology, the human had
become the measure of all things. He explained:
When the Chiistian gospel was changed into a statement, a religion, 
about Cluistian self-awareness, the God was lost sight of who in His 
sovereignty confronts man, calling him to account, and dealing with him 
as Lord. This loss also blurred the sight horizontally. The Christian was 
condemned to uncritical and irresponsible subservience to the patterns, 
forces, and movements of human history and civilisation.^^
In other words, Chiistian theologians had reduced the transcendent God to human
consciousness, had allowed human history and human culture to provide the social
guidelines in the place of God, and had exposed their inability to correct the
glorification of humanity which created conditions of imimaginable inhumanity. Barth
Bartli, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bidtinann: Letters 1922-1966, 154.
Busch, 81 from “Nachwort,” 293.
CD III.4.450. Ironically, after years of resei-vation, Barth joined the Social Democratic Party at this 
time to demonstiate that faith entails involvement in the world and with the hope of reforming the party 
from within (Busch, 82).
The Humanity of God, 27.
108
sought the God who is wholly other, the God who is ti'anscendent, and who provides 
the critical criterion for social justice/^
The Blumhardt’s Ministry: The God Who is Wholly Other
A turning point for Barth came in April 1915 when Thumeysen introduced
Barth to Chi'istopher Blumhaidt. Barth was attracted to Blumhai dt upon first meeting,
describing him as “a man who was not so sure of his affairs, because his secret
awareness was beyond anything he could express. At any rate, this uncertainty was the
best thing about him.”^^  hi contrast with the cultui al deification of human opinion,
Bai'th recognised in Blumhaidt a humility and a faith in something beyond himself.
Having lost confidence in humanity and begimiing to tiu*n his criticism inward, Barth
was drawn to Blumhaidt’s stalling point for social ethics: God. Barth wrote,
“Blumhardt always begins right away with God’s presence, might, and purpose: he
stai'ts out fiom God; he does not begin by climbing upwaids to Him by means of
contemplation and deliberation. God is the end, and because we already loiow Him as
the beginning, we may await His consununating acts.” ®^
From this stai'ting point, the Blumhaidts stood beyond the dogmatic and the
liberal as well as the socialist theologians. “He refutes nobody, and nobody needs to
feel refuted by him, but he does not concur with anybody else’s views e ith e r .B a rth
described Blumhaidt’s critique as priestly because he both engaged with the world yet
did not bend to the ideals of cultme. Barth wrote:
I see only that Blumhaidt can do something which we others mostly 
camiot do: represent God’s cause in the world yet not wage war on the 
world, love the world and yet be completely faithful to God, suffer with 
the world and spealc a fraiilc word about its need and at the same time go 
beyond this to speak the redeeming word about the help it waits for, 
carry the world up to God and bring God into the world, and be an 
advocate for men before God and a messenger of God bringing peace to 
men, pleading imceasingly and unwaveringly before God and to God,
Jolm Webster characterised Barth’s concern during this period similarly, “Barth was sti-uggling to 
wiest ethics from the hands o f those who had made it into what he judged to be merely the theoretical 
counterpart of an idolatr ous pattern of cultural-religious action which required no serious talk o f God as 
other than immanent to tire teleology o f human self-realisation.” Barth's Moral Theology, (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1998), 19.
Busch, 84.
Action in Waiting, (Rifton, NY: Plough Publishing House, 1969), 23-4.
Action in Waiting, 20.
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“Thy Kingdom come!” and waiting and hastening with men toward its 
coniing.^^
Blumhai’dt’s starting point in the power of God, the victory of Cluist over evil, the
presence of the Spirit in this age, and the hope of the eschaton demonstrated for Barth a
foundation for theology and ethics which no longer lay in hiunan loiowledge or human
justice but in the God who is wholly other.^^
Barth’s encoiuiter with the wiitings of J. Blumhardt caused him to abandon
support for Ragaz’ program, believing that he and Ragaz had been approaching their
political activity from the wrong starting point. McCormack describes this shift in
Barth’s thinking:
Up to this point in time, Barth had still operated on Herrmannian 
assumptions. He had identified the voice of God with the negative 
experiences of history and he had done so with a good deal of self- 
confidence because, consciously or unconsciously, he still acted as 
though he believed his own religious experience stood beyond all doubt.
Given the certainty of religious experience, Barth felt that he had the 
right key in his hand for reading the ways of God off the face of history.
He could not really be fr ee of the axiom of religious experience until 
criticism turned inward; until he realised the questionability of all things 
human when seen in light of the otherness of God and His Kingdom had 
to apply to him and his friends as well as to their opponents. From now 
on, knowledge of God—the a priori of all tme representation of the 
Kingdom—would be the central question in Karl Barth’s new 
theology.^"^
Seeking a Critical Criterion for Justice:
The Justice of God
Bai'th’s disillusionment with his former guides led him to seek an entirely new 
foundation for theology. He rejected his prior approach in which “everything had 
always already been settled without God. God was always thought to be good enough 
to put the crowning touch to what men began of their own accord. Barth recalls, “It 
was Thumeysen who whispered the key phrase to me, half aloud, while we were alone 
together: ‘What we need for preaching, instruction, and pastoral cai-e is a ‘wholly other’
Action in Waiting, 22.
Karl Barth, “Past and Future” in The Beginnings o f  Dialectical Theology, ed. J. Smart, (Riclimond: 
Jolm Knox Press, 1968), 41-42.
McCormack, 125. Ingrid Spieckeraiami argues the thesis that knowledge of God became the driving 
question o f Barth’s theology in Gotteserkenntnis\ Ein Beitragzur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl 
Barths (Munich: Cln. Kaiser Verlag, 1985).
Busch, 100.
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theological foundation. The two pastors began by reading and inteipreting the Old 
and New Testaments more thoughtfully. These studies birthed Barth’s first commentary 
on Romans and his discovery of “the strange new world within the Bible.”^^
First Commentary on Romans: The Justice of God and the Sin of Humanity
hi his commentaiy on Romans, Barth emphasised the radical otherness of God 
and the sin of humanity. With Adam’s sin and fall, all of humanity fell from the 
immediacy of being with God. The distance between God and the creatui e is the fall of 
the creature from God.^  ^In order to establish a contact point between God and 
humanity, Barth developed an eschatology of process in which the new world has 
dawned in Jesus Chiist and the Kingdom of God is establishing itself by renewing this 
world through an “organic” sort of growth. Michael Beinlcter smnmarised Barth’s new 
perspective in Romans, “the book is stamped by a process eschatology which clearly 
maintains no direct continuity between the Kingdom of God and the world but knows 
of a history of God which breaks thiough secretly out of the history of the death of this 
woiid.”^^  The Kingdom of God comes tluough a series of “brealcthi'oughs” into this 
world whose continuity are guaranteed by their rootedness in the history of God. Barth 
chose the word “organic” to describe the continuity and growth of the Kingdom 
because it emphasised the work of God rather than the human person’s attempt to build 
the Kingdom.^® hi this sense of the pluase, Barth directly critiqued the teaching of 
Hamack and his former professors who maintained that the Kingdom of God arises 
thi'ough the ethical action of individuals. In opposition to this idea that God’s Kingdom 
is established tluough autonomous hiunan activity, Barth believed that the Kingdom of 
God would establish itself through God’s work and bring change to individuals and to 
society.
This process eschatology finds significance for political activism in Barth’s 
exegesis of the tliirteenth chapter of Romans in which he produced an obvious critique 
of Religious Socialism. For the pmposes of this study, gi eater attention will be given to
Busch, 97 from “Nachwort,” 294.
Barth, The Word o f  God and the Word o f Man, (Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1928), 28-50.
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology o f Karl Barth, (San Francisco; Ignatius Press, 1992), 65-66.
Michael Beintker, “Der Romerbrief von 1919,” in Gerhard Sauter, ed, Verkimdigung und Forschung: 
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Barth’s exegesis in the second edition of Romans in which Barth refines his approach 
and understanding of the Kingdom of God. Of importance for this discussion is the 
understanding that all political action necessarily involves the human in sin and caimot 
be identified with the cause of God. Religious Socialism presumed the relation of 
continuity between divine and human action, maintaining an idealism that the human 
could judge and act for God. As McComiack points out, the one-sidedness of Barth’s 
distinction between the Kingdom of God and the earth dming this phase of Barth’s 
theological development provides a weak basis for ethical decision and human 
involvement.^^ Barth emphasised the transcendence of God’s work in his desire to 
critique the human attempts to build the Kingdom of God tluough their own programs. 
Yet while the force of God’s judgement against hmnan attempts toward justice 
undermined his fomier foundations for justice, he had little positive to offer regarding 
human involvement in issues of social justice.
The Tambach Lectures: Christ in Human Society
Barth delivered a shocking critique of hmnan attempts to establish justice in his 
lecture at Tambach in September 1919. Originally, Ragaz had been the keynote speaker 
at this Conference on Religion and Social Relations sponsored by the Chiistian 
Socialists. When Ragaz cancelled at the last moment, Barth was invited by those who 
thought that he was a disciple of Ragaz. However, Baiih’s message, “The Cluistian’s 
Place in Society,” caused a great stir because it was perceived to undercut the very 
activities and ideals of Christian Socialism.^^ At the time that Baiih gave the lecture, 
the impact of the war had been felt and many were looking for a new hope in the state 
for rebuilding German life and economy. Barth offered an unexpected hope: rather than 
promoting a new vision for the Christian Socialists as he was expected to do, Barth 
offered hope in the Kingdom of God. Once again, Barth emphasised the transcendence 
of God and he critiqued human approaches to society by distinguishing human work in 
society from the work of God.
On the positive side, Barth reminded his audience that the notion of Cluistian is 
the reality of Christ in us. The faith that Chiist is in us affiiins that society is not
McCorniack, 178-179. Jolm Webster takes a more sympathetic view of Bartli, arguing that his 
reluctance to address the human moral life was not due to his disinterest in the subject but “to his deep 
sense that the prevailing ways of talking about what human beings constituted a suppression of the 
critical character of the question of ethics.” Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology, 19.
Timothy Gorringe, Karl Barth: Against Hegemony, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 48.
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forsaken of God. Yet one cannot simply apply Chiistianity to society because the divine 
is wholly complete, a new and different something which stands in contrast to the 
world. Th^ divine, Baith explained, “does not permit of being applied, stuck on, and 
fitted in. . . .  It does not passively peimit itself to be used: it overthi'ows and builds up 
as it wills. It is complete or it is nothing.”^^  He warned that one must consider carefully 
before attempting to take Cluist to society.
Having cautioned the Christian, Baith’s discussion of society provoked his 
audience with the very questions they were asking: “Where is God in all the human? 
Where is meaning in the meaninglessness?” He affirmed the Cluistian Socialist ideal to 
counter the autonomy of culture, the state, and economic life but he challenged their 
program to “use the thought forms of Jesus as the law for every economic, racial, 
national, and international order.” '^^  He commended their criticism and doubts 
regarding the idols of this world but asserted that, in their earnest work towai'ds change, 
they may fail to perceive the tiue meaning and might of the living God who is building 
a new world. Therefore, Barth warned against progiammatic approaches to the building 
of a new society: “Surely we shall resist this temptation to betray society; it is no easier 
to brmg it to Chiist than Christ to it. For it is God’s help that we still have really in 
mind. . . . God alone can save the world. When we approach the execution of our 
program we shall not be able, as the familial- warning goes, to reckon too soberly with 
‘reality’; and there is good reason why we should not, rebus sic stantibus—our ideals 
being impossible and oiu goals unattainable.”^^
Rather than a program or a solution, Barth offered his audience a new 
standpoint or movement from which Cluistian hope and activity may proceed: the 
movement of God in history. He described this movement as “the movement whose 
power and import are revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. This 
must be the gist of all our thinking about the Cluistian’s place in society.”^^
WGWM, 111.
WGWM, 280.
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The new life from God is the bodily resmxection of Chiist from the dead in 
which the world of God broke tluough and appeared in secular life.^  ^This life, Baith 
explained, opened the possibility of eternal life for humans, reminding them that the 
origin of the soul is in God. This awakening of the soul to the new immediacy of 
relationship with God is also an awakening to the hmnan’s relation to society. The 
awakened soul, according to Baith, involves the “sympathetic shouldering of the cares 
of the whole generation.”^^  The Chiistian’s agitation regarding the concerns of this 
world provokes an engagement in the revolt of life against the powers of death that 
enclose it. The Cluistian reflects on the problems and honors of this world with the 
hope tliat tliis despair is not the final word. “The last word,” Barth argued, “is the 
Kingdom of God—creation, redemption, the perfection of the world tluough God and 
in God.” ®^
In this essay, Barth attempted to offer a Christological vision for the
relationship between the Chiistian and Society. He opposed idealistic solutions and
programs and introduced a new way of approaching society that was grounded in the
hope of God’s personal movement of salvation for the world in Cluist. People camiot
be saved through programs but through the person of God in Christ. Secondly, Barth
introduced a new way of looldng at society by seeing through the eyes of hope in
Chiist, eyes of hope which recognise life proceeding from death and see the work of
God in the world. Finally, Barth proposed a new way of relating to society resulting
fi'om a new relationship with God through Chiist.
According to Bai'th, the task of the Chiistian in society is to live in the priestly
agitation or um est of this hope that helps to claiify the way to the solution in God. The
Chiistian talces part in Chiist’s subversion and the conversion of this society while
awaiting the frillness of the Kingdom of God.
For it is by the very fact of our living here and now that we are 
conscious alike of om’ fall and, in the likeness of the eternal, of the 
promise to us. This coiiuptible, must put on incoixuption and this mortal 
must but on iimnortality (1 Cor, 15:53). We must enter fully into the 
subversion and conversion of this present and every conceivable world, 
into the judgement and the grace which the presence of God entails.
WGWM, 288.
WGWM, 290.
WGWM, 297 .1 have chosen to explicate only the first half o f this essay. The second half deals with 
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unless, remaining behind, we wish to fall away from Clirist’s truth, 
which is the power of the resurrection. We camiot look on at this 
subversion and conversion as pious or clever observers nor escape it by 
walking down the broad, light, well-filled streets of the romanticists and 
humanists."*®
The subversion and conversion of humanity was not a program which Barth promoted 
but an entirely new approach in God to human life based upon the creative and 
redemptive work of God in Cluist.
Therefore, this speech substantiated Barth’s turn away from his liberal training 
and his new emphasis on the transcendence of God, and his eschatological hope in 
God’s Kingdom established in Chiist. His former professor, Hamack, found Barth’s 
speech appalling, coimnenting to a friend, “The effect of Barth’s lectuie was just 
staggering. Not one word, not one sentence could I have said or thought. I saw the 
sincerity of Baiih’s speech but its theology frightened me.”"** He believed that Barth’s 
approach to theology was apocalyptic and self-negating, finding Baiih’s turn to 
eschatological hope the most offensive aspect of his new theological developments."*  ^
Despite criticism, Barth continued to refine his theology in this direction. The following 
year, he turned again to his commentary on Romans in order to rework his new ideas.
Second Commentai^ on Romans: God’s Judgement and Justice in the State
Barth’s struggle against the humanism of his day and his desire to found social 
ethics upon a foundation which transcended human social ethics is also manifested in 
his second edition of Romans P  Barth issued his critique for both approaches to 
political ethics that predominated in Protestant cfrcles. He sought to emphasise the 
person and work of God over against the attempts by humans to establish political 
justice.
Barth argued against the legitimisation of the state and the attempt by men and 
women to rule over one another. In Romans 13, he contended that the evil in 
government is not found in the defect of a governmental system but in the very right for 
government to exist at all. Human persons should not dare to claim a right over other
317-318.
Agnes von Zahn-Hamack, Adolf von Harnack, (Berlin: Walter de Gmyter, 1951), 415.
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humans, should not dare to regulate their conduct, should not exercise power over other 
men and women."*"* Thus, against the idolatiies of boingeois Protestantism, Barth argued 
that the state cannot be legitimised.
Yet Barth also sought to critique those who desired to overthrow the state. 
Humans cannot establish justice by overthrowing the state either, he argued. Barth 
warned that in the revolutionary battle to rid the state of evil by overthiowing the 
existing power, the revolutionary himself is overcome by evil as he attempts to make 
things right, in place of Clu ist. “The sense of right which has been wounded by the 
existing order is not restored to health when that order is broken. Overcome evil with 
good. What can this mean but the end of the triumph of men, whether their triumph is 
celebrated in the existing order or by revolution?”"*^
Barth argued against both approaches to the state because of his overarching 
concern to critique human attempts to establish the Kingdom of God and his glowing 
distrust of human judgement. In his effort to correct the glorification of humanity which 
both of these approaches held in common, he emphasised the person and work of God. 
According to Baith, both the ruling order and revolution must be left to God because 
God alone could judge and God alone could establish good.
In his exegesis of the text, he interpreted the first verse as a critique of 
autonomous human judgement and action. Let every man be in subjection to the 
existing ruling powders (Rom. 13:1a). Barth described subjection as withdi*awal, making 
way, having no resentment, and not seeking to overtlii'ow. The rebel’s conflict, Barth 
argued, is not against mling powers but against evil. If a revolution (even a non-violent 
revolution) against government brings evil, then the rebel and the rulers stand on the 
same side, with the existing order of evil. Barth writes, "''Let every man be in subjection 
means, therefore, that every man should consider the falsity of all human reckoning as 
such.. . .  It’s meaning is that men have encountered God, and are thereby compelled to 
leave judgement to him.”"*^
Barth unpacked the remainder of the verse, For there is no power but o f God; 
and the powers that be are ordained o f God (Rom. 13:1b). Although this passage seems 
to affirm the authority of the government, Barth claimed that the important aspect is the
Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, tians. Edwyn Hoskyiis, (London: O.U.P., 1933), 479. 
Romans, 480-81.
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declaration that the powers aie measmed by reference to God, as are all human things. 
Because God both justifies and condemns the powers, the human may not claim to 
judge in the place of God by taking judgement and assault into his own hands. Rather, 
the revolutionary should recognise that the evil of the existing order beat's witness to 
the good and bears witness to God."*^
In the second verse, Barth aigued that judgement and revolution must be left to 
God. Therefore, he that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordinance o f God: and 
they that withstand draw to themselves judgement (Rom. 13:2). According to Barth, 
real revolution comes not from human revolt but from God. The rebel’s attempt to 
bring in the ‘New Creation’ by judging and protesting the powers end in condemnation 
upon himself. Rather, the revolutionary learns several things fiom the governing 
powers: God’s revolt creates order; God’s disclosure cannot be effected by hmnan 
action; and the rebel leai*ns to practice the humility that will guard against contempt. 
Barth exclaims, “Behind the existing order—which may itself be new!—stands God.
He is the Judge, and He is the Right. Insubordination—and there is also a conservative 
insubordination!—is insubordination against Him.”"*^
How then does the Judge establish the good? According to Bai'th, the only 
possibility of overcoming evil is the forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the dead 
thi'Ough Jesus Cluist who is the true answer to the injury wrought by the existing 
order.
Bai'th himself later acknowledged that his enthusiasm to correct the humanism 
of his day by emphasising the deity of God lacked the comprehensiveness found in his 
later work, His approach needed the Christology of his fliture years, which integi ated
Barth addressed the conservatives, “The supporters of the present order, who may feel encouraged by 
what has been said, must, however, be reminded tliat revolution has been ordained as evil, in order that 
they may bear witness to the good; and tliis means, on order tliat they may themselves be without 
justification and utterly unromantic, in order, hi fact, that they too may turn and become from henceforth 
disordered.” Romans, 485.
Romans, 486.
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the deity of God with humanity in Chiist.^^ Yet this stage of his development is vital for 
interpreting his later work because the major themes, though a bit unbalanced, remain 
thi'oughout his works and the context of this stage provides the explanation for Barth’s 
oveiTiding concerns. First, in his reaction to the glorification of hiunanity, which 
dominated Geimmi ideology, Barth condemned the human arrogance that attempts to 
mle over others or judge others. All rule and judgement must be left to God. Second, 
Barth condemned the human attempt to establish Good or to instate the Kingdom of 
God apart from the work of Jesus Christ. God alone establishes justice.
Reformed Theology and the Justice of God for Humanity
Wlien Barth became a professor in Germany at Gottingen and begaii preparing 
his lectures on Reformed theology, he found in Luther, Calvin, and other reformers a 
theological resting place after his period of disillusionment with the deification of 
humanity by post-Enlightenment society.^^ Barth embraced refonned theology because 
it “made the discovery that theology has to do with God. It made the great and 
shattering discovery of the real theme of all theology. The secret was simply this, that it 
took this theme seriously in all its distinctiveness, that it names God God, that it lets 
God be God, the one object that by no bold human grasping or inquiry or approach can 
be simply one object among many others.”^^
Luther ou God’s Justice
Barth located in Luther his own dialectic between the righteousness of God and 
the sin of humanity. Luther first emphasised the offence of humanity’s sin against God 
that characterises every aspect of human behavioiu and human works. Secondly, he 
explained the positive proclamation about God: we are justified and we live by his 
grace. The hope of Cluist’s grace is made known, not by seeking to look at the invisible
The Humanity o f  God, 44-45.
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things of God, his majesty and glory, by way of spiritual vision but grace is made 
known by the revelation of God in the cross/^ “True theology and the true knowledge 
of God lie, then, in the crucified C hrist.A ccording  to Barth, Luther turned from the 
medieval attention to a “theology of glory” to his own theology of the cross as the true 
theme for theology, the only hope for human sin, and the centre for “faith as naked trust 
that casts itself into the aims of God’s mercy.”^^
Barth was di awn to the theology of Luther and he continued to study liis works 
and to reflect on the implications of justification by faith for social justice. Barth drew 
these implications out powerfully m the course of his later dialogue wiüi Catholic 
theology. Upon first discovering Luther, however, Barth found himself disappointed by 
Luther’s failure to make the outworking of ethics of primary importance so he turned to 
Calvin who “made the Reformation capable of dealing with the world and histoiy when 
he hammered the faith of Luther into obedience.”^^
John Calvin: Christ as the Foundation for Theology
John Calvin influenced Barth in two vital aspects of theology as they relate to
Baith’s social ethics: Scriptuie and Christology. First, Calvin’s doctrine of the
inspiration of Scriptiue provided for Barth the mle of life and faith. Barth wrote:
Scripture did not play quite the same part in Reformed Protestantism as 
in Lutheran. It’s dignity here was one of principle as it never was in 
Lutheranism, no matter how highly the latter regar ded it. Introducing 
reformation now meant establishing the Word of God in the Bible as the 
norm of faith and life. The Reformed chinch is first of all the school in 
which we learn and then the institution in which we are brought up. The 
right attitude is first one of docility, then of obedience. Scripture is the 
guide and teacher.
Barth defended the priority of the ‘scripture principle’ in Reformed Protestantism. He 
argued that such a principle was not legalistic but arose from “the quest for a nonn by 
which to regulate the relations, the quest for a rule of faith and life, of lorowledge and 
action.”^^  Because Reformed Protestantism began as a rejection of the forms and orders
Calvin, 42 -3.
Calvin, 44.
Calvin, 46.
Calvin, 90 and 74.
”  Calvin, 386.
Calvin, 387.
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required by Roman Catholicism, the reformers had to seek a new authority that could 
relate eternity to time and could provide new forms and orders for their faith. They 
found this authority in the Biblical text because it was “the place where God’s 
revelation comes to us.”^^  Calvin, in particular, forged the dogma of inspiration. Yet, 
according to Barth, Calvin never spoke of inspiration without also speaking of the inner 
testimony of the Holy Spirit as “the voice of truth that malces itself heard not merely in 
the Bible but also in tlie believing reader or heai er.”^^  Thus, the authority of the Bible 
rests not merely upon the letter of the law but upon the Spirit of truth, which is in the 
letter and in the hear ts of believers as the revelation of Jesus Clnist.^^
This revelation of Jesus Chr ist in Scriptirre became the foundation for Barth’s 
theology. Barth observed in Calvin, “Christ is from tlie first the key with which he 
unlocks the whole. Clirist is that imspoken original presupposition in terms of which we 
see God a priori as the groimd and goal, the one who judges us and shows us mercy, 
and in terms of which we see ourselves a priori, when measured against God, as 
sinners, and ar e thus pointed to g ra c e .B a rth  defended Calvin against the accusation 
that Calvin forced Christian elements into a general metaphysical, philosophical view, 
arguing that Calvin did not separate natural and supematrual knowledge except to show 
that supernatural revelation “is the pair of spectacles by which to read the Word of God 
in nature and history .T herefore, Barth’s study of Calvin influenced his own 
theological method. At this early stage, Barth found articulation for the foundation of 
his own dogmatics and ethics: Jesus Christ as revealed in Scripture.
Calvin, 167.
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McCormack uses this passage to demonstrate that Barth did not exclude the possibility that God could 
speak in nature and history at this stage. One must be careful not to misconstrue McCormack’s 
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could be understood thr ough tlie witness of the Holy Spirit. Barth clearly argues that natur al knowledge 
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The Gospel of Christ as the Foundation for Ethics
As mentioned previously, Baith found the ethics of Luther inadequate to 
address the relation between the Cluistian and the world. '^  ^Whereas Luther recognised 
the vital doctrine of justification by faith, Calvin helped to describe the practical import 
of such doctrine in daily life.^  ^Barth characterised Calvin’s ethics in his 1536 
Institutes, “When at the end Calvin seeks to speak expressly as an ethicist in the more 
precise sense, we do not have an added second or new thing, nor the law as a second 
thing alongside the gospel. His concern is simply for a right use of the freedom that is 
opened up for us by the gospel.”^^  Barth adopted this pattern he ascribed to Calvin in 
his Christian Dogmatics by attributing a gospel foimdation to all of his ethical claims, 
malting faith the basis of his ethics.^^
hi his summaiy of Calvin’s 1536 Institutes, Barth spent a relatively large 
portion of his lecture discussing Calvin’s political ethics.*’^  Barth emphasised the 
fr amework of freedom for Calvin’s political ethics. Rather than promoting a program 
such as a Cliristian state, Christian Socialism, or an ideal state, Calvin rested his ethics 
on the will and command of God. He distinguished the civil order fr om the spiritual 
reign of Christ yet not in contradiction to it. Barth summarises, “The rights of 
government and law and the duty of citizens to obey arise only out of Christian 
fr eedom. For in government and law we encounter the order of God that Cliristians, in 
particular, should not seek to avoid.
Barth found thr ee trains of thought in Calvin’s doctrine of the state and society. 
First, Calvin recognised a positive dignity ascribed to the authorities by God. Though 
he called it “puzzling,” Barth interpreted Calvin’s positive view of government as a 
reaction to fanatics who opposed the government and an affirmation of “something 
divinely significant, a reflection of the majestic divine right that he did not wish to be
Calvin, 74-76. Barth ascribed this to Luther’s background as a monk. He aigues that Calvin’s constant 
engagement with the world enabled him to move from dogmatics to etliics more practically.
Barth describes Calvin’s theology as “simply a new edition of Luther’s with a greater sti'ess on ethics.” 
Calvin, 118.
Calvin, 194.
Calvin, 194 and 197.
^ In the English translation, Barth’s discussion of Calvin’s political ethics comprises over one-third of 
his summary o f the 1536 Institutes (25 pages out of 70 total) whereas in the English tr anslation of 
Calvin’s work, Calvin devoted a mere 20 pages of 225 to this subject.
® ChZvm, 208.
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assailed on obvious rational grounds.” ®^ Secondly, Calvin viewed the law as providing 
legitimacy to government. God’s law as revealed to Moses is “a witness to, and co- 
loiowledge of that natural law which God has engraven on every human soul.”^^  The 
content of this law is the eternal will of God that we worship him and love one another. 
The moral, revealed law explicates the natural law and can be siunmarised by the 
concept of “equity,” the form in which God’s law to love God and neighbour' appears in 
human laws. Surprisingly, Barth did not object to Calvin’s theory of natural law as 
“innate in everyone,though  he did call Calvin’s ideal of equity “pagan-sounding” 
and “imperfect.”^^  He interpreted Calvin’s reference to natural law in the same way he 
interpreted Calvin’s “natur*al lorowledge”: as formed on the basis of God’s divine 
command.^ "^
The third train of thought was “People and Government,” in which Calvin 
posed the question, “May we and should we accept the state in practice?” Calvin 
answered this question in the affirmative, emphasising the duty of subjects to rulers. 
From his own teirdency to question and challenge the government, Barth wrestled with 
Calvin’s positive view of the state. He argued that Calvinism always resulted in a 
refoiming, unsettling, and even revolutionary effect on state life and that Calvin 
provided bars to tyranny in the state.^  ^Thus, in the end, Barth agr eed with this 
affirmation of government, though only “in a par abolic sense, not directly, but 
indirectly, not as it stands but in its relation, as a temporal image of the eternal 
righteousness of God, to what is tlius its meaning and origin.” ®^
In sunnnary, following Barth’s disillusionment with the human foundations for 
ethics found in both Protestant Liberalism and Religious Socialism, Barth discovered in 
the Reformers the exaltation of God, the God who both condemns humanity and who 
embraces humanity tlrrough the justifying work of Christ. He recognised in Luther’s 
doctrine of the justification by faith the work of God’s justice for humanity. In fiitur e
Calvin, 214.
” Calvin, 215.
Calvin, 215.
Calvin, 216.
Calvin, 216.
Calvin, 216 and 224-6. 
Calvin, 221.
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reflection, he would dr aw out the implications of this doctr ine as a foundation for 
human justice.
Barth embraced the work of Calvin because the Scripture principle, which 
affirmed God’s revelation of himself in Scripture, provided Barth with a sure source for 
his theology and ethics.Scripture reveals the foundation of the Christian faith: Jesus 
Christ. Prior to his encounter with Calvin, Barth’s approach had been dominated by his 
reaction and critique to the humanism of his day. Though his criticism provided some 
constructive new ways to approach social justice, his Christological foundation for 
social ethics based upon the revelation of God in Scriptur e took form through the 
influence of Reformed theology.
Two Critiques of Barth’s Christological Ethics
Barth soon encountered criticism from both Catholic and Protestant theologians 
who claimed that his dialectical theology lacked a point of contact with general 
humanity. The Catholics sought this point of contact in the analogia entis while 
Protestants foimd it in natural theology. Barth critiqued both sides for seeking to exalt 
the human person and for grounding ethics in an unrealistic glorification of the human 
person, hi this section, we have chosen two controversies in which this critique by 
Barth comes to the fore: Barth’s lively encounter with Catholic theologian Erich 
Przywara and his heated debate with Emil Brunner. In Barth’s argument that social 
ethics must derive from a distinctly Clnistological understanding of the human person, 
he issued a strong “Nein” to these men on both theological shores because he clearly 
saw the destnrction wrought by the exaltation of human ethics in both of their 
theological systems. First, in his discussion with Augustine scholar, Erich Przywara, 
Barth claimed that Augustine’s appeal to the analogia entis betrayed a basic 
misunderstanding of grace and human personliood. Second, Barth’s strong response to 
Biimner demonstrated his continued plea for a distinctly Clnistological ethic which 
appealed to the Word of God alone, over against the idolatrous exaltation of hiunan 
ethics in natural theology.
See John Webster’s argument that Baith’s turn fi*om the liberal theology was influenced by tlie ethics 
of the Refonned tradition in Barth's Moral Theology, 61 -62.
Although tliis examination has been limited to tlie influences of Luther and Calvin, it is important to 
note Barth’s appreciation of the reformed confessions and of refonned theologians such as Heimich 
Heppe. See Busch, 126-163.
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Przywara’s Complaint: Barth Undermines the Unity of God with Humanity
Barth’s conversation with Catholicism essentially began when he took up a 
professorship at the University in the predominantly Catholic city of Munster in 1925. 
In 1929, Barth invited the Polish Jesuit, Erich Przywara, to Munster to give a lecture to 
his students. Barth had encountered Przywara seven years prior through an article in 
which the Jesuit critiqued Barth’s inability to sustain a concept of God’s immanence in 
balance with Barth’s important emphasis on the transcendence of God. Przywara 
contrasted Baith’s “wholly other God” with Augustine’s God of the analogia entis 
The Jesuit theologian objected to Baith’s replacement of the notion of ‘analogy’ 
between God and the creature with “pure negation.” ®^ Przywara wrote, “If the analogia 
entis of the Catholic concept of God means tlie mysterious tension of a ‘similar- 
dissimilar,’ coiTesponding to the tension of the ‘God in us and above us,’ then in the 
Protestant concept of God, the ‘similarity’ has been completely crossed out.”^^  In this 
original article, Przywara accused Barth of a one-sidedness of relationship that rejected 
any unity of God with humankind. Such one-sidedness, Przywar a claimed, undeimined 
both a theology of Incarnation and an ecclesiology that accounts for the continuing 
presence of God in the world.^^ Thus, Przywara had discerned that the problem of 
Barth’s dialectical theology regai'ded the possibility of bridging the gulf between God 
and humanity. Przywara wanted to bridge this gulf by emphasising the shared being of 
God and humanity grounded in the doctrine of the analogia entis.
Barth responded to Przywara in a lecture given later that year, “The Holy Spirit 
and the Christian Life.”^^  In each part, he criticised the theology of Augustine, 
believing that, “as long as we do not root Augustinianism completely out of the
Rich Przywara, ’^‘Gott in uns oder uber uns? (Immanem und Transzendenz im heutigen Geistesleben),” 
Stimmen derZeit, 105 (1923):344, quoted in McComiack, 320.
McCoimack points out that Barth set aside the way o f ‘pure negation’ in favour o f the ‘dialectic way’ 
in Barth’s article, “The Word of God as the Task of Theology.”
McCormack, 350.
McCormack, 321.
Karl Barth, “Der heilige Geist und das christliche Leben,” in Karl Barth and Heinrich Barth, Zui' Lehre 
vont heiligen Geist, Beiheft I of Zwischen den Zeiten (Munich: Chr. Kaister Veiiag, 1930), 39-105; The 
Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological Basis for Ethics (HSCL), translated by R. Birch 
Hoyle, (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993). There is much evidence that this essay is a 
response to Przywara and the larger dialogue with Catholic theology, including Barth’s engagement with 
Augustine (rather than Aquinas), the discussion of the analogia entis, continuity/discontinuity, and 
similarity/dissimilarity (see for example 8-10, 60) as well as his repeated use of Przywara’s phrase, 
“tianquil and assured,” at key points in his presentation (see 8, 9, 22).
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doctrine of grace, we will never have a Protestant theology.” "^^ Why did Barth respond 
so strongly to Przywara’s critique and Augustine’s theology? Because he recognised in 
Catholic theology a similar problem to liberal protestant theology: the potential 
glorification of the human.
The first problem Barth located concerned the analogia entis, B a r t h  rejected 
any continuity between God and the human at creation. Rather creatm eliness consists 
of God’s continually giving tlrrough his revelation. Barth argued that the creaturely 
spirit cannot produce the word of God by presuming lorowledge about his word as a 
result of continuity or by giving lists of moral counsels confidently taken from 
scripture. He wrote, “An ethics that thinlcs it can Icnow and set forth the command of 
God, the Creator, plants itself upon the thioire of God.”^^  Nor cair the creaturely spirit 
receive the Word of God imassisted.^^ Barth explained, “The fiindamental significance 
of the Holy Spirit for the Christian life is that tlris, our participation in the occuiTence of 
revelatioir, is just our being grasped in this occurrence which is the effect of the divine 
action.”^^  Thus, in oppositiorr to the analogia entis as a foimdation for ethics, Barth 
argued that the only foundation for ethics is revelation of God’s Word in the Holy 
Spirit who meets the creatur e and points to him his way as creatme.^^
The second problem Barth addressed was the Augustinian doctrine of 
reconciliation. Barth argued that Augustine had too weak a view of human sin and
Bartli, HSCL. Barth critiques Augustine’s eschatological failuies in tlie final part. See 60-68.
Later inteipreters criticised Barth for misrepresenting Przywara’s analogia entis. Von Balthasar 
defended Przywara, “Rightly understood, the analogy o f being is the destr uction of every system in 
favour o f a totally objective availability of the creature for God and for the divine measure of the 
creature.” [Von Balthasar, 255.] Von Balthasar conceded that Przywara did not make his answer to 
Barth’s objections clear until his publication in the following decade (Ibid, footnote 5). Jtingel described 
Barth’s early notion of this doctr ine as a “horrible phantom” that Barth later relinquished after he adopted 
a type of analogical metliod (analogia fides) as the starting point of his own theology. [Eberhard Jtingel, 
God as the Mysteiy o f the World, trans. Danell Guder, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 282-283], The 
work of Alan Torrance has resolved Jlingel’s criticism by clarifying Barth’s objection as a rejection of 
analogia entis as a metaphysical principle that provides the foimdation for theological methodology. 
[Alan Ton’ance, Persons in Cotnmunion, (Edinbiugh: T&T Clark, 1996), 162-63. See also later 
discussion in Chapter Seven, Section titled: “Human Ontology and Epistemic Access to Justice.] 
McCormack brought some resolution to the matter: “In all likelihood, [Barth] was simply indicating that 
the plirase analogia entis canies more freight than Przywara personally would allow. Barth saw in this 
phrase the ill-advised attempt to order both God and humankind into a higher concept, namely of ‘bemg’; 
to make botli God and humankind simply differing exemplifications of being in order then to ascend 
ft'om a knowledge o f creaturely being to a knowledge of God (natural theology).” McCormack, 389.
HSCL, 10.
HSCL, 10.
HSCL, 6.
HSCL, 11.
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human grace, “Augustine’s view of sin was that it was really only a wound, a 
derangement within the undistmbed continuity of man witli God.” ®^ Grace, then, is a 
“synergism” of “divine gift and man’s creative action combined into one.”^^  The Role 
of the Holy Spirit is to impait “a divine quality inhering in the soul” which “uplifts man 
by and by until he is made a non-siimer.”^^  Baith balked at such theology for its failure 
to take sin seriously.Grace is the righteousness that is imputed to us, “‘alien,’ 
‘external’ righteousness” or “the righteousness that comes from without.” '^^  Rather than 
the creatiue working his way up to God, God has come to the creature and He has 
justified him. Sin is independence fiom this justification, the attempt to do good works 
without it, the unbelief in the self-giving of God. Barth continued to warn of this himian 
tendency to ‘control’ rather than ‘surrender,’ to judge what is right rather than trusting 
the umpire, the Holy Spirit who alone knows what is Christian and what is not 
Cliristian. Thus, Barth challenged the aiTogance of the creature who thinlcs he finds 
righteousness in his autonomous self. Such arrogance wrealcs destrnction in human 
ethics because it idolises the creature rather than hearing and receiving through the 
Spirit the righteous Word of God.
The Protestant Critique: Brunner and Natural Theology
The second and far stronger “Nein” Barth issued in this period was against the 
attempt by Brunner to establish a natmal theology as the basis for ethics. Brunner’s 
question was a valid one to pose to Barth. Because Barth grounded ethics in his 
tlieology of judgement and grace, Brunner questioned Barth’s ability to find a point of 
contact with non-Christian ethics that would allow for dialogue. He argued that Barth 
could not communicate to non-Cluistians an ethic that depends upon the gi'ace of God 
to be understood and he said that natui al theology provided that point of contact.
HSCL, 23.
HSCL, 22.
HSCL, 23.
Barth wi'ote, “Sin is not taken in deadly earnest when it is regarded as something that can be radically 
overcome by the enthusiasm of ‘good intentions’ and then, by and by, can be removed by practical 
activity.” HSCL, 23.
HSCL, 26.
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The political developments in Germany concnnent with Brunner’s article help 
to explain the force of Barth’s “Nein.”^^  Hitler and the National Socialists had forced 
their way to power in January 1933 and systematically sought to undermine and 
eventually destroy the chui’ches by imposing a “German Christian church” which held 
to the tenets of National Socialism alongside the Christian gospel. Bar th spoke out 
boldly during tliis time against the idolatry of any ideology besides or alongside the 
gospel of grace and he argued against the authority of any human over the church .H e 
declar ed that the chm ch “could have no other gods than God, that holy scripture was 
enough to guide the church into all tr uth, that the grace of Jesus Clirist was enough to 
forgive oiu* sins and order our life.”^^
Nature and Grace
Writing from Switzerland, Brumier questioned Barth’s ethical foundation in this 
gospel of grace. In his essay, Brminer proposed six theses to counter “Barth’s false 
conclusions.” As an introduction to his first thesis, Brunner divided tlie imago Dei into 
the “formal” image and the “material” image of God. The formal image is that which 
differentiates the human from an animal and consists in the human person as subject 
(possessed of capacity for words and rational) and the human’s responsibility. The 
material image, on the other hand, has been lost because, “man is a sinner thr'ough and 
tlu'ough and there is nothing in him which is not defiled by sin.”^^  hi his second thesis, 
Bmnner claimed that there ar e two kinds of revelation: revelation in Creation and 
revelation in Jesus Christ. Although creation is not sufficient for salvation because “sin 
malces man blind for what is visibly set before our eyes,”^^  he ar gued that God has 
bestowed a “capacity for revelation” upon his works. Only those people whose eyes 
have been opened by Chr'ist, those who stand witliin the revelation of Christ, can gain a 
true natiual knowledge of God.
Trevor Hart argues this point in “The Capacity for Ambiguity,” in Regarding Karl Barth, (Cumbria: 
Paternoster Press, 1999), 144,
Busch, 236. (Quoted from Gottes Wille und unsere Wunsche, Theologislie Existenz heute 7, 3-9.)
Busch, 227. (Quoted from Selbstdarstellung, 1964.)
Brumier, “Nature and Grace,” in Natural Theology: Comprising 'Nature and Grace ’ by Emil Brunner 
and the Reply 'Not' by Karl Barth, Peter Fraenlcel, tians., (London: Centenary Press, 1946), 24.
^  “Nature and Grace,” 25.
“Nature and Grace,” 27.
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Third, Brunner ai'gued for a notion of God’s gracious preservation as his 
presence to those who are fallen. His fourth thesis stated that the sphere of preseiwing 
grace contains “ordinances” that form a basic part of all ethical problems. He 
differentiated between an “ordinance of creation” such as marriage which was 
instituted by the Creator and the “ordinance of preservation” which was given by God 
as a result of sin, arguing that both of these ar e created and maintained by instinct and 
reason, by nature’s unconscious action and by the reason of the human person.
Fifth, Brunner contended for a “point of contact” between God’s grace and man. 
He located this “point of contact” in the human persons’s formal imago Dei, through 
which the human is receptive to the Word of God.^^  ^Brunner wi'ote, “The sphere of 
this ‘possibility of being addressed’ includes not only the huinanum [formal image] in 
the naiTower sense, but everything comiected with the ‘natural’ lorowledge of God. The 
Word of God could not reach a man who had lost his consciousness of God entirely... . 
Wliat the natural man loiows of God, of the law and of his own dependence upon God, 
may be very confused and distorted. But even so it is the necessary, indispensable point 
of contact for divme g r a c e .B r u n n e r ’s final thesis stated that the subject, and the fact 
of self-consciousness, is not destr oyed but repaired by the act of faith. The remainder
of Brunner’s pamphlet comprised a defence based upon his interpretation of the 
Reformers and an explication of the signifîc^ce of natinal theology for the church.
Kai'l Barth perceived Brunner’s essay as “an alarm signal” indicating tlie danger 
of compromise which thr eatened the pmity and unity of the theology of the Evangelical 
Church.'®"^  Thus, he replied to Brunner with a violent, “iVem!” and rejected natural 
theology which he defined as “every (positive or negative) formulation o f a system 
which claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine revelation, whose subject, 
however, differs fundamentally from the revelation in Jesus Christ and whose method 
therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy Scriptiue.” ®^^
“Nature and Grace,” 32.
“Nature and Grace,” 32-33.
“Nature and Grace,” 33. Bmnner argues that Galatians 2:20 demonstrates that “the formal personality 
continues beyond the death of the material.”
Barth, “No!” m. Natural Theology: Comprising ‘Nature and Grace’ by Emil Brunner and the Reply 
‘No!’ by Karl Barth, Peter Fraenlcel, tians., (London: Centenary Press, 1946), 69. He writes, “The real 
danger seems to me to lie in a future attitude of the Church and of theology which is informed by die 
spirit of the many on both sides to-day who are undecided and ready for compromise and which might 
stand at the end of all that we are now going tlrrough.”
105 74_75_
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Barthes “Nein!”
In a later reflection on Baith’s negative response. Reformed theologian, Edward 
Dowey, criticised Barth for misunderstanding Brunner on two accounts: Brminer’s 
aims regai'ding natural theology and Brunner’s interpretation of John Calvin as a 
supporter of such aims. Dowey argued that Brmmer was not seeking an independent 
natural theology to stand over against God’s revelation in Scriptme (as Barth’s 
definition implied), but a “Chiistian theologia naturalis, i.e. for Cliristian theological 
thinking which tries to account for the phenomena of natural life.” ®^*’ He concluded that 
both Karl and his brother, Peter Baith, interpreted Brunner’s essay inaccmately.^®  ^
However, Barth’s objection was not a matter of conflicting definitions of natural 
theology as Dowey supposed. Barth stmck at the very aim, method, content, and ethical 
implications of Brminer’s theology, arguing that there can be no valid Chiistian 
miderstanding of creation, nature, or sin apart from Jesus Chiist.^®^
In contrast to Dowey, I would argue that with regard to the aim of theology, 
Barth opposed Brunner’s definition of the theological task: “to find a way back to a true 
theologia naturalisl’^ ^^  Barth argued that the only aim of theology could be to 
understand God as he revealed himself. This additional aim of Brunner’s displayed his 
preoccupation with a subject other than Chiist.
Secondly, Barth criticised Brumier’s theological method both for its abstract 
speculation and his use of natmal theology as a hermeneutical tool. For example, Barth 
claimed that Brunner went beyond what is revealed in Scripture by using speculative 
categories such as formal and material. Although such categories may have initially 
seemed straightforward in Brunner’s essay, Baith pointed out that the lines between 
them became blurred and Brunner tended to include hints of the material in the foimal 
imago Dei in a way which mislead and confused the reader. Although Brunner claimed 
a concern that the church’s proclamation rest upon Holy Scriptme as “the ultimate 
standai'd,” Barth exposed Brunner’s methodological fallacy of using human categories
“No!” 30.
Edward A. Dowey, A Knowledge o f  God in Calvin's Theology, (London; Columbia University Press, 
1964), 137-139 and 247-249.
Alasdair Heron, A Century o f  Protestant Theology, (Cambridge: Lutterwortlr Press, 1980), 88.
No!” 70.109
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that made natural theology (rather than Jesus Chiist) the foundation for his theological 
speculations.
Third, Barth opposed Brunner’s theology for failing to take seriously the impact 
of sin upon humanity. Barth posed two opposing options regarding epistemic access to 
God. (1) The human person is completely blind, idolatiy (a false hnage of God) is the 
prepai'atory stage for Imowledge of God, and Brunner’s "'theologia naturalis'' is merely 
a systematic exposition of the liistory of religion, philosophy, and culture. (2) Or the 
human is capable of gaining real Imowledge of the true God without Clnist and without 
the Holy Spirit. According to Barth, Brunner’s reference to a “point of contact” for 
redeeming giace blurred the lines between ‘formal’ and ‘material’ by indicating that a 
remainder of man’s original righteousness, openness to God, or readiness to heai* what 
God has to say. Baith argued that the Word of God does not rely upon human capacity 
in any sense. Rather, the Word overcomes hiunanity’s resistance and opposition to 
God.^ ^® Thus, Barth concluded, the Word does not need to merely perfect humanity but 
to create it anew.
The ethical and political implications of Bnumer’s claims were perhaps the 
gieatest impetus for Barth’s uncompromising reply. Barth feared the imminent danger 
of natural theology as a foundation for ethical and political decisions. He sought to 
reinforce the absolute impossibility for a human to hold up history or society as a 
foimdation for discovering God-implanted orders in creation which shape political and 
ethical progi'ams. Precisely such a foundation, Barth believed, had led to a Clnistian 
ideology which justified the domination of the Ai'yan race and to readings of history 
that supported the Nazi regime. By holding liistoiy and society and nature as valid 
foundations for Imowledge about God, the Geiman Chiistians built their ethics upon a 
faulty foimdation and limited the fieedom of the gospel to proclaim God’s grace and his 
commands for humanity.
Writing fiom Switzerland, perhaps Brunner did not realise the implications of 
his argument for the existence of natural “ordinances which ai e the constant factors of 
historical and social life.”^^  ^Though Barth conceded that such ordinances may indeed 
exist, he insisted that humans are unable to discern them or use them as a basis for 
speaking about God or ethics. He wrote:
110 «No!” 89 and Hart, 162-163.
“Nature and Grace,” 29.
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No doubt there are such things as moral and sociological axioms which 
seem to underlie the various customs, laws and usages of different 
peoples, and seem to appear in them with some regularity. And there 
certainly seems to be some connection between these axioms and the 
instinct and reason which both believers and unbelievers have indeed ■ 
every reason to allow to fimction in the life of the community. But what 
are these axioms? Or who—among us, who aie ‘sinners through and 
through’!—decided what they ai*e?^ ^^
Thus, Barth radically opposed Biamner by exposing that his theologis naturalis was not
merely an inquiry into Christian knowledge but provided a foundation for human
speculation. Despite Brunner’s claim to view creation through the spectacles of God’s
revelation in Scr ip ture ,Barth’s strong retort revealed that Branner’s aim, method,
subject, and ethical implications did not find their basis in the revelation of Jesus Clnist
in Scripture and for tliis reason held potential for the destmctive nature of human
ethics.
Because of this concern with Bmmier’s approach, Barth came down even haider 
upon his own good friend than he had come against Catholic natural theology. He 
wrote:
I can hardly say a clear “No” to Hirsch and his associates, but close my 
eyes in the case of Brunner, the Calvinist, the Swiss “dialectical 
theologian.” For it seems clear to me that at the decisive point he takes 
part in the false movement of thought by wliich the Church today is 
thi eatened.. . . My polemic against Brunner is more acute than that 
against Hirsch, because his position is more akin to mine, because I 
believe him to be in possession of more truth, i.e. to be closer to the 
Scriptui'es, because I take him more seriously—because for that very 
reason he seems to me just now to be much more dangerous than a man 
like Hirsch.
Because he saw Nazism as the primary enemy, Barth went so far as to line Brunner up 
with Hirsch in seeking to oppose any methodology that opened the door to the 
exaltation of human ethics over the command of God. His opposition to Brunner 
demonsti'ates that Baith’s critique of natural theology was not anti-Catholic^^^ but that
“No!” 86.
BiTuiner took this metaphor from Calvin’s Institutes I.vi and xiv. T.H.L. Parker argues.that Brunner 
did violence Calvin’s theology by interpreting these passages in this manner without regard to the whole 
of Calvin’s argument. Parker wiites, “Calvin tells us, on the basis of the Biblical witness, that the faculty 
of perceiving the Creator in His works is not merely impaired, but lost; tliat man is not suffering fr om 
bad eyesight, but from total blindness.” See Parker, The Doctrine o f the Knowledge o f God: A Study in 
the Theology o f John Calvin (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1952), 30-39.
"‘^ “No!” 68.
For example, see Barth’s affirmation of Sôhngen’s conception of the analogia entis in CD II. 1.81.
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his oveiTiding concern was to oppose the methodology, aiising from either tradition, 
wliich lacked the critical critique which Nazism made necessary.
In his responses to Brunner and Przywara, Barth did not explicitly answer the 
valid questions which were implied in their critiques: Does Baith’s Christological ethic 
have a point of contact with common humanity? What does the gospel of gi'ace have to 
do with the morality of a non-Christian society? Does the church, without a point of 
contact in natural theology or the analogia entis, lose her voice altogether? Barth’s 
answers to these questions came more explicitly in his Church Dogmatics, which we 
will expound in the following two chapters.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the reaction of Barth against the glorification of 
humanity in Geiman society and in Gennan theology. Baith first began to question the 
liberal theology under which he was ti ained when he encountered the misery of human 
persons who were oppressed by the social system which that theology supported and 
maintained. He began to realise that this theological approach had accepted too readily 
the tenants of cultui e and had thereby embraced the deification of humanity. Such 
theology was meaningless because it placed human opinion in the place of God’s 
command and judgement. Liberalism provided no distinctly Cliristian critique for 
humanism or for the oppression which humanism wrought. Liberalism had no place for 
a God who is wholly other and who judges the injustice of humans against one another.
Bai*th’s turn to religious socialism, which opposed the “dead God” of the 
liberals, provided little hope for him either. Whereas Liberalism had no basis for social 
critique, the religious socialists critiqued their opponents in the name of God, claiming 
to usher in God’s Kingdom here on eaitli. Though he became intrigued with them for a 
time, their support of WWI led to Barth’s disillusionment. He began to wonder if such 
critique should not also be turned inward. Certainly, religious socialism offered a 
needed critique of bour geois cultur e, but who were they, as humans, to claim to speak 
the word of God and to establish the Kingdom of God? It was during this time that 
Bar*th posed the self-critical question, “Is it self-evident tliat ‘we’ ‘represent’ the 
Kingdom of God?”"®
Kai‘1 Barth to Eduard Thumeysen, 6 August \9 i5 , Revolutionaiy Theology in the Making: Bank- 
Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, trans., J. Smart, (London: Epwortli, 1964), 69-70.
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A needed reprieve came when Barth encountered the ministry of the 
Blumhardts. He observed men and women who worked to alleviate human suffering 
and who attempted to promote social justice yet they exuded a luunility which stmck 
Barth. The Blumhardts based their theology and their ministry upon a God who is 
wholly other, a God who breaks into human history and establishes his Kingdom. 
Baith’s encoimter with Blumhaidts brought him an eschatological understanding of the 
Kingdom of God that affimied God's work through CMst in society rather than 
autonomous human work for God. This affirmation led to Barth’s new questions 
regarding the natuie of God’s revelation: how God makes himself Imown in the 
epistemological sense and also how one may perceive God’s work in society.
Baith sought to understand this God tlrrough liis study of scriptuie. His 
commentaiy on Romans articulated a dialectic between God and humanity, the 
righteousness of God and the sinfulness of humanity. As he argued in later essays and 
in his revision of the commentaiy on Romans, Baith clearly saw the implications of this 
dialectic for social issues. The righteousness of God that reveals the sin of humanity 
shows that humans can no longer put themselves in the place of judge or of mler. Rule 
and judgement belongs to God alone. In this manner, he critiqued both the ruling class 
and the socialists who sought to overthrow them. Even at this early stage, Barth saw 
clearly that humans alone cannot establish justice. Rather, humans stand in need of the 
goodness of God and the justice of God found in the person of Jesus Clnist.
Barth found in the Reformers the theology which supported his own discoveries 
and which furthered the development of his Clnistological approach and foundation for 
justice. However, this foundation was soon challenged by both Catholic and Protestant 
theologians who claimed that Barth was undennining human ethics altogether by 
making them dependent upon Clnistian doctrine. Again, Barth argued against their 
criticisms that by seeking a point of contact in creation rather than in Clnist they were 
opening themselves to the danger of human approaches to justice and he believed that 
they lacked the fundamental criterion forjudging when such approaches would lead to 
the sort of destructive idolatiy of humanity that Barth was witnessing in pre-WWII 
Germany. “But what are these axioms?” Baiih demanded, “Or who—among us, who 
are ‘simiers through and through’!—decided what they aie?”^^  ^In the midst of an era 
that sought to deify the human person and to found social ethics upon human ideas,
“No!” 86.
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Barth witnessed the destruction which such confidence wreaked and he sought a new 
foundation in Chiist for understanding the human person under the judgement and 
gi ace of God and for approaching questions of social ethics. While this chapter traced 
how he came to this conclusion, began to construct his foundation, and battled against 
those who opposed him, the following chapter will explore the implications of a 
Christological foundation for the understanding of human persons and for the approach 
to social ethics.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CRITERION FOR JUSTICE:
JESUS-CHRIST, THE COVENANT PARTNER OF GOD
In the previous chapter, we traced Barth’s reaction against the approach to 
social ethics which dominated his context and which had no voice of critique for the 
destruction wrought by two world wars. Barth did not only try to chop off the leaves 
and the branches of this poisonous ti'ee by addressing the symptoms of the problem. He 
also discerned the root of the problem and he hacked away mercilessly at the 
deification of the human person which was poisoning his society within and wreaking 
destmction on a global scale.
Bai*th argued that theology and ethics must start anew; his Church Dogmatics 
encapsulates that attempt to root out humanism by starting afiesh with God. He 
contended that humans need not deteiinine God or ethics based upon their own ideas 
because God himself has made himself Imown in the person of Jesus Clirist. Rather 
than begimiing with the human and then ascending to knowledge of God, Barth began 
with God in order to understand humanity.
In this chapter and in the chapter that follows, I will examine the implication of 
Barth’s new stalling point for political and economic ethics as developed in his Church 
Dogmatics. In this chapter, I will explore Bailh’s linlc between social ethics and 
theology by expounding Bailh’s doctrine of election and his doctrine of creation as they 
reveal the criteria for social justice. First, based on Barth’s Doctrine o f God, I will 
argue that Jesus Christ provides the criterion for social justice because covenant 
includes election and the command that creates human freedom. I will briefly explore 
the implications of Baith’s Chiistological criterion for his general ethics.
The second section will address Barth’s transition from general to special ethics. 
Whereas general ethics are the counterpart to Bai th’s doctrine of election, special ethics 
deal more specifically with concrete human action. I will seek to demonstrate that
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Barth’s special ethics are equally connected to his theology as were his general ethics. 
This connection is most evident in the methodology that he employed.
In the final section, I will argue that Barth’s criterion for specific social ethics of 
creation is the person of Jesus Christ because Christ alone determines humanity. 
Whereas the humanistic approach to ethics begins with a universal notion of humanity 
and human rights before moving to specific ethical responsibility and action, Barth 
started with particular humanity in order to interpret universal humanity. His 
antlnopology originated in the particular person Jesus Chiist, the one elected to be 
covenant partner with God, the one who revealed true humanity uncorrupted by sin, 
and the one in whom humans have been elected to become the covenant partners of 
God and to be sanctified by the command of God. While Clnist’s divinity implies that 
he is man for God, his humanity implies that he is human for men and women, human 
in fellow-hiunanity, and the human who reveals that tine humanity involves encoimter 
with God and fellow-humans.^ In other words, Chiist made human solidarity a material 
reality by making himself one with humans.
In the political sphere, this Christological anthropology means that over against 
a naiTow nationalism, the human is determined for being and activity as a member of 
his own nation as well as all of humanity.^ This outward movement involves respecting 
the life of all humans and calling for justice in service to the world. With regard to 
hiunan life, Barth argues for respect for one’s own life and the life of others. In the 
economic sphere, Barth placed a special emphasis upon work as the human action that 
corresponds to God’s providential rule. He appealed for the criterion of humanity in 
work, that work maintain the element of brotherliness. According to Barth, the criterion 
of humanity for political and economic life rests not upon ethics that are autonomous 
fi om theology but they ar e revealed in the very person of God as he is made known in 
Jesus Christ. Thus, I will argue that Barth’s social ethics were determined by his 
Clnistological antlnopology, specifically in the covenant of God with humanity which 
was established in Clnist and in the real humanity revealed by Clnist.
The following chapter, Chapter Six, will explore the linlc between Barth’s social 
ethics and his doctrine of reconciliation. Barth argues that Christ provides not only the 
criterion, but the possibility for human justice through his life, death, and resurrection.
' CDIII.4.116. 
 ^CD III.4.286.
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Chiist’s downward movement of incarnation revealed the justice of God’s judgement 
and his justification of humanity so that humans might live in righteous relation with 
one another and work against injustice in this world. The upward movement of Clirist 
revealed his kingly office and God’s establishing of his Kingdom in this world. As 
citizens in the free Kingdom of God, Christians have been freed to work for justice in 
accordance with Clnist’s Lordship. The prophetic role of Chiist is a movement outwaid 
in service to the world, in which the church co-operates through witness and seiwice to 
the world. In this manner, Chiist transfoims human life so that we might be fieed to 
participate in God’s establishing of justice in this world. Thus, in chapters five and six,
I will argue that Barth established a necessary comiection of social ethics with Chiistian 
theology because he located the true dignity of personhood in the person and work of 
Jesus Christ. Specifically, as a reaction against the humanistic ethics of his day, Barth’s 
Christological starting point provides the criterion for assessing true justice and the 
means for forming just persons in society.
The Criteria for Justice: The Election and Command of God
In contr ast to the hiunanistic approaches to ethics that sought to move from 
universal notions of humanity or God to the particulaiity of autonomous human ethics, 
Baiih sought to ground his ethics in the particular person of God as he revealed himself 
in Jesus Christ.^ Baiih argued that Jesus Christ alone provides the criterion for social 
justice because the covenant which God establishes with humanity in Jesus Christ 
includes the election o f humanity and the command o f God that creates human 
freedom. We will unpack the significance of this argument by examining these two 
sides of God’s gracious covenant: election and command.
God’s Gracious Election
In 1936, Barth heard Peter Maury give a lecture titled, “Election and Faith,” 
which laid the foundation for Barth’s doctrine of election. In this essay, Maury 
proposed that the doctrine of election could not be treated in abstr action from Jesus 
Clnist for “outside of Chi ist we loiow neither of the electing God, nor of His elect, nor 
of the act of election. Maur y reasoned that if election is in Clirist, it means that Chiist
 ^CD 1.2.789-793.
 ^PieiTe Mamy, Ei-wahlung und Glaube, (Theologislie Studien, 8; Zurich: EVZ, 1940); quoted in 
McCormack, 457.
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has taken human rejection upon liimself and, as a result, the pui-poses of God for 
humans aie positive. Rather than electing some and rejecting others, God in Chiist 
rejects all and elects all. Mauiy wrote, “Each Clnistian Icnows that in Chiist his life is 
rejected, and pardoned by grace; faced with the Cross he sees himself to be the 
unpardonable executioner of his Saviour, and at the same time the pardoned sinner 
whom nothing can sepaiate from the love of God, which is in his Son.”  ^Thus, both the 
election and the rejection of hiunanity were realised in Chiist, revealing God’s love for 
humanity.
Barth incorporated Maury’s thesis into his own thought, applying it in his 
Doctrine of God, as the first step towards understanding the linlc between God and 
humanity: the love of God for human persons revealed in the election of humanity in 
Clnist. According to Barth, the subject of election is the Son of God with the Father and 
the Holy Spirit. Christ is the subject because he is the elect, chosen by God to bear the 
sin of the human race and to accept the wi*ath that is the consequence of sin. hi 
addition, Clnist is the object of divine election. Chiist is the subject of election because 
he is the electing God, the one who chooses the human race and chooses himself as the 
bearer of our sm and its consequences. Clnist is also the object of election as the 
elected human person, the eternal son in human nature. Thus, Jesus Clirist was elected 
to be the object of divine retribution and rejection, accepting the consequences for sin 
that humans deserved, and electing hiunankind to participation in his glory.^ Because of 
this election, Christ bridges die gap between God and humanity, “tiimself God and 
Himself man, and so mediating between the two. In Him man sees and knows God.”  ^hi 
this way, Jesus fulfils the eternal will and decree of God and he discloses this will to 
humanity: the divine election of giace.^
What, then, is the implication of this election of grace for the community and 
the individual? The election of grace is the election of a community, which witnesses to 
the whole world and summons the world to faith in Christ.^ The church witnesses to the 
fact that the choice of the “godless” individual to isolate herself fr om God is empty
Pierre Maury, Predestination, trans. Edwin Hudson, (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1960), 65. 
 ^CD II.2.94.
’ CD II.2.94.
* CD II.2.95.
^CDII.2.195,
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because she belongs to Christ and is elected by God in Christ, appointed for eternal life 
with God.^ ®
Election and Command
Barth’s chapter on theological ethics that follows his discussion of election 
sheds light on the unique character of this doctrine. Baifh emphasised the covenant of 
God and the gospel of God as the basis of the law of God. The command of God for 
human behaviour talces place only within the election of humanlcind in Clnist.
Opposing the idea that the law is independeiit from the gospel (i.e., the human is given 
law, lives by the law, and joins the people of God through obedience to the law), Barth 
described election as God’s act of gmce to come to humans, to choose humans, and to 
establish a covenant with hrmians. Thus, the election of grace (rather than the giving of 
law) is the first element of the covenant. Barth wr ote, “God elects himself to be 
gracious toward man, to be his Lord and Helper, and in so doing He elects man to be 
the witness to His glory.
Yet the doctrine of election did not comprise the whole of the concept of 
covenant. Baith asserted that God elected humans for a piupose: to be a partner in the 
covenant. Thus, the covenant is two-sided. Covenant includes (a) election, in that God 
elected himself to be God of his people on the other hand, and (b) command, because 
God elected his people to be his people. As par tners of the covenant, his people are 
mled over by God; He wants their obedience and service, “He wills to talce him into his 
service, to commission him for a share in his own work.”^^  In this way, God’s Word is 
both Gospel and Law, “as the one Word of God wliich is the revelation and work of his 
Grace reaches us, its aim is that our being and action should be conformed to His.” "^^
CD n.2.306.
“ CDII.2.510.
As Colin Gunton stated, “Election is to a paiticular kind of life.” “The Triune God and the Freedom of 
the Creature,” in S.W. Sykes, ed., Karl Barth: Centenary Essays, (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 51. See also John Webster, Ethics o f Reconciliation, 48-50 and P.D. Matheiiy, Dogrrnatics 
and Ethics, (New York; P. Lang, 1990), 166-270 on the ethical implications of Barth’s docti'ine of 
election.
‘^ CDII.2.512.
‘'‘ CDII.2.512.
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Command Ethics
Bailh calls the ethics which are connected with election, “general ethics” 
because they deal with the question of miderstanding generally the fact and the extent 
to which good hmnan action is effected by the action of God in His command. General 
ethics show that the command of God is always God’s decision about the right or 
wrong of human action. The command claims humans and decides God’s judgement of 
gi'ace by which the hmnan person is free for good action and free for eternal life. Barth 
wrote that the command of God is the hmnan’s sanctification, “Good hmnan action is 
set free by the command of God, by His claim and decision and judgement.”^^  Thus, 
through election, God elects himself to be the God of his people and tlnough his 
command he elects his people to be his people. His connnand is judgement because he 
decides what is justice in the social sphere of human relations yet it is gi acious 
judgement because it sets humans free fr om their destructive self-glorification so that 
they might live justly in the social sphere.
Command Ethics and the Problem of Human Freedom
Numerous critics of Barth’s work claim that this theology limits human freedom 
and self-determination as ethical beings.Certainly on the surface, Baith’s command 
ethics can appear to portray God as a totalitarian ruler who chooses humans and forces 
his leadersliip upon them, thus limiting their fieedom. His work has often been 
inteipreted in this manner. However, recent research by Colin Gimton and Jolui 
Webster has highlighted Baith’s multi-faceted affirmation of human fi'eedom.*  ^Baith’s 
theology of command and election provides for human fieedom in tlnee ways.
” CD IIL4.5.
J. Cullberg was among the first of many critics to argue that Barth’s concept of God overwhelmed and 
negated any real sense o f human agency. Das Problem, 18 and 29; H. von Balthasar criticised Bartli for 
yielding to a metaphysics structmed around his conception of revelation and election which causes the 
response of the creature to become ambiguous. {The Theology o f Karl Barth, 242-246.) See also 
Elizabedi Vincent, Ethics from Above or Below? PhD thesis. University of Edinbuigh, 1993 and Willis, 
199.
Webster and Gimton have argued that much of the misunderstanding lay in Enlightenment 
presuppositions regarding human freedom and autonomy against which Bartli was reacting. Webster 
provides the most thorough argument tliat Barth’s theology maintains the freedom of humanity in 
Barth’s Ethics o f Reconciliation and Barth's Moral Theology. Witli regard to election and human 
freedom, Gunton ascribes partial fault o f the persistent misunderstanding to the inadequacy of Barth’s 
pneumatology. He has suggested that Barth’s modal conception of God undermined particularity in 
Barth’s Chiistology and destabilised die balance between divine and human freedom. Gunton prefers the 
pneumatological approach to election by Edward Irving because it gives more weight to the distinctive 
fimctions of the Spirit while affriniing the humanity o f Clirist and, tlius, human freedom. [Colin Gunton, 
"The Triune God and the Freedom of the Creature,” in Karl Barth, ed. S.W. Sykes, 59-64.] Jolm Webster
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First, Barth argues that the leadership of Christ does not usuip par ticulaiity but
gives freedom and responsibility to the individual:
The Clnistian concept of election does not involve tliis despoiling of the 
many for the salce of the one. On the contrary, when Jesus Christ is the 
elected One, the election and the accompanying mystery of individuality 
and solitude, and with it the fr eedom and responsibility and the authority 
and the power of the many, are not abrogated, but definitively confirmed 
in this Other. He is not the object of the divine election of gr ace instead 
of them, but on their behalf. . . .  He is what he is and has what He has, in 
his revelation and imparting of it to the many.’^
Thus, Christ rules through his service to his people, allowing for and enliancing their
paiticularity.
Secondly, the election and command of God does not restrict human fr eedom 
because it creates human freedom. According to Barth, the person who is severed from 
the Creator and the Lord is the hrmian person who is a slave of the created world and of 
himself. As contrasted to this slavery of godlessness, the election and command of God 
brings freedom to live by the grace of God. God’s election does not disqualify 
humanity but intimately sets humanity upon its feet, “specifying, founding, and 
centring himian self-determination.”^^  Thus, the command relieves the human fr'om 
slavery to the created world by drawing him to God.^°
In this doctrine, Barth opposed the Enlightenment description of human 
autonomy in two ways.^^ First, he ar gued against the possibility of an autonomous 
human choice for  God. God has elected himself to be God for  luunans, Barth argued,
balances Gunton’s work by demonstrating the emphasis upon the Spirit in Barth’s ethics and the freedom 
that arises from Baith’s pneumatology. [Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, 108-111.] Yet Gunton’s 
critique of Barth’s heavily Clnistological view of election better accounts for the confusion which has 
arisen over human freedom in Barth’s work.
CD II.2.311. In this passage, Barth is showing a contrast between tlie leader who rises tlnough the 
ranks and becomes elevated over them as an absolute usuiper in relation to other individuals. Yet this 
passage still seems to project some totalitarian understanding of mle upon God.
Jolm Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, 107 and 109. Webster argues, “To exist as a moral being is to 
exist in a given shape, to act within certain limits. Those limits are not a set o f arbitrarily imposed 
barriers, closing off what are, in fact, genuine human possibilities. Rather, they are fue form  within 
which and as which the human moral agent may exist, and outside which it is not meaningful to speak of 
good human conduct at all. Being a human moral agent means existing in this way, not as a hindrance to 
liberty, but as the shape in which human life is itself.” Barth’s Ethics o f Reconciliation, 55.
CD.II.2.586.
Daphne Hampson provided an example of a Kantian approach to fr eedom as autonomy in “On 
Autonomy and Heteronomy’’ in Swallowing a Fishbone, edited by Hampson, (London: SPCK, 1996), 9- 
12. See also Charles Taylor’s definition of fr eedom as “something men win through to by setting aside 
obstacles or breaking loose from external impediments, ties or entanglements.” He affirmed of Hegel’s 
notion of authentic freedom, “To be free is to be untrammelled, to depend in one’s action only on 
oneself.” Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 155.
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humans had no choice in the matter. Second, Barth rejected the autonomy of human 
response to God. Humans did not choose to become the people of God by living up to 
his standard as deduced from natm*e or by reason or even in His law.^  ^On the contiary, 
God elected liis people and gave them his command by which they might live as his 
covenant people. Only in the fr eedom of this election does the human become fr ee.
Third, while God elects himself to rule humankind, the individual may respond 
in faith and obedience, as the one who will live as elect (on the basis of the truth of her 
existence) or she may respond as one who is reprobate (thus living on the basis of a 
lie).^  ^In other words, God’s command does not approach the autonomous and free 
individual with a choice to obey or disobey. Apart from Christ, the hiunan does not 
have freedom or individuality. Only through God’s election in Jesus Christ, who 
received the punislunent for hiunan sin and graciously gave humans fr eedom, does the 
individual become truly free to obey. Thus, because the command of God is also the 
grace of God (indicative of the election of God), the command of God sets humans 
free, liberating the human from unfaithfulness and evil and binding him to the person of 
Jesus Christ.
Election and Justice
What aie the implications of God’s election and command for notions of 
political and economic justice? First, Jesus Christ forms the starting point for all ethics 
for “there is no good which is not obedience to God’s command. And there is no 
obedience to God’s command which is not the obedience of Jesus C hrist.B ecause  
God has chosen himself to be our God, all of human life and behaviour, including 
political and economic behavioui", come under his Lordship. Second, the election of 
God in Jesus Chiist forms the starting point for defining notions of societal justice. The 
doctrine of election undergirds every facet of commitment to that which is other than
I include ‘his law’ here because humans proved incapable of attaining God’s command in the law as 
will be discussed in CD IV.
McCormack, 459.
CD.II.2.586 & 630.
CD II.2.541. Bromiley summarises Barth’s assertion, “He concedes that thanks to God’s patience and 
wisdom and man’s inconsistency the good may in fact be Imown and done, at least in part, by non- 
Cliristians. Yet this forms no basis for an independent ethics. In principle this knowing and doing of the 
good is right only in so far as it is Cliristian. It will always need to be conected by Christian ethics. 
Scientifically, then, theological ethics is the only ethics.” Introduction to the Theology o f  Karl Barth, 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1979), 101.
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God.^  ^As Alan Torrance explained, "to confess the Lordship of Clirist over all areas of 
life (intellectual and cultmal, ecclesial and civil) means that, in the light of the Gospel, 
we are unconditionally obliged to be true and obedient to the One who is in her person 
God’s Word to humanldnd. Cultiue, therefore, may neither determine the sphere of the 
Gospel nor relativise its imperatives but, conversely, culture and society require to be 
perceived, intei'preted and evaluated critically in the light of the Gospel.”^^  Therefore, 
human action in the political and economic spheres must be critiqued and foimed by 
the gospel of gi*ace.
This belief has implications for both non-Chiistian and Cluistian ethics. For 
ethics that begin independently of God’s revelation in Clirist, notions of justice will 
always be inadequate and often detrimental to political and economic relations. In 
Christian ethics, the Lordship of Cluist must prevent any claims of divine sanction for 
universal principles of justice deduced fi*om scripture or for worldviews based upon 
natme or reason. Rather, as the elected God, Cluist reshapes human imderstanding and 
approaches to divine justice through his being and conunand.^^
In conclusion, the criterion for human ethics is revealed and established in the 
covenant that God established with humanity in Jesus Christ through election and 
coimnand. The problem of human ethics and the problem of measuring good behaviour 
ar e solved in the doctrine of the command of God because the command of God is the 
form of His electing grace.^^ The command and Christ’s obedience to the command 
thus becomes the starting point for assessing social justice as well as the origin of 
human just behaviour.
The Theological Foundation for Barth’s Special Ethics
In his Doctrine o f Creation and his subsequent works, Barth turned in his 
ethical investigation from ‘general ethics’ to what he called ‘special ethics.’ Whereas 
general ethics looks first at divine action—God’s election and command—which 
effects good hmnan action, special ethics looks downwards to the human who acts
For this reason, Bailh condemns any appeal to orders of creation which stand apart from election.
Alan Torrance, “Introductoiy Essay,” in Christ, Justice, and Peace by Bberhard Jtuigel, trans. D. Bruce 
Hamill and Alan Torrance, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd, 1992), xii.
Torrance, “Introductory Essay,” ix. Section three of this chapter will explore Barth’s anthropology and 
die implication of Clirist for die ontological construct o f personal being in relation to neighbour,
^^CDII.2.519.
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under the command of God the Creator, the Reconciler, and the Redeemer.^^ Like his 
general ethics, Barth’s special ethics are vitally connected to his theology. This section 
will expound this vital connection between ethics and theology by exploring the 
methodology that formed Barth’s special ethics.
Three Erroneous Methods
Barth opposed thr'ee common methods for deriving human ethics that severed 
ethics from theology. He first condemned casuistry which understands the command of 
God as a prescribed text, “made up of biblical texts in which there are believed to be 
seen universally binding divine ordinances and directions, of certain propositions again 
presumed to be imiversally valid, of the natiu al moral law generally perceptible to 
human reason, and finally of particular norms which have been handed down 
historically in the tradition of Western Christianity and which lay claim to universal 
validity.Essentially, God’s command is regarded as a legal text laiown to the ethical 
teacher, expounded and applied to individual cases, instmcting others what is to be 
chosen as good or rejected as evil. He opposed this approach for three reasons:
a. The moralist wishes to become the commander of God’s will, wishing to set 
himself in God’s place and distinguish good from evil and making himself 
lord, king, and judge in God’s place.
b. This approach assumes that the command of God is a imiversal rule. Barth 
wi'ote, “Casuistry thinks it can and must abstract fiom the Bible a collection 
of general moral mles which it is then the task of ethics to expound and 
apply in paiticulai*.”^^  The commands, Barth insists, are specific directions 
that concern the behaviours and deeds of humans in particular historical 
contexts and cannot be divorced from the concrete situations which they 
addressed.
c. The moralist destroys Clrristian fieedom by replacing God’s free gracious 
relationship of father to his child with a universal moral principle. The 
human’s action under God is not to decide what is the command; God’s
30 CD m.4.4-5.
CD III.4.6. Baitli claims that this approach arose at the time of tire transition from tire to tire 2'"^  
century “when there developed a lack of confidence in the Spirit (who is tire Lord) as Guide, Lawgiver, 
and Judge.” CD III.4.7.
^^CDIII.4.12.
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commandment leaves no room for application or inteipretation—it leaves 
only room for obedience or disobedience.^^
Secondly, Barth opposed an etliical methodology based upon natural law, as 
exemplified by Emil Bruimer. Though Baith appreciated Brunner’s rejection of 
casuistry, he opposed Bruimer’s ethical method for its appeal to natmal law as a basis 
for just behaviour in society. Bai*th objected to Bruimer’s conception of “divine orders,” 
i.e. the orders of society established in creation. Binnner defined these orders of 
creation as “those existing facts of human corporate life which lie at the root of all 
historical life as unalterable presuppositions, which although their historical fonns may 
vary, aie unalterable in their fundamental stmcture, and at the same time, relate and 
unite men to one another in a definite way.” '^* Though Bmimer rejected the universal 
ethical guidelines of the moralist, he favoined presuppositions and structures in nature 
that created a basis for ethics. Rejecting any foimdation apart from Jesus Christ, Barth 
repudiated Brumier’s divine orders, his notions of eaithly and human justice in family, 
industiy, and state, for their basis in natiual law.^^
If Barth opposed ethics which are founded in God’s universal moral principles 
and those ethics which find their sour ce in the laws of nature which unite men and 
women, does he expect the Christian to be guided by the Spirit hour by hour? Tliis 
approach Barth also rejected because the command of God is not a “disconnected 
multiplicity of individual demands, claims, directions and prohibitions, but a single and 
unitary command which moves the divine plan of history toward completion.”^^
Barth’s Analogical Method
Rather than talcing one of these tliree approaches to ethics, Barth introduced his 
ethics by reminding his reader of the theological groimd for special ethics. In Jesus 
Cluist, God encoimtered human persons thiough the Word, making himself laiown as 
Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer. Thus, the command of God will always be 
chai'acterised by this divine action and manner. Baith wiites, “The One who commands 
is the One who as Father is sovereign Lord of His creature, who in his Son has given
”  CD III.4.13-15.
Emil Brunner, The Divitie Imperative, (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1937), 210.
Barth sought to expose Brunner’s dichotomy between the justice to be apprehended from natural law 
and tlie command of God for individual ethics. CD III.4.21.
^®CDIII.4.17.
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Himself for it, and who as Spirit will lead it into all truth and thus perfect it.”^^  On the 
other side, the human is the creatiue of God, the one determined as God’s covenant- 
paitner and for participation in His eternal life.
According to Barth, the task of ethics is “to accompany this history of God and 
man from creation to reconciliation and redemption, indicating the mystery of the 
encounter at each point on the path according to its own distinctive charac ter .The  
encounter between God and the human involves God’s gracious commandment and the 
human’s response of obedience or disobedience. Thus, ethics must recognise its limits 
by leaving the final judgement to God, not seeking to provide ‘God’s’ answer to 
concrete situations but attempting only to offer guidance as indicated by the Word’s 
revelation of divine command and conesponding human action.^^
Bai'th offers this guidance in his theological ethics, particulaiiy with regard to 
political ethics, through what he calls a n a lo g y .Bai’th defines analogy as “a 
conespondence, a parallel in the creatuiely world, to the plan and purpose and work 
and attitude of God.”'^  ^He used the idea of analogy to provide a means for speaking 
about God’s action in the political sphere. Analogy, which allows a person to speak 
decisively about something which caimot be fully Icnown, enabled Barth to speak of the 
Kingdom of God with reference to human kingdoms. With God’s revelation in Christ 
as the starting point, Barth sought to understand the human world by analogy to what is 
laiown in Christ.^^ He aimed to discern the workings of God in the world and in the 
governing powers based upon his faith in Cluist’s Lordship and the coming of God’s 
Kingdom.'^^
For example in the use of analogy for political ethics, Barth wrote that the state 
must be seen “as an allegory, as a correspondence and an analogue to the Kingdom of
CD m.4.25.
CD 111.26.
^^CDIII.4.31.
Although Baith does not present this analogical method in the Doctrine of Creation I have chosen to 
present it here because it offers insight into the approach Barth takes in his tlieological etliics in tliis 
volume. Barth first articulated this message in “The Clrristian Community and the Civil Community” 
written five years prior to this volume in Community, Church, and State, (Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 
1968), 169-191.
CD IV.2.166.
Robin W. Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices, (Philadelphia: Fortr ess Press, 1984), 33-34. 
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146
God which the Chmch preaches and believes Political action is guided by the 
following criterion: “Among the political possibilities open at any particular moment, it 
[the church] will choose those which most suggest a conespondence to, an analogy and 
a reflection of, the content of its own faith and gospel.”"^  ^Following discernment, he 
sought to prayerfully assess alternatives and malce specific political decisions.'^*’ 
Although these decisions may be compar able to a non-Christian’s conclusion, the 
Christian decision is distinct because it talces place “before the God who speaks to the 
world, to the Christian community and therefore to the individual Christian, in the 
gospel of Jesus Christ.”'^ ^
The criticism by Emil Brumier and Helmut Thielicke that Barth’s analogical 
method could be used to defend a variety of practices fails to recognise Barth’s integral 
connection between theology and ethics."^  ^Robert Willis, in his study The Ethics o f 
Karl Barth, argues that one is not free to derive any or every possibility by analogy. 
Rather, the overall direction or movement in which the human person is placed by the 
action of God in Christ acts as a limit. Willis explains, “In the event of reconciliation, 
man is restored to his original and proper place as the covenant partner of God, and is 
set on the way to authentic co-humanity and fellowship all men and women. The only 
legitimate use of analogy, therefore, will be in providing suggestions as to the 
consequences this might carry for an ordering of man’s common life within the 
political o r d e r .B a r t h ’s theology of God the Creator, the Reconciler, and the
Barth, Against the Stream, 32.
Barth, CCCC, 154.
Barth, “Political Decisions in the Unity o f Faith” 'm Against the Stream, Stanley Godman, trans., 
(London: SCM Press, 1954), 152 and 159.
Against the Stream, 152, In “CInlstian Community and Civil Community,” Barth acknowledges that 
his decisions remind one o f Rousseau. He explains, “If our results really did coincide with theses based 
on natural law, it would merely confirm that the polis is in the Kingdom of Jesus Cluist even when its 
officeholders are not aware of the face or refuse to admit i f ’CCCC, 181.
Helmut Thielicke, Theologische Ethik, Band I, (Tubigen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1951-1958), 411-413; Brunner 
wrote, “anything and everything can be derived from the same principle of analogy: a monarchy just as 
well as a republic (Christ the King), a totalitarian state just as much as a state with civil liberties (Christ 
the Lord of all, man a servant, indeed a slave, o f Jesus Cluist).” Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctiine of  
Creation and Redemption. Dogmatics, Vol. II. Translated by Olive Wyon, (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1952), 319. See also Will Herberg’s introduction to Community, State, and Church 
where he calls Barth’s method “most arbitiary.” He writes, “The objections to the Barthian teaching on 
analogy are so obvious and so compelling that we are hard put to it to understand why Barth himself has 
not seen them from the veiy start.” (Herberg, 35). For more discussion on the recent critique and a 
defence of Barth’s doctrine of analogy, see R.K. Aboagye-Mensah, Social-Political Thinking o f Karl 
Barth, (PliD Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1984), 102-123.
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Redeemer provides the limitation and the basis for his analogical method. The 
following section will demonstiate the manner in which Barth’s Doctrine o f Creation 
forms his social ethics. Having explored Barth’s analogical method, we will examine 
his use of the analogy of relation as it shapes Barth’s anthr opological assumptions and 
as it provides a foimdation for his social ethics.
The Criterion for Social Justice in Creation: Real Humanity
Creation is the context in which God’s election and command transpires. Barlh 
called creation the external basis of the covenant because creation prepares and 
establishes the sphere in which the institution and history of the covenant can take 
place. On the other hand, the covenant is the internal basis of creation, for “the 
wisdom and omnipotence of God the Creator was not just any wisdom and 
omnipotence but that of His free love. Hence what God has created was not just any 
reality—however perfect or wonderful—but that which intrinsically determined as the 
exponent of his glory and for the corresponding service.”  ^^ hi this intricate relationship 
between creation and covenant, we miderstand God as Creator and Lord over all, freely 
loving his creation through his covenant.
God the Creator
Barih’s discussion of the relationship of creation and covenant formed the 
means by which he founded his study of creation upon the self-revelation of God in 
Jesus Clirist. According to Barth, creation is the external basis of the covenant and the 
covenant is the internal basis of creation. He called creation the external basis because 
creation prepar es and establishes the sphere in which the institution and history of the 
covenant can take p lace .T he  covenant is the internal basis of creation, for “the 
wisdom and omnipotence of God the Creator was not just any wisdom and 
omnipotence but that of His fr ee love. Hence what God has created was not just any 
reality—however perfect or wonderful—but tliat which intrinsically determined as the 
exponent of his glory and for the corresponding s e r v i c e . I n  this intricate relationship
50
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between creation and covenant, we understand God as Creator and Lord over all, freely 
loving his creation through his covenant.
Barth next described the human being as the creature of God and his 
detennination as covenant-partner with God in Clnist. The Creator relates to his 
creature as a sovereign and loving Lord who exercises providence toward his creation 
in accomplishing his will and covenant in Jesus Christ. '^  ^God fulfils his providential 
ordering, or his fatherly Lordship, over his creature by preserving, accompanying, and 
ruling the course of its earthly existence. He preserves the creature by upholding and 
sustaining its individual existence for covenant in Jesus Christ.
Secondly, he accompanies the creature; Baith writes, “Every moment of its 
activity and existence the creature has need of a momentary preseiwation. And the face 
that God does preserve the creatine means already that He goes with it.”^^  Thus God’s 
activity accompanies and suiTounds the creature with his presence as Lord, ruling over 
the creature in a way that gives freedom and maintains the autonomy of the creature in 
relation to Creator.^^ The activity of the creature is preceded by God, God joins with, 
and God follows the creature’s activity, helping to bring it to effect.
The final aspect of God’s fatherly Lordship consists in his divine ruling. Barth 
listed the components of this mling: God orders events as the King of Israel, controls 
and directs events in the freedom of his grace, co-ordinates creatures and events into a 
community, and moves creation towards a common goal. This doctiine of God the 
Creator paints the backdrop for Baith’s exploration of the human creatui e and the 
significance of Barth’s anthropology for his social ethics.
CD m.3.3.
55 CDIII.3.91.
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Christ the Criterion for Real Humanity
Barth believed that Jesus Christ provides the criterion for social justice in 
creation because Christ determines real humanity. Rather than starting with a universal 
understanding of humanity and moving toward the particulars of social ethics, Barth 
began with the particular human Jesus Clnist to determine tine humanity, which is 
being-in-encounter with God and humanity. This section will explore the tine humanity 
of Christ and the implications for social ethics.
Christ the Real Human
Baiih argued that humanity may be known only in the particular person of Jesus 
Chiist.^^ He critiqued speculative theories of human beings for their over-confident 
presupposition that one can know oneself without the revelation of God. Such theories 
lead to human self-exaltation and to the destinction of human freedom by man’s 
absolute subjectivity.^^ Barth also contended that a scientific approach such as 
naturalism, while it can be helpful for spealdng about humanity, ultimately deals only 
with the Sinn of specific and partial phenomena rather than the being of humanity.^^
Not even the revelation of God in the Old Testament shows us true hmnanity. 
For it discloses “man as a betrayer of himself and a sinner against his creatui'ely 
existence. This radical depravity of humanity hides the true nature of the person and 
the light of God’s revelation enables humans to understand their self-contradiction. 
Revelation also reminds men and women that they are objects of divine grace, partners 
in the covenant, and creatures of God.^  ^Yet the revelation about humanity in scripture 
does not reveal humanity without sin, except in the vicaiious humanity of Jesus Christ. 
To understand authentic himianity, Barth argues, we must begin with the human 
personliood of Jesus Christ.
He wrote, “In its [theological antlu-opology’s] investigation of the natwe of man in general, it must 
first look away from man in general to concentrate on the one man Jesus, and only then look back from 
Him to man in general.” CD III.2.53.
Barth critiques Fichte’s anthropology which culminates in a docti ine of autonomy, CD III.2.106-9.
CD III.2.22-24 and 80-87. Barth also critiqued existentialism and theological anthropology but we will 
leave the details o f this discussion to our final chapter in dialogue with John Paul’s antlnopology.
“  CD m.2.26.
CD III.2.31-32.
CD III.2.132. Barth acknowledges the manner in which Clnist is not like real humanity by nature of 
his divinity and his unique relation to God, which will never exist between God and the human, “he 
alone is the Son of Man and the Son of God. Oin fellowship with God rests upon the fact that He and He
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Such a declaration immediately raises the question of the relation of Clirist’s
humanity with his divinity. If Jesus is also God, which aspects of Christ exhibit the
humanity that is similar to our humanity? Which are the human chai acteristics and
which are the divine characteristics of Clirist? These classic questions of Clrristian
theology begin with the assumption of a ‘general humanunp into which Jesus fits and
the highest qualities of which Jesus models. The radical implications of Barth’s starting
point aie manifest precisely at this point. Christ does not share in our hmnanity or take
on the characteristics of a universal humanity in addition to his divinity. Rather, He is
the one in whose humanity we share. Baith writes:
It is not the case, however, that He must part alee of hmnanity. On the 
contrary, humanity must partalce of Him. It is not the case, then, that He 
is subject to these specific deteiminations and features of humanity. It is 
not that he is conditioned and limited by them, but in so far as humanity 
is His it is He who transcends and therefore limits and conditions these 
features and deteiminations. As the natme of Jesus, human nature with 
all its possibilities is not a presupposition which is valid for Him too and 
controls and explains Him, but His being as a man is as such that which 
posits and therefore reveals and explains human nature with all its 
possibilities.^^
What then does Chr ist reveal about hmnan natme? Christ reveals that real 
humanity finds its basis in relationship with the divine.*’'^  Bromiley summarises, “Real 
man is to be seen as conditioned by his relation to God, his deliverance by God, his 
determination to God’s glory, his standing under God’s lordship, his being in history 
and fr eedom, and his service of God and being for him.”*^^
Real humanity is being-with-God. He is man elected and summoned by God. 
According to Barth, to see the human as “summoned” *^^ is to understand human nature 
in its entirety. “Who am I really?” Baith asks, “If I imderstand myself in the light of 
God or His Word, then I must answer that I am sunnnoned by this Word, and to that
alone is one with God.” In the following chapter, I will argue that this veiy dissimilarity makes possible 
Cln ist’s vicarious humanity that frees humanity from the sin that separates us from right relationship 
with God. Through Ms vicarious humanity, CM’ist restores humanity to fellowship with God. In tliis 
mamier, tlie divinity of Clirist restores real humanity.
CD III.2.59. Webster substantiates my assumption here that tlie decisions that Barth makes in his 
antlnopology regarding the prioritising of the humanity of CM ist in defining human nature and action has 
profound implication for his later etliics. Barth’s Ethics o f Reconciliation, 61-66.
CD m.2.66.
Bromiley, 125. Summary of CD III.2.73-75.
“  He defines summoned: “to be heard, to have been awakened, to have to arouse oneself, to be claimed.” 
Bromiley, 150.
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extent I am in this Word. And the same answer is equally tme of others. They are men, 
and may be addressed and seriously regarded as such, because primarily and 
fundamentally they are summoned by this Word. This is a universal truth.”^^  In this 
manner, Barth draws out of Clirist the elected one the implications for general humanity 
as elected and characterised at the root of their nature as claimed by the divine address.
He conti'asts this view with Brumier’s anthropology in which the very essence 
of humanity is “freedom as rationality and responsibility, and therefore as personality, 
historicity and capacity for decision.”^^  Barth rejects anthropology that characterises 
human being as “potentiality” with a neutral capacity for choosing in loyalty or 
disloyalty to God. Rather, Baith ai'gues that “if man has his being in the Word of God, 
he can do only that which corresponds to the Word of God. The actuality in which he 
has his being is from the very first orientated in that direction. It is the actuality of man 
caught up in the act of divine revelation and human o b e d ie n c e .h i  other words, the 
anthropology which appeals to humanity as potentiality or human freedom as a neutral 
capacity fails to refer to the ontic basis of humanity but appeals only to a foimal 
disposition in which the being of humanity has not yet been positively characterised or 
orientated. Barth argues that grounding humanity in the loving election of God means 
that the human finds her being in the covenant; she is newly characterised by the divine 
address of God; in Chiist humanity has been transformed at an ontological level as 
being-with-God.
If humanity is indeed characterised at the ontological level by this divine 
addiess, then why do humans turn away from God? Why do they sin? By groimding 
humanity in the election of God, Bai1h claimed that sin is for the hmnan person “an 
ontological impossibility.”^^  The human was not created with a neutral capacity to 
choose good or evil. The human person was created for relationship with God and 
obedience to him. The person does not decide against God because the possibility has 
been rooted in his natme. “On the contrary,” Barth wrote, “when [man] chooses evil he
"CDHI.2.150.
68 Brunner’s antlu'opology, his description of human freedom and capacity is strikingly similar to Jolm 
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grasps that which is made impossible for him and from which he is preserved.”^^  Thus, 
there is no excuse for sin and the human can be re-made righteous not by his own 
choice but by that state of right which God alone can effect tlirough his divine 
forgiveness. Hmnanity was created for relationship with God, not with a neutral 
capacity for good and evil. This creation, election, and summoning by God 
characterises that which is the very core of humanity. Turning against this core can 
only be conceived as an impossible possibility.
Wlien he sins, the human contiadicts hhnself. Yet even when he sins he can 
deny and conceal but he cannot remove or destroy the fact that he is oriented to be the 
covenant partner with God. “He camiot escape God, or lose his being as the creature of 
God, or the natme of his being. He can trifle with the grace of God, but he cannot make 
himself wholly unworthy to be in covenant with God. He does this too. But he is found 
and rescued by the free and totally mideserved grace of God.”^^  By the faithfulness and 
gi'ace of God to humanity, then, all hmnans aie determined as covenant-partners to 
God, even when they refuse to acknowledge this reality.
Real Humanity Ontologically Relational
Baith ai'gues that the image of God in humanity means that real humans are 
relational as the core aspect of their being. The image of God in Chiist does not 
indicate direct identity with the essence that exists between God and God (i.e. between 
the Father, the Son and the Spirit.) Rather, the imago indicates correspondence and 
similarity.In Jesus Chiist the comiection between God and humanity is realised in an 
analogia relationis, an analogy of the relation between the Father and the Son in the 
relationship between God and himianity. hi other words, the similarity of the two 
relationships exists in the love that the Son and the Father have for one another. This 
love is addressed to the human by God. “Hence the factuality, the material necessity of 
the being of the man Jesus for his fellows, does not really rest on the mystery of an 
accident or caprice, but on the mystery of the purpose and meaning of God, who can 
maintain and demonstrate His essence even in His work, and in His relation to this
CD m.2.147. 
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work.”^^  Thus, the imago Dei in Jesus Christ consists in the fact that, as he is for God, 
He is also for his fellow-humans/^
In describing what the imago Dei consists in, the conception of similarity as an 
analogia relationis conti'asts with the analogia entis. Barth ai'gues that the being of God 
cannot be compared with the being of humans because he rejected the concept that the 
imago Dei could reside in an individual without regal'd to the relation to others/^ hi the 
same way that God is relational in his very essence, the imago Dei in Christ entails 
ontological relationality between God and humanity as an analogue of that relation of 
love which exists between Father, Son and Spirit/^ For God created the human “in His 
own image in the fact that he did not create him alone but in this connection and 
fellowship. For in God’s action as the Lord of the covenant, and even furtlier back in 
His action as the Creator of a reality distinct from Himself, it is proved that God 
Himself is not solitai'y, that although he is one in essence He is not alone, but that 
pi'imai'ily and properly He is in comiection and fellowship.Likewise, in his image, 
the human is created-with-God as man and wonian-with-others.^^  Barth located human
82relation, therefore, in the very essence of human ontology.
Real Humanity as Neighbour
Bai'th argues that the analogia relationis means that as humans are covenant 
pai'tners with God by nature, they are also neighbours with one another by nature. He 
ai'gues this based upon the humanity of Clnist. Whereas Clirist’s divinity means that he 
is the hmnan person for God, his hmnanity means that he is a creature among others. 
What interests Jesus exclusively is the hmnans who need him, the hmnans who are the 
objects of his saving work. He is sent and ordained by God to deliver his fellow-
CD m.2.220.
CD in.2.222.
CD m.2.220.
CD III.2.323-4. Cf. Ray Anderson, On Being Human, (Pasadena: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982), 75-76. 
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The final chapter will draw out a contrast between Barth’s ontology o f relation and Jolm Paul’s 
analogia entis, arguing that Jolm Paul’s social ethics is problematic because it is fundamentally 
individualistic. For John Paul, human ontology is relational only by potential, not in material reality.
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humans.^^ Christ’s work reveals that he is ontologically the Neighbour and Saviour of 
huinans. '^  ^Like John Paul, Baidh described Chiist as gift. He gave of himself in 
fulfilment of the task given him by God.^  ^His humanity is characterised by being the 
Human for other humans.
Our corresponding being is being in encounter with other human persons.
Barth ruled out anthropologies such as Nietzsche’s which bracketed out fellow- 
humanity by seeking to understand the human as individual, Barth argued that such 
isolation is inhmnanity.^^ Humanity means encounter with other humans in which 
humans look one another in the eye, speak and listen to one another, render mutual 
assistance, and exist with others in gladness.^^ As the human for fellow-humans, then, 
Jesus Christ provides the criterion for social justice by determining humanity as fellow- 
humanity.
Real Humanity as the Criterion for Justice
This Cluistological anthropology fonns Baith’s social ethics. As God calls a 
person to Himself, as He summons that person to serve Him, He addresses the person 
concerning his or her vocation to be a covenant-partner with Himself and he directs the 
person to his fellow-human. He calls men and women to fulfil their being through 
encounter with another, to allow his humanity as fellow-humanity to be his nature.
Thus God calls the human person into freedom in fellowship with others. In this 
manner, the divine coimnand is the invitation to real humanity. Barth explained, 
“Humanity, the chaiacteristic and essential mode of man’s being, is in its root fellow- 
humanity. Humanity that is not fellow-humanity is inhumanity. For it cannot reflect but 
only contradict the determination of man to be God’s covenant partner.” ®^ As the image
CD m.2.208-209.
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of Deus triunus, men and women aie created for fellowship. Thus, people find freedom 
in this summons by God to fellowship with others.
Humanity as the Criterion for Political Relations
This summons to fellowship means that, in the political realm, humans are 
commanded to live in the reality of their relation as neighbour to both those who are 
near and to those who are far. Those who aie near share a common language, 
geographical location, and history. While God’s command does not remove these 
boundaries, it overcomes the baiiiers between those who cannot relate in this manner 
because it wills that the human should move out fr om his beginning place and seek a 
wider f i e ld . In  addition, the fact that the covenant of God has been extended to all 
humans in Clirist means that while the hmnan belongs wholly to his people, God also 
belongs to humanity. “As he holds his neai' neighbours with the one hand, he reaches 
out to the distant with the other.”^^  Barth argued this point against the idolatrous 
nationalism of which he had witnessed in Germany and which exalted one etlmicity 
over against another.
Baith’s exegesis of Genesis 11-12 potently describes the purpose of nations and 
the implications of God’s covenant for international relations. Nations were not an 
order of creation, he contended, but an act of God’s gracious preservation for humanity. 
He argued that according to Genesis 11:1-9 a single race came to build a tower with 
intention of exalting itself and becoming its own Lord—maldng itself equal with God 
on the basis of its work. God came and, knowing that a sinfril race in unity could cause 
great evil, he judged their arrogance by taking away their gift of unity, giving them 
many languages, and dispersing them thioughout the earth. Barth concluded that this 
act of the Creator was an act of Preservation for his creation, instituted to preserve the 
continuance of the world. On the one hand, the Christian gives thanks to God for 
preserving Creation for the covenant. On the other hand, a homesiclmess is evoked by 
this separation of people into neighbours neai" and far. Thus, the person remains loyal to 
their nation or near neighboms while maintaining an openness to fai’ neighbours.
Where does one’s loyalty then lie? Does the Christian continue to swing back 
and forth between national and international allegiance? Barth continued his exegesis in
CD m.4.292.
CD m.4.298.
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Genesis 12, pointing out that one nation was chosen from among all of the nations to be 
called the people of God. Through this nation, Clnist came to offer salvation to all 
nations, hi Acts 2, the Holy Spirit manifested this universal offer of salvation by giving 
the peoples one language and making them one in Clnist Jesus (Eph. 2:13ff). Because 
of Christ, the loyalty of the believer in the Creator God no longer entails loyalty to a 
particular nation. The loyalty of the believer belongs first and foremost to Jesus Christ 
as the head of the new polis, the Kingdom of God.^  ^Because God’s light now shines 
among all the nations, humanity also moves outward in loyalty to God and in love, gift, 
and seiwice to humanity.
Human Respect as the Criterion for Life
Whereas the language of human rights is normally employed in defence of 
human life, Barth approaches the discussion fi'om an entirely different angle. Over 
against the assumption that intrinsic to human nature are certain rights which must be 
discerned and defended, Baith argues that human life is on loan fr om God and must be 
respected.Human life is not a right but a loan fr om God. The human is not 
intrinsically endowed with the right to live. Rather, the human is commanded to live by 
the Creator God who gave him life. This radically different understanding of human life 
exposes the selfish ambition, which can so easily lace human rights. Language of 
human rights can conceal actions that destmct the life of another. For example, the fight 
for women’s rights went awiy when it obliterated appropriate respect for the life of
CD III, 4, 516-17. Further implications of this encounter of the Kingdom o f God with the state will be 
developed in the following chapter.
CD III.4.323.
CD III.4.325. William James clarifies the complexity of Barth’s conception o f rights: “In Barth's view, 
‘human rights’ are not rights of natuial humanity as abstract principles which become embodied in the 
state or society as an impersonal authority. What is right is groimded in what actually is in fact the 
case—though this can only be known with certainty and clarity through revelation—tliat human beings 
exist for and with tlie other as neighbour,. .We do not have a claim to rights by virtue of nature, but by 
virtue of reconciliation. Tliis means that the inherent ethical mandate is responsibility for the other. On 
the one level, natural rights can be viewed as ‘a claim’ on others, but responsibility is another way of 
speaking of how we tr eat others. This is true because reconciliation seems to be grounded not so much in 
a claim for rights as in a responsibility. Therefore, the concept of ‘rights’ is not based on ideological 
concepts, but on a tlieological anthropology developed out of an incaniational theology.. .The concept of 
‘right’ is determined by two things: one, the command to love my neighbour as myself; and two, the 
right of tlie neighbour to be respected because God has placed the neighbour there under command as my 
ethical boundary.” In “An Analysis Of Karl Barth's Theological Antlnopology As A Basis For An Ethic 
Of Social Justice And Human Rights,”(PliD Thesis, University of Aberdeen August 1995), 18-19.
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another. Such destinction led the proponents of human rights such as Hans Küng to
also address human responsibilities.^^
Yet the language of human rights and responsibilities places human life solely
in the hands of hmnan persons and fails to acknowledge the vital coimection between
humanity its creator. It deifies human reason and behaviour because it takes a
moralistic approach to e th ics . I t  assumes that fi'eedom depends upon the right of the
individual. In contrast, Baith ai'gues that God’s command to treat one’s own life and the
life of other as a loan creates fr eedom for the individual m community. As a loan, a
hmnan’s life is not mider his conti ol or claim but it is for the service of God in which
tme fr'eedom is fomid.^^
How does “respect for life” limit human forms of destruction with which human
rights language can be laced? Barth explained:
What matters is not something but someone, the real man before God 
and among his fellows, his individual psycho-physical existence, his 
movement in time, his fr eedom his orientation on God and solidarity 
with others. What matter is that everyone should tieat his existence and 
that of every other human being with respect. For it belongs to God. It is 
His loan and his blessing. And it may be seen to be this in the fact that 
God Himself has so imequivocally and completely acknowledged it in 
Jesus Christ.^^
This recollection that real human life is lived in orientation on God and co-ordination 
with others safeguards against the constant tlireat of egoism. Respect for life does not 
consist in a rigid principle or mle, or in an absolute will to live. Rather, it consists in a 
will to live which by God’s command or decree may be weakened, broken, or 
desti'oyed. But if so, it will be such with the hope of eternal life.^^  ^Thus, respect for 
one’s own life must always stand under the command of God and it camiot become 
grounds for the destruction of another.
Kimg, Hans. A Global Ethic fo r Politics and Economics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 65- 
66 and 223-224.
See earlier section of this chapter, “Tliree Erroneous Methods.”
CD m.4.327.
99 CD m.4.340.
***** CD m.4.342.
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Humanity as the Criterion for Work
Barth also applies the criterion of fellow-humanity to the economic sphere in his
discussion of human work. Human work con esponds to providential rule and its
meaning is found in man’s affirmation of his existence as a human creature.*®  ^Thus
human work is faithfulness to God’s creation through the “prolongation of life in the
fonn of stiiving in which man sets himself certain ends and does his best to attain
them.” ®^^ Good work is aimed to promote the needed universal and individual
conditions of human existence. According to Baith, work must be assessed by the
question whether and to what extent it is himian:
The criterion of humanity! Here at least it is siuely clear to us that there 
is a great gulf between the command of God and our observance of it, 
that even in oui' best activity we are pei'verted men in a pei'verted world.
Human work can and should take place in co-existence and co­
operation. But in reality it does so in isolation and mutual opposition. It 
should provide each of us with om* daily bread in peace, offering us an 
opportunity for the development of oui' pai'ticular abilities and the 
corresponding accomplishments, and thus liberating us for the service 
which provides the real meaning of oiu' lives.
With respect to the social character of work, Barth warned of a two-fold
thoughtlessness. First, the thoughtless opinion that a human person can work for
himself without working in fellowship with others, without making room for their work
and for the earning of their livelihood, leads humans into inhuman work. Bai'th wrote,
“Without his fellows, man is not man at all but only a shade of man. If he seeks to earn
his bread and therefore to work in absti act isolation, his existence is that of this
shade.” A second problem that dehumanises work is the lust for possessions, “the
lust for a superabundance which is not the natiu al and beautiful abundance of life but
the overflow of nothingness.” ®^^ Work for genuine and vital claims can maintain the
Barth explained, “It is established by divine providence. Irrespective o f whether it is recognised and 
acknowledged by us men or not, it rests on God’s sovereignty over the whole world and all men has its 
centre and aim in the coming of His Kingdom. The objective teleology o f this comiection is the basis of 
the fact that God has created man as man, that He has ordained and equipped him for human existence, 
for its active affirmation and therefore for work, and that as man and as worker, whether he recognises it 
or not, man is already engages in preparation for the true and essential service to which God wills to call 
him with the coming of His Kingdom.” CD III.4.524.
CD m.4.527.
CD III.4.529.
'**■* CD m.4.536.
105
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CD III.4.537. 
CD m.4.538.
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character of peaceful co-operation. However, work in the service of inordinate profit 
transgi'esses the command of God and becomes the root of a gi eat deal of evil and 
oppression.
Barth calls this two-fold thoughtlessness the root of inhuman work because it 
creates an atmosphere of competition that leads to conflict. As people gieedily strive to 
fulfil their desires, they cannot work in co-operation and mutual self-giving but in 
competition against the other. Barth especially condemns the West for social injustice 
and oppression tlu'ough the exploitation of the weaker by those who ai*e stronger. He 
condemns the owners of the means of production for “eaining more than they ai'e 
entitled” thiough the labour of weaker and dependent workers.
The command of God summons humans to a counter-movement, which can 
ease the situation. International laws or measm es may erect some justice or may 
establish some limits between legitimate and illegitimate competition. Organisations of 
labour may create more fair working conditions. The awakening of the working classes 
associated with Marx helped to erect effective barriers to protect the weak against the 
sti'ong.
While he admitted that state socialism may become a new form of injustice, he 
warned Cliristians in the West against hypocritical condeimiation of socialism. 
“Christianity in the West has its main work cut out to comprehend the disorder in the 
decisive fonn still cuiTent in the West, to remember and to assert the command of God 
in the face of this form, and to keep to the Teft’ in opposition to its champions, i.e. to 
confess that it is fundamentally on the side of the victims of this disorder and to 
espouse their c a u s e . Y e t  Barth opposed the identification of the Christian message 
with any particular* economic system. The root of the problem lies deeper than any 
radical attempt at reform could repair. The root lies in “a human abenation which 
necessarily gives rise to the exploitation of man by man in ever changing forms—so 
necessarily that even the most well-meaning and vigorous attempts at counter­
movement can arrest and modify but not entirely remove it.” ®^^
The word of God regarding social justice, which arises fr om the Christian 
community, therefore, consists in the “proclamation of the revolution of God against
CD m.4.542. 
***' CD III.4.544. 
CD m.4.545.
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‘all ungodliness and umighteousness of man.’”^^® The Christian community should not 
identify the Kingdom of God with any particular system but should expouse that 
system which upholds the criterion of humanity. This criterion of real humanity is 
determined in the personliood of Jesus Chiist. Jesus reveals that real humanity is the 
human-with-fellow-humanity in a manner analogous to the relation of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit,
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Barth’s social ethics aie intrinsically related 
to his Christian theology. The criterion of humanity which shapes Barth’s interpretation 
of justice in political, social, and economic relations is determined by the humanity of 
Clirist, the one elected to be the covenant paitner of God. First, Chiist’s election 
deteiinined the election of humanity for God and set humans under the command of 
God as covenant partners with Him. Becoming covenant partners in Clirist opened to 
humanity the possibility for freedom in ethical behaviour thiough the command of God. 
Having opened this possibility for fr eedom in obedience to the command of God, Barth 
turned to consider the justice and injustice of specific human acts. His very 
methodology of deteimining these specific ethics rested upon the Doctiine of God as 
Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer. In closmg this chapter, we tinned to explore Barth’s 
specific ethics as they aie related to his Doctrine o f Creation. I argued that Barth’s 
social ethics in the fields of political relations, human rights, and economic relations are 
derived from the criterion of humanity, which is also deteimined by Christ. As the 
covenant partner of God, Clnist is also the real human person who determines tme 
humanity as the person who is, by nature, with-fellow-hmnans. In conclusion, Barth 
guards himself against the deification of humanity that haunted the social ethics of his 
day by maintaining an intrinsic comiection between theology and ethics. In particular, 
he gi'ounded his theories of just social relations upon the real humanity of Jesus Clnist.
CD m.4.545. Barth’s quotation from Romans 1:18.
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CHAPTER SIX 
JESUS CHRIST THE GOD-HUMAN ESTABLISHES JUSTICE
The previous chapter outlined some of Barth’s key concerns for human justice 
in the political and economic spheres, specifically with regar d to ethical support for the 
preservation of human life and the promotion of just labour*. We argued that Barth’s 
primar y criterion was “humanity”—meaning that social ethics must maintain the cause 
of humanity over against the injustice of inhumane behaviours and destructive political 
and economic systems. Wliile this concern for humanity echoes the concern of John 
Paul II, Bai*th differentiates his criteria from hmnanism at a fundamental level. Rather 
than defining humanity according to universal notions of the human to which the ethics 
of Chi*ist ar e then applied, Barth defined humanity by the particular person of Jesus 
Christ. Thus, he based his criterion of “humanity” directly in the middle of the 
revelation of God, surrounded and formed by theology from every side. In this manner, 
Bai'th sought to guard against establishing criteria or ar*ticulating social etliics that are 
based upon autonomous hmnan ideals of justice. For, as we argued in oiu* ffrst chapter 
of Part Two, Chapter* Foiu*, Barth perceived clearly the destruction wrought by such 
deification of human ideals. While on the surface such aims might promote the good of 
society, exalted human ideals that are not formed by God’s revelation potentially 
contain a seed of violence and inhmnanity against the neighbour*.
In this chapter, we will explore two questions. The first question explores why 
Barth believed that this violence and inhumanity occurs, despite the best of human 
intentions or the highest of human ideals. Bai'th perceived that the problem of social 
injustice was not located in the lack of Imowledge concerning moral criteria. Rather, 
the incarnation of Clirist reveals that the actuality of human sin is an ontological 
problem. By comparison, John Paul II who also affirms that the problem of human sin 
is the root of social injustice, embraces the doctrine of the analogia entis which 
maintains that the sin only inliibits the mind and the will, that gr ace need not sanctify
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the human intentions. As a representative of the refoimed tradition, Barth located the 
problem of social evils in the ontological effects of human sin. We will argue that 
Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation must be read as dealing with sin as the critical 
problem of injustice at the level of ontology.
When Barth posed the problem in this manner, he did not merely mean that 
social injustice results from blatant acts of himian evil against the neighbour. Rather, 
Barth located one of the worst potentials for injustice in the problem of human 
goodness. While the analogia entis affinns the goodness of um'edeemed humanity, 
Bai'th argued that this “um'edeemed goodness” is a root cause of injustice against the 
neighbour. The reconciliation wrought in Chi ist exposes the evil of pride, sloth, and 
unti'uth that lies within this seed of umedeemed goodness. In addition, this 
reconciliation redeems human goodness so that the quest for just society finds its way 
by the establisliment of God’s Kingdom. God’s Kingdom is established in CMst’s 
reconciling work that brings humanity into unity with one another.
The second question explores a solution for social injustice. As the reader may 
recall, Chapter Four proposed that Barth’s social ethics were shaped by his concern to 
oppose the deification of humanity which influenced German culture and prevented 
liberal theologians from taking a critical stand against the ethical abuses of Barth’s day. 
Chapter Five explored Baith’s critical criterion for justice which aiose from his concern 
to begin anew in the theology, antlnopology, and social ethics revealed by God in Jesus 
Clnist. This chapter argues that Jesus Clnist also reveals that ethical criteria alone are 
not sufficient to foim a just society. The human must be reconciled with God and with 
the neighbour at an ontological level; human goodness must be redeemed tlnough the 
hmnanity of God in Jesus Clnist. Thus, we will explore Barth’s claim that the 
reconciliation of God in Christ Jesus forms the starting point for social justice by 
reconciling humans with God and with one another.
Clnist has enacted and revealed this reconciliation in a threefold movement in 
which humanity has been deeply involved. First, Christ revealed God’s justice in the 
downward movement of incarnation thi ough which God joined himself with humanity 
in the person of Jesus Clnist and in which he justified humanity. Reconciliation also 
took place as a movement from below to above: Jesus Christ, the true hmnan, has been 
exalted by God and has drawn humans to God in himself. As members of God’s 
Kingdom, humans are i*uled by justice and they are given fr'eedom to practice justice. 
Third, Barth described the prophetic role of Chr ist as the outward movement of
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speaking and acting that reveals God’s reconciliation and justice to the world. In imion 
with Chiist, the chui ch serves the world by proclaiming Christ and by caring for the 
world. Working from our two questions posed for Baiih concerning why unredeemed 
human goodness destroys himian relations and societies and what is the solution for 
creating just societies, this chapter will explore Barth’s social ethics in the three 
movements which reconciled hmnanity to God and to the neighbour.
The Incarnation of Christ: The Lord as Servant
According to Baith, the downward movement of Chiist reveals the sin of pride 
and disobedience as an ontological problem that undennines the relationship between 
humans and God. The injustice of humanity did not merely need to be con ected by a 
model, Jesus Clnist, who could show humans how to live in reconciliation with God 
and one another. Rather, the vicarious humanity of Jesus, who is God, revealed that the 
establishment of just relations demanded a total conversion of humanity so that humans 
might be reconciled and free to obey the command of God. Barth’s characterisation of 
sin as ontological renders a starting point for social justice in the person and work of 
Chiist alone. ^ Without Chiist, humans can neither know what is good nor can they 
participate in the goodness that God commands toward the neighbour.
Incarnation Reveals the Extent of the Human Dilemma
Rather than moving fr om the problem of sin to the solution of redemption like 
John Paul, Barth first explored the solution in order to adequately assess the human 
dilemma. The downward movement of Jesus as the incarnate Son of God, his being 
with humanity as a human, and his seiwanthood expressed in humility and obedience 
unto death reveals the depth of the human problem.  ^Barth wiote, “It was not necessaiy 
that God should become man and that the Son of God should die on the cross simply to 
deal with an intermption in the comse of the world, simply to mitigate the relative 
imperfection of the human situation, or to strengthen and increase its relative 
perfection.”  ^Rather, the giving of Jesus, who is God with us, to live with humans and
 ^ Cf. Christian Kettler, The Vicaiious Humanity o f Christ and the Reality o f  Salvation, (Lanliam; 
University Press of America, 1991), 233-262.
 ^CD IV. 1.157-9.
 ^ CD IV.1.411.
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to die for humans reveals the “serious and teiTible natur e of human corruption.”'^ Barth 
wrote:
The depth of the abyss into which man is about to fall as the author of it, 
can be measured by the fact that the love of God could react and reply to 
this event only by His giving. His giving up, of Jesus Chiist Himself to 
overcome and remove it and in that way to redeem man, fulfilling the 
judgement upon it in such a way that the Judge allowed Himself to 
overcome and remove it and in that way to redeem man, fulfilling the 
judgement upon it in such a way that the Judge allowed himself to be 
judged and caused the man of sin to be put to death in his own person.^
The truth of the incarnation, the fact that Jesus is God, demonsti ated the serious
dilemma posed by human sin.
This sin, Baith argued, is the trutli of a human’s entire being. Often humans
want to separate their sinful behavioiu fi'om their personhood. They adopt the idea of a
neutral Ego which is different firam nor is it affected by its evil actions.^ However,
Barth argued that the human’s “inward being is the source of his outwar d actions.” In
other words, “Man is what he does.”  ^The fact that Jesus died totally for the
reconciliation of all humans means that hmnan cormption is “both radical and total.”^
Bai'th spared no space in the human person that was not effected by sin, no seed of
umedeemed human goodness.® He wrote:
The Word of God—and the atoning work of Jesus Chi ist as the 
Representative of man, of the whole man—brings against man the 
accusation that at the very core of his being—the heart, as the Bible puts 
it—he is not good but evil, not upright but cormpt, not humble but proud 
in one or other of the fonns laiown to us, wanting to be God and Lord 
and the judge of good and evil, and his own helper, and therefore hating 
God and his neighbour.'®
Thus, Barth believed tliat sin has corrapted the very ontological natm e of humans.
Barth did not mean by this claim that the hmnan, tlirough sin, acquired another
human nature which is evil. The hmnan has not ceased to be human; he has not lost his
divine likeness. Barth explained, “The Bible accuses man as a sinner from head to foot,
■* CD IV. 1.412.
' CD rv.1.412.
** CD IV. 1.403.
’ CD rv. 1.405.
'C D  IV. 1.492.
* See entire argument in CD IV. 1.492-495. 
CD IV.1.494-5.10
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but it does not dispute to man his full and unchanged humanity, his natme as God 
created it good, the possession and use of all the faculties which God has given him.”"  
For the human camiot step outside of the covenant which God made with him. Barth 
thought that the problem of sin is much greater than a setting aside or damaging of 
good human natme. Rather, “it consists in the crying contr adiction that he sets 
himself—his being in the integrity of his human nature and his being in covenant with 
God—in the service of evil, and that now he has to exist in that service.”'  ^By living in 
this contradiction, the human estranges himself from himself, his good natm'e is altered 
but not destroyed.'^ Yet despite this “alienation and aberration and failure” by humans, 
God remained faithflil and gr acious to humanity, bringing reconciliation by justifying 
all of humanity in his Son.'''
Bai'th’s exegesis of the second temptation of Cln ist provides an excellent 
illustration that Chiist recognised that the problem of sin had invaded all of the human 
person, including the will. Christ recognised that social ills could not be solved through 
legislation alone, tlnough his ethical model alone, nor by an act of autonomous human 
willing, no matter how good the intentions may be. In Mark 4 and Luke 4, Satan 
promised to give Jesus Lordship, if Christ would fall down and worship him. Barth 
asked, Why did Jesus not accept the Kingdom and rule it as he saw fit? Christ could 
have established a tmly just system of politics and economics and he could have ruled 
justly. Yet he refused. According to Barth, Jesus did not acloiowledge the authority of 
Satan because “He would have ceased to recognise and confess the sin of the world as 
sin, to take it upon Himself as such, and in His own person to bring to an issue the 
conflict with it (as with man’s contiadiction against God and himself).”'^ Because 
Chi'ist recognised the problem of the world as sin, he willed the opposition to this sin 
by continuing to worship and serve God alone. Clnist Imew and acknowledged that the 
problem of injustice did not result from any deficiency in the rale of God over this 
world or merely in himian ignorance of just standards. The problem of injustice lay in 
the hearts of humans because they have set themselves in the service of evil by denying
’* CD IV. 1.492.
CD IV. 1.493.
CD IV. 1.406.
“* CD IV. 1.406.
CD IV. 1.262. Barth’s brief discussion o f the “overlordship of evil” indicates that Christ dealt not only 
with the sin of the human heart but also with tlie evil forces with which shiflil humans participate.
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the covenant with God and thus denying their own nature. Only tlnough recreating the 
human person as righteous would God be worshipped and seiwed; and in the worship 
and service of God by re-created himianity, his justice would reign in human society.
Justice Possible Through Christ
Before turning to reflect on the significance that God’s justification of humanity 
poses for human social justice, we will explore the implication of the specific sin of 
pride which characterises the problem we have called, “um'edeemed human goodness.” 
Often, people thinlc that they can judge good and evil and can behave justly toward the 
neighbour without the justification of Christ. Barth argued that the humility of the 
incarnate Christ exposes such pride. The humility of Christ who became the Judge 
judged on our behalf teaches us (a) that God alone is the judge of good and evil and (b) 
God alone frees humans for just behaviour.
Barth opposed the assumption that autonomous humans could judge right from 
wrong, good fi'oni evil, or justice from injustice. He questioned the authority and 
competence of humanity to judge what is forbidden and wrong, based on conscience, or 
general reason, or tradition. He asked, “What is the basis of the accusation which gives 
evil its name and calls the man evil who takes this direction?”'® Jesus Chiist alone is 
the Judge; God deteimines right and wrong because he alone is righteous. Humans 
attempt to resist or reinterpret that which is tmly right. In the desire to judge good and 
evil, the human misunderstands herself. If she wants to make a decision between right 
and wrong where the judgement of God has aheady decided and his Imowledge has 
discerned good from evil, she anogantly overestimates her ability and her position. By 
renouncing confidence in God’s judgement, she looses her freedom to stand as a 
witness of what God has decided. For she is free only when she “thinks and decided 
and acts at peace with God, when [her] decision is simply and exclusively a repetition 
of the divine decision.”'^
Barth illustrated the implications for ethics in his exegesis of Genesis 3. In this 
story, Eve was tempted by the serpent to become like God, knowing good and evil. 
“What the serpent has in mind,” Barth ai'gued, “is the establisliment of ethics.” The
CD IV. 1.402. 
CD IV. 1.449.
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following quote of Barth displays the radical nature of his inteipretation and approach 
to justice;
It is surprising that in the Cliristian Chiuch more offence is not talcen at 
the fact—or have we simply read it away?—that in Gen. 3 the desire of 
man for a knowledge of good and evil is represented as an evil desire, 
indeed the one evil desire which is so chai'acteristic and fatal for the 
whole race. The consequences for the theory and practice of Chiistian 
ethics—and not only that—would be incalculable if only we were to see 
this and accept it instead of regarding this very questionable loiowledge 
—whether sought in the Bible or in the rational nature of man or 
conscience—as the most basic of all the gifts of God. The annour 
behind which the real evil of the pride of man conceals itself is 
obviously thicker and more impenetrable at this point than at any 
other.
This quote reveals Barth’s fundamentally different approach to ethics. He 
claimed that Chiistian ethics must begin, not with reflection, but with heaiing.^^ 
Human persons answer the question of good and right not by a philosophy or 
worldview or program but by thinldng through what God has already thought 
about human activity. Christian ethics merely repeats what God has already 
spoken to the human about his activity.^^ The human has not been left to reflect 
upon and judge between abstract notions of good and evil. As the just Judge,
God in Chiist has declared justice; he has spoken his command. The human 
need only act accordingly.^^
According to Barth, not only must the human rely upon God in order to 
know just social behaviour, the human may also find in God alone the source for 
just social action. Webster summai ises, “The image of the self as fashioner of its 
own identity tlnough its acts is, simply wicked and ruinous. ‘Wicked’ because it 
is a direct refusal of God’s omnipotent grace; ‘ruinous’ because it thereby 
opposes the one tme source of our well-being. Sin as pride is the hopeless
CD IV. 1.449.
Bartli, God Here and Now, 87.
God Here and Now, 87. See for instance Barth’s exegesis of Naboth’s vineyard in Kings 21. Barth 
affirmed that human knowledge of right and wrong is not based upon categories of good and evil or upon 
hmnan judgement of just or unjust. The knowledge of righteous behaviour issues directly from the 
commands of God. God has already made the ethical judgement. In attempting to assert justice which 
counters God’s command, as Ahab did, the human finds himself an arrogant and unjust judge. CD 
IV. 1.453-454.
God Here and Now, 87.
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delusion that we can maintain our own cause without g r a c e .H u m a n  reliance
upon self results fi'om a fimdamental misunderstanding of human capabilities.
Believing herself to will what is good, she wills that which is objectively evil.
She desires to stand at God’s side in defence of the good, preserving the world
against chaos, and pretending to be strong and able. However, this very
aiTogance places the hmnan on the side of evil. Barth argued, ‘T can only live at
unity with myself, and we can only live in fellowsliip with one another, when I
and we subject ourselves to the right which does not dwell in us and is not
manifested by us, but which is over me and us as the right of God above,
manifested to me and us only from God, the right of His Word and
commandment alone, the sentence and judgement of His S p i r i t . H e  believed
that war is the inevitable consequence when the law and the commandments of
God are taken out of the hands of God and placed in human hands.
Barth argued that the attitude and act of the persons smToimding Chiist’s
cmcifixion reveal that the heaits of all humans are inclinded to hate God and the
neighbour.He wrote:
The religious leaders in Israel in their fanatical blindness; the people in 
their stupidity and vacillation; the statesman and judge with his 
umighteous judgement; the women with their useless tears; the disciples 
with their flight; Peter with his denial; and the man who set it all in train,
Judas with his ti eachery. Here in the light of the One to whom all this 
was done, who had to suffer all this, we see plainly the man of sin.^^
The pride of man is expressed in the fratricide of his neighbour, the brother of all
hmnans, Jesus Chiist “in whose image God has made every man, in whom as the Head
of the human race every man is either honoured or despised, and is not actually
despised and denied and rejected and put to d e a th .T h u s ,  Baith believed that human
pride leads to the exaltation of self over against the person of Clirist and, by
implication, over against the neighbour.
Webster, Barth's Ethics o f  Reconciliation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95. His 
quotation is from Barth’s CD IV. 1.230. Webster explains fiirther, “The truth about our existence is tliat 
we are ‘participants in the great drama’ of reconciliation rather than shapers o f our own selfliood.” 
(Webster, 96.) Yet as Webster argues, this participation does not limit human fr eedom in Barth’s 
anthropology. Rather, it opens up the possibility of fr eedom (Webster, 223-230).
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In summary, Bai*th argued that the Judge judged in our place reveals the 
complete inability of humans to Icnow and to do justice apait from God’s revelation in 
Clu'ist. Left to their own devices, humans cannot judge justly. Rather their judgements 
reveal their pride, disobedience, and unbelief in God as the Judge. Nor ar e humans 
capable of any degree of just behaviour without God.^  ^The Judge judged in our place 
pardons hmnan injustice and makes hmnans just in Christ.
Reconciliation through Justification
Barth described this pardoning in his discussion of the doctiine of justification. 
According to Barth, this doctrine has a negative and a positive side. On the negative 
side, the justification of the human person in Jesus is the destruction of his wrong; the 
sin and the proud person of sin are destroyed in this justification.^^ On the other side, 
the justification of the human person in Jesus is the establishing of his right: the 
introducing of a new man or woman who is righteous before God. By virtue of Jesus’ 
resunection from the dead, the person has turned from his own wrong and from himself 
as a doer of wrong to God as a recipient of his gi ace and pardon. The justified person 
has peace with God and neighbour and self and he lives righteously.^^ Justified people 
are gathered by the Holy Spirit to be made holy by the Holy Spirit in the Chiistian 
community.
In summary, Barth expounded the downward movement of Chiist Jesus as 
revealing the justice of God in two ways. First, the Judge judged in om* place tlirough 
the cross displayed the justice of God to judge between good and evil and to reveal the 
inability of the human to know and to practice the good (and by implication justice) 
apart from God’s revelation in Chiist. The second revelation of God’s justice is his 
rebirth of humanity in Chiist so that hmnans are justified by God, humans turn to God, 
and humans acknowledge, witness to, and live by the justice of God’s Word as a part of 
God’s holy community.
The question then becomes, to what degree does God enable humans to do justice in tins world as a 
preservation of their existence?
CD IV. 1.553-4.
^ CD IV. 1.627.
CD IV. 1.650.
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The Possibility o f Human Justice
In light of this theology, what does Baith believe to be the scope of human
justice? In light of Chiist’s revelation of justice, how does the human understand her
work for justice? In the ethical portion of the doctiine of reconciliation, The Christian
Life, Baiili described the limit of human justice by contiasting it with God’s justice. He
ai'gued that humans could not bring in or build up a moral or political Kingdom of God
on this eaiih because God’s justice is the affair of God’s own act that has been
accomplished and is still awaited in Jesus Cluist. Barth explained, “The righteousness
that brings life to the world can only be that of the Kingdom of God. Where people,
especially Cliristians, practice this or introduce it, where they tiy to proclaim, define,
and exercise a divine right instead of simply believing in the coming of God’s Kingdom
and praying for it, there they are enslaved to a titanism whose only result can be all
kinds of greater and smaller monstrosities, wild illusions, oppressions and suppressions
of all kinds, and finally witch hunts, mui'der, and killing.”^^  Christians may only claim
to work for human righteousness; God’s righteousness requires them and empowers
them to work for justice. Though this just action will be related to the Kingdom of God
and initiated by the righteousness of God, humans must always remember that their
work will always fall short of God’s work. Baith explained that Chiistians have been
made responsible to work for righteousness:
The only point is that in spite of their situation of shared guilt and 
oppression they have been required and empowered to pray for the 
coming of the kingdom. This is what differentiates them from all other 
people. So too, of course, does their commitment to oppose, resist, and 
revolt against human cormption in their own sphere, which it is not their 
affair to tianscend. Not led astray by necessity, they have to swim 
manfrilly against the stream regardless of the cost or consequences. They 
do this by looking past and beyond all other things to man, whom God 
loved in spite of all his corruption and misery, by making man the 
proper object of their interest, by making man’s right and life and 
fr eedom and joy their theme, hi this way they fight the fight for human 
righteousness against human umighteousness.^^
Therefore, those who seek a triumphal political or economic programme in Barth’s
ethics of reconciliation will find themselves disappointed. Barth opposed such
triumphalism by holding before his reader the human reality that Christ’s downward
movement revealed: both the human pride which claims to know justice and the human
31
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disobedience, which seeks to mle rather than worship have been judged and deemed 
unjust.
The Upward Movement; The Servant as Lord
Whereas the downwaid movement of the God-human revealed the humility and 
obedience of Christ the Lord in becoming a seiwant, the upward movement of Christ 
reveals the exaltation of human essence in the Servant who becomes Lord. According 
to Barth, this upward movement reveals the sin of sloth and disobedience as an 
ontological problem that undermines the relationship between humanity and God and 
humanity with one another. Christ’s upward movement reveals both the problem of 
sloth that destroys human relationality and it reveals the sanctification for humanity 
tlirough which persons are fr eed to live justly in social relationships. As participants in 
the Royal Man Chiist, humans discover what it is to live under his lordship in 
reconciled relations with the neighbour. Following a brief discussion of Christ the 
Royal Man, we will explore this dialectic of sin and conversion revealed in CMst’s 
exaltation.
The Royal Man
Barth located his discussion of the Royal Man in the context of covenant and 
election. In the elected one, Jesus Christ, God made an eternal decision to reconcile 
sinful humanity to himself. The incarnation is tlie historical frilfilment of election, it is 
the “act of majesty in which the Son of God assumes human essence, and exists as the 
man Jesus of Nazaretli, in which He unites in Himself His divine with our human and 
our human with his divine essence, in which He commits them to a mutual 
participation, in which especially He exalts oiu* assumed human essence, i.e., to 
gracious fellowship with his divine nature, to the consortium divinitatis, and therefore, 
as we have seen, to a common action with His d iv in i ty . I n  his being as a human, 
Cluist raised up human essence so that the reconciliation of the world with God has 
talcen place and Kingdom of God has been inaugiuated on this eaith.
CD IV.2.37-38, 117.
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The Sloth and Sanctification of Humanity in Christ
According to Barth, the exaltation of Chiist reveals the sloth and the misery of 
humans. This sloth describes the bondage of the will seen in the human unwillingness 
to raise herself up to obedience. Like the downwaid movement of Clirist that revealed 
human injustice, the upwai d movement also reveals the unwillingness of the 
autonomous human to obey God and, by implication, to practice love and justice 
toward the neighbour”. Like the sin of pride, sloth is an ontological reality which affects 
the will of humans negatively, prohibiting them from choosing to behave justly. Again 
in this chapter, Barth ai*gues against the notion that the individual is left relatively 
unaffected by evil action.^ "^  On the contrary, the human who sins is the human 
chai acterised by sloth and indolence, the human who wills to turn to that which God 
has not willed but He has rejected. Sin as sloth involves the “human refusal and failure 
to budge” fr om adherence to nothingness and self-contradiction, the disobedience to 
God’s call of freedom.^^ Because this inaction which is sin camrot be separated from 
but is intrinsic to human persons including the human will, Barth argues that the sin of 
sloth exposes sin as an ontological problem sepaiating God from humanity.^*’
Sloth and the Neighbour
The sin of sloth also separates himians from each other. Baith wrote, “Man wills 
tliat which according to His incarnation God does not will. He wills the impossible. He 
wills to be man without and even in opposition to his fellow-man.. . .  He does not live 
a genuinely human, but an inhuman, life, because he does not live as a fellow-man.”^^  
In sloth the human turns away from the grace given him by God to bring reconciliation 
with God and with the neighbour. “Inhumanity” is coimected with this godlessness. In 
turning away from CMst, the human turns fr om the one who is fellow-human.
Baith exposes the manner in wliich humans may conceal their inliumanity 
thi'ough phiianthi'opy, which he defines as “the focusing and concentrating of human 
will and action on the prosecution of one such anonymously human cause to a
34 CD IV.2.393-395.
CD IV.2.394,433.
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victorious and successful outcome.”^^  Yet such charity is not love at all but “a form of 
love in which, however sacrificially it is practised, the other is not seized by a human 
hand but by a cold instimment, or even by a paw with sheathed talons, and therefore 
genuinely isolated and frozen and estranged and oppressed and humiliated, so that he 
feels he is trampled imder the feet of one who is supposed to love him.”^^  This 
inhumanity is expressed in the power and exploitation of another. The sloth of 
withdrawal fr om the fellow-human is exposed by the self-giving of Jesus Cluist for 
humanity.
Reconciliation o f Fellow-humanity
Thus, the cross and the resurrection play a central role in this upward
movement. In the incarnation, Jesus becomes the Fellow-human for the sake of
humanity. Through the cross, Cluist genuinely embraced the hmnan situation and he
radically transfonned it as om* brother." '^ His resmxection declares him as the Royal
Man who is reconciled with God."^  ^He lives as the new man in whom all humans “may
discover that they are known and proclaimed as regenerate.”"^  ^Humans camiot see this
sin standing by itself. They can only see it in Jesus whose death and resiurection
accomplished the deliverance from sin, the elevation of himianity, and the restoration of
humans as covenant-partner of God.'^ '^  Thus, Barth explained:
It is only in this loiowledge [of Jesus and of the self in Jesus] that there 
is fulfilled the critical clarification, the liberation, in which man is given 
and shown his true fr ontier, and (without being merely cut loose from 
himself) is really brought behind and below himself. We have the old 
man behind and below us when we have Jesus Clirist before and above 
us, and in Him ourselves as the new man who is elevated and exalted to 
fellowship with God; who is certain of his elevation and exaltation, 
inviolably, impregnably, and indestructibly certain; who cannot 
therefore be separated fr om the love of God."^ ^
CD IV.2.438. 
CD IV.2.440. 
CD IV.2.452. 
*“ CD IV.2.293, 
CD IV.2.297f. 
CD IV.2.395. 
CD IV.2.281. 
CD IV.2.285.
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Sanctification for Fellow-humanity
The foimation of human persons into fellow-humanity comes thi’ough 
the sanctification of humanity in Jesus Chiist. The upward movement of Christ 
in his death and resurrection achieved the exaltation of the human, creating his 
new fomi of existence as the faithful covenant-partner of God, free to live in 
fellowship with God and neighbour, and to practice holiness in living by his 
commands. Barth called this sanctification the second moment of reconciliation. 
Justification describes the “I will be youi* God” and sanctification completes the 
“you shall be my people” of the covenant."^  ^Bai th described sanctification as 
God’s fashioning of a holy people, “i.e. those who in spite of their sin have the 
freedom, which they have received from Him to live in it, to represent him 
among all other men, and to serve Him in what they are to do and suffer.”"^^
The Holy Spirit grants us “a very definite fr e e d o m . G o d  recreates 
humanity in Chiist as obedient children and speaks to us, “Be what thou art.”"^  ^
Our being is ti'ansformed by his power and we are set in a new direction. This 
direction is one of fr eedom in Cluist in which humans ai e liberated fr'om the 
compulsion of continuing in disobedience into life as the brother of the one 
exalted, obedience to the command of God, and love for fellow-humans.^^
Like John Paul, Baith defined love as the giving of the self.^  ^Love thus 
entails relation with the neighboiu*.^  ^Love for the neighbour springs from the 
love, which God has given to humans. It is not a general love for humanity but a 
specific love for neighbours and enemies which is given as a witness of God’s 
own love.^  ^Christians ai'e thus called and set in the direction of Chiist in giving 
of themselves to witness to the love which God has already given to humanity. 
Later in the chapter, we will address the more systemic issues of politics and 
economics as they are related to Christ’s exaltation and the establishing of the
CD IV.2.499.
CD IV.2.511.
CD IV.2.363.
CD IV.2.363.
CD IV.2.312.
CD IV.2.728-731,786.
CD IV.2.733.
”  CD IV.2.802, 812.
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Kingdom of God. For the time, however, we see that Barth’s overwhelming 
emphasis is upon the paiticipation which believers are given in Christ’s relation 
with the Father. This participation creates human freedom to love the neighbour 
and to fulfil the criterion of humanity that is core to Baith’s social ethics.
The Outward Movement: The Prophetic Role of Christ
hi his time, Jesus lived and died as the Lord who humbled himself as 
seiwant and as the sei*vant exalted to be Lord. Yet in his resurrection Jesus 
Christ lives eternally as the contemporary of all humans, active as a Prophet in 
His Word and by His Spirit.^ "^  Thus, while Baith described Cluist’s priestly 
work in his downward movement that brought about the justification of 
himianity and Jesus’ upwaid and kingly movement, which sanctifies humans 
and draws humans to God, the resuixection and ongoing life of Christ as Prophet 
calls humans to an outward life of vocation and service.
Jesus Christ, The Prophet
As Prophet, Jesus Christ is first the true witness in both his speech and his act. 
Secondly, Jesus Christ is truth and light and his reconciling work is a prophetic word. 
As Barth explained, Jesus spoke the logos and he is the logos; he spoke to all people 
and his life was “the light of men”; he spoke of the covenant and he fulfilled the 
covenant; and as prophet he acted as mediator between God and hmnanity unlike any 
prophet before him.^^ However the world,^ *^  wliich Christ encounters, reacts with 
hostility. The light of Jesus shines into daikness and the darlaiess opposes it. Barth 
explained, “Word and revelation as this is active in great superiority yet has not so fai* 
attained its goal but is still wrestling toward it, being opposed by the power of darkness, 
which even though it yields in it clear inferiority, is still present and even active in its 
own negative and restrictive way. A history is here taking place; a drama being 
enacted; a wai' waged to successful conclusion.Thus,  the third aspect of Jesus’
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prophetic role is “Jesus as V i c t o r .H i s  work of reconciliation overcomes the distance 
between God and human persons; hmnans perceive this work through his proclamation: 
“The Kingdom of God is at hand.”^^  This proclamation declares the reality of the new 
human person and the new freedom in the Kingdom of God thi ough Chiist’s vicai ious 
work yet in opposition to this revelation of Christ, the world clings to the old reality 
and resists Clirist with anthropocentiic worldviews. However, at the conclusion of 
history, Chiist will be proven the final victor in truth and light.
Human Truth and Falsehood
In this time between Easter and the end, Cluist comes near to humans in his 
Spirit, encountering us, proclaiming his truth, and giving to us the time and space to 
live in this new human freedom. His revelation of truth exposes the falsehood of 
humans as they seek to evade his prophesy by establishing false ‘truths.’ Baith wrote, 
“The era post Christum is a sphere which is effectively controlled or even blockaded by 
human falsehood. It is also and much more the sphere in which the manoeuwes of lying 
man ai'e constantly disrupted and thwaited as by an invisible hand.”^^  God opposes this 
falsehood tluough the living and present reality of Jesus Cluist, the self-declaration of 
the gi*ace and truth of God.
Barth provides the friends of Job as an example of such pious falsity hidden in 
the garb of human goodness. The goodness and earnest religiosity of these men stands 
in marked contrast to the violent utterances of Job. Barth finds these men interesting 
because “on the one side such excellent people who aie on such fr iendly tenus with the 
tme witness imdoubtedly incur the guilt of the real falsehood of the man of sin, and yet 
on the other, the ground does not open beneath their feet to swallow them up as in the 
rebellion of Korah,” but God extends his patience and goodness to them as well.^  ^The 
sinful falsity of these friends exposes the destruction that the neighbour can wreak 
against another, when reliant upon human wisdom and goodness. The tmth attacks and 
judges such evasion and principled untmth which exalts the hmnan person to the place
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of judgement or autonomous freedom or the imaging of one’s own god, which looks 
differently from God’s self-revelation in Jesus Cluist. Jesus Clirist meets us as the true 
witness. Christ proclaims the reconciliation of the human with God, which is active in 
himself.
What ai'e the implications of this declaration for the human? In proclaiming and 
activating the reconciliation of man with God, Jesus calls the human out of darkness 
into light. This particulai' person, Jesus, frees all humanity fi'om falsehood by rising and 
living for the world and by proclaiming God in the Word of grace and reconciliation 
and in the promised Spirit.^^ Thus, the person is called into Christ’s fellowship: the life 
of Christ in her and her life in Christ. The will of God fonns the common standpoint 
and outlook of Christ and the church in her obedience to the work of God and God’s 
will forms their final goal: seivice to the world.Bai 'th used the word “service” to 
denote this fellowship of action in which Cluist is clearly superior and his work 
initiates the action of the Chi*istian servant as a witness to God. '^^  Yet the calling 
{KXpcrif) of the Christian is not a calling into a solitary life of service but into a church 
{sKîcXî]aio^,^^ Therefore, the prophetic word of Christ calls the human into fellowship 
with God and with the people of God in sei"vice to the world.
The Outward Movement and Political-Economic Justice
What is the service that the church gives to the world, specifically with regard 
to political and economic seivice? According to Barth, the church exists for the world 
in on-going seivice for the world in tluee aspects.
First, the commimity of Jesus Chiist is the fellowship in which it is given to 
laiow the truth concerning the world. Barth explained, “The world does not Imow itself. 
It does not know God, nor man, nor the relationship and covenant between God and 
man. Hence it does not know its own origin, its state, nor its goal. It does not know 
what divides nor what unites. It knows neither its life and its salvation nor its death and
“  Cl IV.3.486. Barth related this calling to election in 486ff. See John Webster on tire universality of this 
particular human in (London: Continuum, 2000), 133.
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destiTiction. It is blind to its own reality. Its existence is a groping in the dark. The 
community of Jesus exists for and is sent into the world in the first basic sense that it is 
given to it, in its Imowledge of God and humanity and the covenant set up between 
them, to know the world as it is.”^^  For this reason, the church exists as a light and a 
witness to the world, distinguishing itself fr om the world, and proclaiming the 
Kingdom of God to the woiid.^^
Secondly, Jesus Chiist gives his community the knowledge and practice of 
solidarity with the world. Solidarity means that the church is committed to the world, 
participating in its situation, in the promise given to it, in the responsibility for the 
arrogance, sloth, and falsehood that reign in it, in its resulting suffering, and in the 
grace and hope in Jesus Clu is t .The community is called to live with the world in 
compassion rather than fleeing fi'om the world or holding oneself aloof.^^ hi cases of 
injustice, in particulai', the church cannot remain “neutial” by witliliolding her witness 
but she is called to pray and to fight for just peace.^^
Third, the church has become obligated to and responsible for the world as co- 
operators with Cluist. Barth wrote that the community is sent to the world “not merely 
knowing it better in its good and evil, its gi'eatness and misery, nor merely hoping and 
suffering with it, but also waiting with it for its future and with it hastening towards the 
futiu'e.”^^
In sununary, the church has been given a task of (a) proclaiming Jesus Chiist to 
humans and (b) caring for the recipient of this proclamation tluough service.^^ Barth 
likewise divides the specific forms of ministry into two categories: ministries of speech 
(or action by speech) and ministiies of act (or speech by action).^ "* The Cluistian 
ministry of act, which holds special implications for political and economic ethics is the 
ministry of the diaconate. The origin of the diaconate is described in Acts 6: I f  when 
seven men are selected to undertake the diakonia of the daily provision for the widows,
CD IV.3.769.
Bartli, God Here «?îriNow, 66 and CCCC, 158-159.
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The temi has come to be used to indicate the special ministiy to the physical or material 
distress of those within and outside of the community. As Jesus commanded, the 
community accepts solidarity with the least of the little ones (the elachistoi of Matthew 
25:40 and 45), those who are marginalized, hungiy, thirsty, naked, homeless, sick, 
feeble, mentally confused, orphaned, seeking refuge, and imprisoned.’  ^The diaconate 
reveals the Kingdom of God by addressing the physical needs of the person.
Baith addressed three issues in the theory and practice of the Cluistian 
diaconate:
1. Because the needs of individuals are grounded in certain disorders of human life in 
society, the prevailing economic, social, and political conditions often limit the 
human. The Cluistian conununity cannot turn a blind eye to social injustice or 
evade its responsibility as a member of that society. Rather, the community must 
“raise its voice and with its proclamation of the Gospel summon the world to reflect 
on social injustice and its consequences and to alter the conditions and relationships 
in question.” Thus, Barth calls for Christian social criticism.’^
2. A second issue is the role of the diaconate as it relates to the state. The state has 
increasingly assumed responsibility for the material well-being of its citizens 
through vai'ious social progi*ams. The church must recognise the possibilities which 
this change sets before her. First, the state can only tackle the physical and material 
needs but caimot provide for the whole person as the church can. Second, the state 
tends to function bureaucratically rather than person to person. Third, the state 
misses some people. Fourth, persons in the church can serve by working for the 
state in positions of seivice.”
3. Although deacons and deaconesses may be specially called and fitted and endowed 
for places of seivice, the whole community must take a role in this service.’^
In this maiuier, then, the prophetic role of Cluist draws the church 
outward, in service to the marginalized and the oppressed in society. The church 
is not required to make effective the reality of Jesus but to attest to his reality.
"CDIV.3.890-1.
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Thus, the seivice of the church reflects the two forms in which Clnist lives in 
the Christian. First, Clnist as the new Adam is the Mediator, Head and 
Representative of all, whose work belongs to himself. Humans can participate 
in this work passively, by faith. Second, Jesus imparts himself and calls others 
to be his heralds. Baith wrote, “Being called by and to the Christ engaged in the 
exercise of his prophetic office, they have no option but to attach themselves to 
Him with their own action, to ti*ead in His steps, to become with Him 
proclaimers of the reconciliation of the world accomplished in Him, heralds of 
His person and work.”’^
In summary, the prophetic role of Clnist demonstrated the dependence of 
humanity upon the truth revealed in Him. This truth moves humans outward as a body 
of believers not primarily to establish themselves as the church or to proclaim ideas but 
to witness to the person of Jesus Chiist. Witness entails proclaiming Clnist in word as 
well as act; it includes proclaiming the justification of Christ and participating in the 
justice God commands by caring for the poor and marginalized in society.
Political and Economic Ethics
Thus far in our examination of Barth, we have focused on the reconciliation of 
Chiist with the individual and the benefits confeixed to social relations through his 
work. We have traced Barth’s ai'gument that Clnist reveals an intrinsic problem with 
the concept of “uinedeemed human goodness,” for Chiist’s incarnation, his life, death, 
and resiuTection demonstrate the extent to which humanity needed redemption and the 
inability for the human to become reconciled with God or neighbour through 
autonomous attempts at justice, love, and seivice. Chiist reconciles humans to one 
another and enables them to participate in the tme justice, the self-giving love, and the 
joyful service of God and the neighbour.
hi this section, we will explore with the laiger question of justice in society. 
Barth ai'gued that the dilemma of sin in individual persons has created the larger 
problem of injustice in society. He argued that Christians are called to revolt against 
these systems and forces, the “disorder,” to which humans have enslaved themselves.
CD IV.3.606. For further discussion, see Webster, Barth, 135-6.
He calls this revolt the "stiuggle for human righteousness.” The Christian Life, 206.
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This disorder directly results from the human revolt against the order of obedience to
God.^  ^Regarding the origin of this disorder Barth stated the following:
It arises and consists in the unrighteousness of the fall of people from 
God which as such ineluctably caiiied with it their fall fr om one another, 
the changing of their being with one another, which corresponds to their 
being with God, into a general being without and against one another. In 
offending God they can only offend one another as well. They cannot 
deal righteously with one another, nor be liberal with one another, nor 
live at peace with one another. In and with the sin of Adam who wanted 
to be as God, there is already enclosed the sin of Cain, the mui derer of 
his brother.^’
The human who pretends to be lord gives rise to and will find himself ensnared by what 
Baith calls the “Lordless Powers.” These powers aie imleashed by the rebellion of the 
human person against God, they are the human abilities which exalt themselves as 
lordless forces and become destmctive towards the very person who thought himself 
lord of them.^^ These forces such as govermnental absolutism, mammon, sport, and 
technology, when they create disorder, find the root of their power in the broken 
relationship between God and humanity. Thus, Cluist came to revolt against and defeat 
these powers tluough his reconciliation. The Kingdom, which he established, restores 
the order and right relations for which humans long. In this section, we will explore 
Bai'th’s conception of the Kingdom of God as it especially relates to the establishing of 
political justice.
The Kjngdom of God
Barth described the Kingdom of God as the Lordship and Rule of God, which
he established in this world through Jesus Cluist. '^  ^Cluist amiounced the establishing of
the Kingdom in the Semion on the Mount. Barth summarised this declaiation:
Here on this earth and in time, and therefore in the immediate context of 
all human Idngdoms both small and great, and in the sphere of Satan 
who lules and tomients fallen man, God has irrevocably and
Barth wrote, “it may be presupposed that man’s fall and alienation from God is the root of all evil and 
therefore of this evil too. This is the final and true basis o f the disorder. Indeed, it is itself the original 
disorder, the true mnighteousness which darkens and burdens human life and fellowship. Man’s 
alienation from God at once carries with it his self-alienation: the denaturalising of humanity and fellow 
humanity of his own existence, the contr adiction of the determination, inalienably given to him as God’s 
creature, tlrat he should belong to God and have in him his Lord ” The Christian Life, 214.
The Christian Life, 212.
^ The Christian Life, 215.
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indissolubly set up the kingdom of His grace, he throne of His glory, the 
kingdom which as such is superior to all other powers, to which, in spite 
of their resistance, they belong, and which they cannot help but seive.^^
Yet Clnist did not only announce the Kingdom, he himself is the Kingdom. He is the
Lord who is King over tire whole cosmos, the one who acted for humans, who has
fought for them, who has taken their side against their enemies. Thougli humans have
been unfaithful, God in Chiist remained faithflil to his covenant with them by
establisliing his Kingdom in freedom and power and gi'ace.^^
Clnist revealed this Kingdom to this world through analogy. Barth described
Clnist as created “after God” {kata theon) meaning that he exists analogously to the
mode of existence of God. Baiih explained, “In what he thinlcs and wills and does, in
His attitude, there is a correspondence a parallel in the creaturely world, to the plan and
pui'pose and work and attitude of God.” ’^ As the analogy of God, Jesus revealed the
concern of God for the marginalized of this world and the fr eedom of the Kingdom of
God over against and within the kingdoms of this woiid.^^
Barth recognised thi*ee approaches of Christ toward the economic and political
realms of this world in which he revealed the freedom of the Kingdom of God
analogously. First, Bai'th described the passive conservatism of C h i i s t .h r  this sense,
Jesus accepted many things in principle or in practice which he could have attacked and
set aside. With regard to economics, Jesus never came into direct conflict with the
relationships and obligations of His setting, hi the instance of the brother who asked for
justice in the dividing of his father’s inheritance, Jesus refused to judge and warned the
brother against covetousness.^® hr his parables, he seemed to accept the laboui* practices
prevalent in his day.^  ^He even seemed to accept poverty as axiomatic in his answer to
the disciples who would have preferred almsgiving to the woman’s lavish gift of
perfume when he said, “You have the poor with you always.”®’
CD IV.2.688.
CD IV.2.244.
"  CD IV.2.166.
See also Gerald Allan Butler, Karl Barth and Political Theology, (PhD Thesis, Duke University, 
1973), 261-3.
CD IV.2.173-175.
CD IV.2.174; Lulce 12:13-21.
CD IV.2.174; Luke 16:If.
CD IV.2.174; Mark 14:7.
183
In addition, Jesus did not directly criticise the political authorities who “thinlc to 
rule over the nations” nor does he stand against the oppressive imperialism or 
militarism of his day.®^  He recognised Pilate as an authority in relation to Himself and 
he did not allow Peter to resist the Sanhediin guai'd.®'^  Thus, Christ did not directly 
condemn the prevailing political or economic systems despite their oppression of the 
Jews, of women, and of the poor.
Second, although Jesus accepted and subjected himself to the prevailing orders, 
he remained superior to them. Barth exposed the breaches of economic order: Wliat 
king ever pronounced freedom from punishment to a seivant who had misappropriated 
what was enti'usted to him?®^  What vineyard owner would pay his labourer equal wages 
for working differing hours?®® Wliat sense does it malce that the human person who 
built new bams to house his haivest was described as fool?®’ And Jesus seemed to lack 
a proper understanding of trade and commerce when he condemned the small-scale 
financial activities of the temple merchants as a “den of thieves.”®^ In the political 
scale, Jesus’ command to “Render to Caesar the things that aie Caesar’s, and to God 
the things that are God’s,” Jesus does not indicate two kingdoms alongside one another. 
Barth interpreted this passage to show that the human kingdom is authoritative and 
demands obedience yet this kingdom is sharply delimited by the one Kingdom of 
God.®® He argued that these signal give warning of the threat of the free and 
revolutionary nature of the Kingdom of God.
Third, the coming of the Kingdom brought a crisis far more revolutionary than 
these human Idngdoms had yet faced. Baith quotes the Mai'kan passage, “Non one sews 
a piece of unshinnk cloth on an old gaiment; if he does, the patch teais away from it, 
the new from the old, and a worse tear is made. And no one puts new wine into old 
wineskins; if he does, the wine will burst the skins and the wine is lost, and so are the 
skins; but new wine is for fresh skins.” ®^® He interpreted the old garment and old bottles
CD IV.2.174; Mark 10:42.
CD IV.2.174-5; John 19:11; Mt. 26:52. 
CD IV.2.176; Matt 18:23ff.
^  CD IV.2.176; Matt 20: Iff 
CD IV.2.176; Liüce 12:16f.
CD IV.2.176; Mark 11:17.
^  CD IV.2.176.
CD IV.2.177; Mark 2:21-22.
184
as human orders, which are incompatible with the Kingdom of God. He wrote, “All 
true and serious conservatism, and all tme and serious belief in progress, presupposes 
that there is a certain compatibility between the new and the old, and that they can 
stand in a certain neutrality the one to the other. But the new thing of Jesus is the 
invading Kingdom of God revealed in its alienating antithesis to the world and all its 
orders.” ®^^ For example, Christ simply but radically calls the economic order into 
question because neither he nor his disciples took part in the acquisition or holding of 
any possessions. His disciples and those who sought to follow him were told to leave 
everything, “Sell everything you have and give to the poor, and you shall have tieasure 
in heaven.” ®^’ Acts 2:44 describes the bold attempt of the early church to have all 
things in common, selling their possessions and distiibuting them to all, as any had 
need. Jesus’ commands not to lay up treasures on earth and his command to take no 
thought for life, for food, and for diink challenge the presuppositions of a healthy 
economy. Barth noted, “Sinely there could be no sound or solid economy, either private 
or public, without this laying up and talcing thought? . . .  Obviously this is to shake the 
basic pillars of all noimal human activity in relation to the clearest necessities of life— 
and in the initating foiin, not of the proclamation of a better social order, but of the free 
and simple call to fr eedom.” ®^^
Cluist’s questioning of the political order finds fat* more revolutionary power in 
its lack of direct aggression. Barth claimed that he did not oppose the evil but he came 
to root it out. He instmcted his disciples not to judge and not to resist evil but to turn 
the other cheek but to love their enemies and pray for their forgiveness as he did.^ ®"^  “It 
is again clear,” Barth wrote, “for what political thinldng can do justice or satisfaction to 
this injunction and to the One who gives it?—that this involves a shaking of every 
human foundation; that the right of God is quite incompatible not merely with the 
wicked totalitarian state but with every conceivable human regime; that the new thing 
cannot be used to patch or fill the old.” ®^®
Barth concluded that the Kingdom of God is opposed to oui' whole world, tliis 
world which has fallen away fr om him. The Blmnhardts influenced Barth in this
101
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direction thi'ough their conception of the Kingdom of God as “the world to come 
intervening from outside and fr om first to last, not just limiting or even illumining this 
world, but with superior severity and goodness storming and smashing it in all its 
dimensions.” ®^® Yet Christ did not directly oppose the stmctures of authority and call 
for revolution as many expected. Jesus Chiist, the poor man who blessed and 
befr iended the poor became the incomparable revolutionaiy because he “exposed the 
darkness of the order of this cosmos, questioning it in a way that is quite beyond our 
capacity to answer.” ®^’ Clirist addressed the root problems of this world by opposing 
evil and human sin and by revealing the fr eedom of the Kingdom of God from injustice 
and evil and sin. In revealing this Kingdom, he also opened the way for all humans to 
participate in his Kingdom. Thus, Chiist became human for humanity, at once a divine 
“No” and a divine “Yes,” judging the kingdom of humans yet bringing in himself a new 
Kingdom which “indicates and explains and interprets their being and determines and 
directs and characterises it.” ®^^
The Kingdom of God, the Church, and the State
We now turn to examine the significance of the Kingdom of God for the 
relationship between church and state. Those who become followers of Christ also 
become part of his body, the church. Barth described the Chiistian community as the 
community on earth that Jesus creates and upbuilds through his Holy Spirit and that 
which he mles as his earthly historical fonn of existence.^ ®® According to Bai'th, the 
church is not equivalent to the Kingdom of God but the Kingdom of God is the 
church.^ ^ ® By this statement, Barth means that the Kingdom of God creates the 
Chiistian community as the church awaits the fullness of the Kingdom of God in the 
eschaton}^^ In this in-between time,^^’ the command of God gives order to this 
community tlnough their Lord and Head, Jesus Christ, as attested in Scripture.^Barth
The Christian Life, 258. 
The Christian Life, 258. 
The Christian Life, 189. 
“^ ^CDIV.2.614.
CCCC, 170.
CCCC, 656.
112 Meaning that the Kingdom of God has come in part. 
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made several claims concerning the commands or laws given to the church but of 
special interest for this topic is the presupposition of the exemplary nature of church 
law. As exemplary, church law serves as a pattern for all human law.
If the Kingdom of God creates the chinch to live by the laws of Chiist, how 
does the chinch relate to the laws of the state? First, we look at Barth’s understanding 
of the state as it relates to the Kingdom of God. Barth defined the state as the possessor 
and guardian of the law and order of a nation. As discussed previously, the state 
exists as an instinment of gi'ace to preserve common life from d es t rac t io n .The state 
testifies of the Kingly rale of Chiist because it has been set up by God as a sign of his 
protection and preservation.^^® In the same way that the full Kingdom of God cannot be 
embodied in the church, the state cannot become the Kingdom of God. Rather, the state 
exists under and belongs to the Kingdom of God, as an analogue to the Kingdom of 
God, which the church preaches.^”  In addition, the state serves God’s plan for salvation 
by preseiving mankind for God and providing time for repentance and reconciliation.^ 
Therefore, the task of the state is to discriminate between right and wrong and tlircugh 
its laws to set certain bounds upon the conduct of all humans, maintaining them by 
force.
Second, Barth pictured the relationship of the state with the church as two co- 
centric spheres with a common centie in Cluist. In other words, the grace of God in 
Christ provides the centre around which the circle of the church is formed to provide 
the spiritual centre of the lai'ger circle, which represents the state. Thus, both share a 
common centre of gi'ace and both exist under the lordship and direction of Jesus 
Christ.” ® For this reason, Paul commanded the Romans to submit to the state and even 
called the political autliority “God’s servant.””  ^The church fonns the inner circle
CD IV.2.687-8. He defined political systems as “the attempts undertalcen and canied out by men in 
order to secure the common political life o f man by certain coordinations of individual freedom and the 
claims of the community, by the establishing of laws with power to apply and preserve them.” In “The 
Cliristian Community in the Midst of Political Change,” in Against the Stream, 80.
CD II.2.718-720
Bartli, A Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland, 12.
"^CCCC, 169.
CCCC, 156.
CCCC, 14.
CD IV.2.687; This idea of co-centiic spheres Barth drew from O. Cullman’s Konigscherrschaft 
Christi und Kirche im Neuen Testament, 1941, CCCC, 155 and 169.
Romans 13:4.
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because it recognises the Lordship of Jesus and its laws are formed by the command of 
God. The state, on the other hand, does not recognise Jesus’ Lordship and its laws are 
evil.” ’ Yet its laws are not wholly evil because they are still under the grace of God; 
the guidance of God is evident because “the question of law is raised in the world and 
the law is proclaimed and respected and practised.””  ^The further the state moves from 
its rightful dependence upon Clnist the more it becomes demonic.” "^ hi contrast, the 
more the state founds its laws upon the preaching of justification, the more it is a true 
system of law and a true state.” ®
In Jesus Chiist, both the world and church have been reconciled with God, 
creating a basis for solidarity between the two. The church, those who have been 
redeemed by the Holy Spirit, is not complete without the world but moves outward in 
solidarity with the world. Solidarity means “frill commitment to it, unreserved 
participation in its situation, in the promise given it by creation, in its responsibility for 
the aiTogance, sloth and falsehood which reign within it, in its suffering under the 
resultant distress, but primarily and supremely in the fr ee gi'ace of God demonstrated 
and addiessed to it in Jesus Clirist, and therefore in its hope.”” ® Although the world 
does not recognise this solidarity with the chiu'ch nor with others in society,” ’ the 
intercomiectedness of all humanity has been established in Jesus Chiist.
In the midst of this similaiity, Barth also emphasised the difference between the 
church and the state. He opposed any attempt by the church to impose her laws upon 
the state because he did not want the state to become the church or the church to 
become the state. He believed that the state was commissioned divinely and sepaiately 
from the church, though both remain luider the Lordship of Christ.” ^
Being distinct fr om one another yet having the same basis in Christ, what role 
must the church take within the state? Although Barth did not delineate the implications
^^^CDIV.2.721,724.
CD IV.2.724.
The Christian Life 220-221. Baitli opposes the state that does not serve man by safeguarding him and 
giving him life and peace when it becomes the totalitarian state which forces man to be ruled.
“Church and State,” in Community, Church and State, 126.
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Barth argues despite the many philosophical, moral and religious insights regarding hmnan solidarity 
that there is no basic impulse that drives Âe world in this direction. Rather, the world divides itself 
according to different causes and interests. Unfortunately, the church also ignores this deep 
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of Christ’s outwai'd movement for the service of the state by the church, his theology of 
Clirist as witness imdergirded his approach in his political writings.” ® The primary 
seiwice the church offers the state is the seivice of witness to Christ.” ® Having 
loiowledge of the Kingdom of God, the church takes its share of political responsibility 
by preaching the gospel, by reminding the state of its connection with the order of 
divine salvation and gi'ace, and by itself thinldng and acting from its centi e in the 
gospel.”  ^ It calls the state from “neutrality, ignorance, and paganism into co­
responsibility before God.”” ’ For the state, like the church, remains imder the Lordship 
of Clu'ist for the preservation and salvation of humanity. Christ is Lord of the church 
and the world as Reconciler. His Lordship exists over the church as the Redeemer 
thi ough the work of his Holy Spirit. The church must serve the state by helping it to 
point towai'd the Kingdom of God (of which the state is unaware) and by choosing 
those political possibilities that most closely correspond to the content of the gospel of 
Clu'ist and proclaim the Lordship of Clu'ist.” ^
What sort of state should the church support? What Idnd of state most nearly 
corresponds to the divine ordinance? Using his method of analogy, Bai'th drew many 
implications for the state from his Chi'istology as examples of how the chiuch can make 
decisions on a Christian b a s i s ,T h e s e  parallels will be briefly summarised:” ®
a. Because Chiist became a neighbour to humans and treated them with compassion, 
the chui'ch must find her primary interest in human beings and not in abstract causes 
which debase individuals.” ®
b. The primary purpose of the state is to limit and to preserve human persons so that 
the chiuch may witness to divine justification. Thus, the state should be a
The bulk of Barth’s politically-related essays written after 1930 are found h\ Against the Stream: 
Shorter Post-War Writings 1946-1952; The Church and the Political Problem o f  Our Day; A Letter to 
Great Britain From Switzerland; The Christian Life; Community, Church, and State. Other significant 
works include: God Here and Now; The Knowledge o f God and the Seiwice o f  God.
“Church and State,” 126-127 and CCCC, 158.
CCCC, 170 and “Church and State,” 186.
CCCC, 171.
CCCC, 170.
CCCC, 179. Bartli contrasts this with the natinal law approach, see 163f and 179f.
This sort of analogical reasoning sparked the criticisms addressed in chapter five. I am summarising 
those which have not been included previously in this chapter. See also XXV and XXVI, 178-9.
These ten points can be found in CCCC, 171-177. See also God Here and Now.
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constitutional state based upon commonly aclmowledged law under which the 
church is protected and to which the church must submit.” ’
c. Because Chiist came to seek and save the lost, the chmch must also take special 
interest in the lowest levels of society. Barth wiote, “The poor, the socially and 
economically weak and threatened, will always be the object of its primary and 
particular concern, and it will always insist on the State’s special responsibility for 
these wealcer members of society.””  ^The church will stand for social justice in the 
political sphere, choosing the system which provides the greatest measure of social 
justice.
d. As children of God who were are freely called, the church affirms the right to 
freedom in the political context.” ®
e. Yet the Lordship of Christ as Head over the body means that those rights (whether 
recognising the interest of the individual or the whole) must be interpreted as 
responsibilities which do not dominate the individual or the whole but seek to limit 
and preserve the life of hmnans.
f. The church must stand for the equality of freedom and responsibility of all adult 
citizens despite various needs and abilities, on the basis of its fellowship under one 
Lord and their baptism in one Spirit.
g. The variety of gifts and tasks of the Holy Spirit indicate the need for separate 
functions in the state: legislative, executive, and judicial.
h. The light of Jesus which destroys works of darkness means that the church 
recognises that it cannot support the state which deals in secret.
i. The freedom of the Word of God to use hmnan word as its mouthpiece means that 
the state should support open discussion rather than the control and censor of public
. . 144opinion.
CCCC, 172-3. 
CCCC, 173.
39 CCCC, 173-174.
CCCC, 174. 
CCCC, 175. 
CCCC, 175. 
CCCC, 176. 
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190
j. As the church serves the community, the rule of political power must also serve the 
upholding of the law.
Thus, Barth demonstrated the continuous line of Christian political thought and action 
dr awn by the corxelation between explication and application. He acknowledged the 
striking similarity with the democratic state, though he maintained that the concept of 
“democracy” is powerless to describe the kind of State which most closely conesponds 
to the divine ordinance. For according to Bar th, the Cliristian doctrine of the just 
State simply does not exist for the proclamation of Christian doctrine entails the 
proclamation of God’s Kingdom.
How does the church promote the formation or maintenance of a just state? 
Should the church form itself into a particular Cliristian party that supports such 
policies? Barth opposed the formation of a Christian party because the politicising 
would inevitably obscure compromise its distinctly Cliristian content. Rather, Barth 
encouraged Christians to enter the political arena anonymously, to act in accordance 
with their Christian faith, and thereby to live as witnesses to the gospel of Clnist. Barth 
wrote, “The way Christians can help in the political sphere is by constantly giving the 
State an impulse in the Christian direction and freedom to develop on the Christian 
line.”‘“
The Unjust State
The state that refuses its centr e in Christ becomes the unjust state. The church 
can identify the unjust state by asking three questions:”  ^Does this state abide by God’s 
commands and do justice? Does it provide freedom for chur ch to preach justification? 
Does it obey God? The state tliat attempts to exalt itself as god as Germany did under 
National Socialism or other totalitarian states become demonic by opposing the
CCCC, 177.
146 CCCC, 181-2.
CCCC, 160.
Unfortunately, there is a gap in tlie teaching of tlie New Testament with regard to Cluistian citizens 
who bear some responsibility to the state because the New Testament focuses upon authoritarian states.’ 
“Church and State,” 144.
CCCC, 183-4.
CCCC, 188 and “Church and State,” 145-147.
The Knowledge o f  God and the Service o f  God, Gifford Lectures, 1937, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1949), III and IV.
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Kingdom of God.” ’ In addition, the state that asserts itself too little, the state that fails 
to declare justice as Pilate failed when he recognised the imiocence of Chiist, also 
demonises itself.” ^
How must the church relate to the imjust state? First, by believing that the 
Lordship of Clirist means that the unjust state camiot achieve what it desires. Through 
the injustice of humans, the unjust state will continue to testify to God’s justice. For 
example, the injustice of Pilate brought about the justification of all humans through the 
death and resuixection of Jesus Chiist.” ® God works his justice despite and in the midst 
of human injustice. Secondly, under certain conditions the church is called to resist 
political power.” ® God must be obeyed first rather than men or women. At the times, 
when the state demands obedience that entails disobedience to God, the church must 
actively witness to faitli in Christ and serve the state through resistance.” ’ Thus Barth 
wrote, “Chiistians would be neglecting the distinctive service which they can and must 
render to the State, were they to adopt an attitude of unquestioning assent to the will 
and action of the State which is directly or indirectly aimed at the suppression of the 
freedom of the Word of God.”” ^
In summary, Barth argued that the stance of Christians against human injustice
must be one of confrontation and revolt. They aie to oppose injustice by practising
solidarity with the world and by continuing to proclaim of the righteousness of God, his
order of right, freedom and peace for humanldnd. Barth wrote:
They cannot acquiesce, then in the dominant disorder. For them this is 
not a final reality that cannot be altered. Instead, it is a powerful 
phantom that is destined to disappear. Hence, even though they cannot 
do away with it, in all circumstances they must swim against its current.
If we call the continually new development of great disorder a 
revolution, we might say that even though Cliristians participate in it and
“Chm-ch and State,” 118. 
“Church and State,” 112-113. 
“Church and State,” 118. 
“Chui'ch and State,” 113.
156 The Knowledge o f  God, 230.
“Church and State,” 231.
“Church and State,” 139. One example of Barth’s revolt was his support of the British in their battles 
against Hitler. In A Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland, 1-9. Yet Willis raised die important 
question, a point of contention between Barth and R. Niehbuhr: Why did Bartii not take a sti'onger stand 
against comimmism? See Willis, The Ethics o f Karl Barth on Barth’s response to communism.
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share the guilt for the resulting plight, they are at the sanie time bom 
coimterrevolutionaries. ^
This counterrevolution never entails a fight against other people. Rather, it involves the
continual petition to God, “Thy Kingdom come.” For God’s Kingdom judges and
establishes humanity, institutes his perfect lordship over human relations, and
overcomes the disorder that rules humanity. This prayer calls for God’s righteous
Kingdom and sets humans in the direction of obedience to his mle and par ticipation in
his reconciliation.^^®
Conclusion to Part Two: Karl Barth
Having witnessed the hon or of human self-interest as it wrought destniction 
against the human persons in two world wars, Barth sought to develop his social ethics 
in a way that both exposed and prevented such destruction. Chapter Four traced Barth’s 
discovery that he could not merely graft onto the tree of human ethics a conective 
branch of Christian ethics because the tree was poisonous to the core. The tree of 
autonomous social ethics must been uprooted and assessed by starting with God’s self­
revelation to humanity regarding human persons in the social sphere. Barth appealed 
that Christians begin thinking from a Christian epistemic basis starting with God’s self­
disclosure in order to fomi a foundation for social ethics.
In Chapter Five, we explored the new Christological criterion for social justice 
articulated in Barth’s doctrine of election and his doctrine of creation. The covenant 
established by God with humanity contains the criterion for social justice because it 
includes the election of humanity into the covenant and the command of God that 
creates human freedom and solidarity. Jesus Christ reveals that the command of God 
the Creator establishes the criterion of real humanity for just political and economic 
relations.
Ceriainly, such critical criteria help to articulate social justice within the context 
of creation. Yet we are still left with the problem that injustice continues to wreak 
havoc despite the highest aims at social morality. Barth may say tirat humans must seek 
to uphold the life of the neighbour' in political and economic spheres. Yet even the 
people who know this social command fail to apply it in all situations. According to 
Barth, the problem of human injustice runs much deeper than merely a lack of
The Christian Life, 212.
The Christian Life. 212.
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Imowledge. The root of human injustice is a broken relationship with God that has 
twisted social relations as well. Thus, reflecting on our prior metaphor, the seed planted 
in the soil of Clii'ist’s criterion for justice cannot be supposed to be the seed of a certain 
goodness in unredeemed humanity which might blossom into a just society if taught 
how to grow rightly. The very incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ reveals that 
no such seed exists, Baith would ai'giie. The seed for human justice comes from the real 
humanity of Jesus Christ, the source of human goodness because he redeems humanity 
in his incarnation, his death, and his resurrection.
This chapter explored the doctrine of reconciliation in its implications for social 
justice. According to Barth, the person and work of Jesus Cltrist revealed that human 
sin is an ontological problem that God freely addressed tlnough the incarnation of the 
Son, Jesus Christ, who by talcing on humanity brought human persons under the 
judgement of God. By dying on the cross, Cln ist took on himself the judgement against 
human sin. By raising him fr om the dead, God declared victory over human sin in Jesus 
Chr ist and in the Son, He draws humans to himself for their sanctification. According 
to Barth, the person and work of Clnist addressed not only the source of injustice, 
which is located in human evil. Clnist also dealt with the seed of uinedeemed human 
goodness, the seed that tries to bear the fruit of justice but whose very being 
necessitates freedom from the pride, the sloth, and the untruth which characterises it 
before justice can be borne. Thr ough his work of reconciliation, Christ made right the 
relationships of God and humanity so that humans might live once again in ft-ee 
obedience to his just Lordship.
Barth’s social ethics, therefore, are grounded in the Clnistological assertion that 
the humanity of Christ binds all humans to one another in a relation of solidarity 
tlnough his creation, his incarnation, liis deatli, and his resurrection. Drawing on his 
appeal to the analogia relationis, Barth argued that human ethics exist not as a 
universal law or an order of creation. Rather, ethics arises out of the very being of 
human persons in solidarity with one another through Christ. Clnist has reconciled 
humanity in himself, laying the gr oundwork for ethical encounter in his own real 
humanity.
John Webster describes this new reality as the “moral space” in which humans exist in encounter. 
Ethics o f Reconciliation, 216.
194
CHAPTER SEVEN 
A CRITICAL COMPARISON
The primary focus of this work has been the theological anthr opology that 
undergirds social ethics. The differing routes taken by John Paul and Kai'l Barth 
towards establishing a social doctrine or ethical formdation for social justice are to be 
expected in theological traditions which have developed historically in relative isolation 
from one another. The convergence between the two on several crucial fi'onts perhaps 
comes as a gr eater and welcome surprise at a time when the two traditions recognise 
the necessity of working toward rmity at an ideological level and at the level of praxis.^ 
First, both men believe that the critical criterion for evaluating all human societies is 
the criterion of humanity.^ They argue that human persons must be valued and upheld 
as primary witliin economic and political systems. Both hold specific issues—fr om 
human rights abuses to the materialism rampant in capitalistic societies—up to the 
criterion of humanity. The ethical act that is just promotes the “tr'ue humanity” or the 
dignity of persons in society.
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Clnist 30 (1994), 310-318; English Roman Catholic—Methodist Committee, “Justification— A 
Consensus Statement,” One in Christ 24 (1988), 270-3; Salvation and the Church: An Agi'eed Statement 
by the Second Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission ARCIC II (London: Church House 
and Catholic Tmth Society, 1987); K. Lehmami and W. Pannenberg (hrsg.), Lehrverurteilungen—  
kirchentrennend? I: Rechtfertigung, Sakramente und Amt in Zeitalter der Reformation und Heute, 
(Gôttigen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); H. G. Anderson, T. A. Miuphy and J. A. Biugess (eds.). 
Justification by Faith, (Miimeapolis: Augsburg, 1985); and Hans Küng, Justification, (London; Burns 
and Oates, 1981). See also Anthony N.S. Lane, Justification by Faith in Catholic—Protestant Dialogue, 
(London: T&T Clark, 2002).
 ^For example, Jolm Paul (JP), CA, 55 and Bartli, CD III.4.340.
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Second, John Paul and Barth both define true humanity according to a distinctly 
Christian anthropology. In other words, the ethic that promotes true humanity begins 
with God, the God revealed in Jesus Christ who created humanity and freely initiated 
his covenant with human persons.^ Through this creation and his gr acious covenant of 
love, humanity was established."  ^In Jesus Christ, humanity has been raised to “a dignity 
beyond compare” through renewed covenant partnership with God.^ True humanity is 
initiated and established in this covenant relationship, a relation not only of mutual love 
but also of obedience to the law and commands of God.®
In this manner, both Barih and John Paul locate the starting point for social 
ethics in God. They argue against the more prevalent naturalistic approach, which 
presumes that hiunan persons decide what is right or what is wr*ong.  ^They believe that 
God alone determines justice. By implication, human beings do not determine justice; 
they do not possess absolute moral criteria independent of their relationship with God. 
The autonomy of humanity, both men argue, does not mean that people may determine 
their own social standards. Rather, human autonomy entails the freedom to live in 
accordance with the justice that God has commanded, the morality that finds its origin 
in him.^
In addition, Jolm Paul and Barth articulate a response to the sort of impasse 
reached in human rights debates, when the right of one party infringes upon the right of 
another. Jolm Paul emphasises the responsibility of the human person to the common 
humanity of all, which he grounds in the image of God. In addition, his theme of self- 
gift (derived fr om the sacrificial mercy of God in Christ) also overcomes such a 
stalemate because mercy overcomes justice; thr ough sacrificial giving, trne hmnanity is 
acutalised and fulfilled. The ethics of Barth also prevent such a stalemate because Barth 
has bypassed the individualism of rights ethics through his Christological anthr opology. 
He has defined humans as persons in cormnunity, as an ontological constrnct, so that 
respect and responsibility for the neighbour is intrinsic to one’s true humanity.®
 ^JP, God, 139-40.
JP, God, 140-1 and Bartli, CD III.3.3.
 ^JP, DV, 8 and Barth, CD IV.2.281.
® JP, God, 191 and Barth, CD 11.2,510-512.
’ JP, VS, 35 and Barth, CD IV. 1.402.
* JP, VS, 32 and 35 and Barth, CD IV. 1.449 
 ^These differences will be unpacked more fully in this chapter.
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While both men address the impasse created by an ethic of rights, their 
anthropologies shar e a commorr appeal to Christ as the basis for social ethic, the two 
differ in one key area which impacts the means by which they arrive at a definition of 
ethics, their expectations for human action, and their interpretation of the social 
community, hr this chapter, I will argue that the fiindamental difference lies in the 
ontological construct of being. Jolm Paul defines human persons in their analogous 
relation to God, a relation of continuity and discontinuity between Creator and creature 
which instils at the core of human beings both reason and free will, hr these gifts, Jolm 
Paul believes, men and women discover their dignity. Due to the fall of humanity, this 
dignity is marr ed by the propensity to sin. Christ becomes the fulfilment of humanity 
because as the God-rnan, he restores humanity to a dignity beyond compare. He 
completes that which the human was destined to become.
Karl Barth, on the other hand, defines real humanity in relation to Jesus Christ. 
Real humanity is beirrg-with-God and with fellow-humanity. Human beings are those 
who are elected and summoned by God for relationship with God and fellow- 
humanity.^® Whereas Jolm Paul allows for ontological continuity between God and 
human persons through the analogia entis}^ Barth believed that hmrran persons find 
their true being only in Jesus Clnist. This divergence created differing interpretations of 
the nature of human knowledge and human acts as well as incongruous expectations for 
the possibilities for persons in society. The following two sections will explore tlris 
divergence in ontology that shapes assumptions regarding epistemic access to moral 
standards and human acts in society. The final section will engage these differences in 
the realm of social ethics by reflecting on the cun ent situation in Israel/Palestine.
CD ffl.2.150 and CD III.4.117.
** The analogia entis implies “an a priori assumption of continuity between the divine and human realms 
which is argued to underlie and is justifiably presupposed, Üierefore, by theological statement 
independently o f the consideration of God’s Self-Revelation in the person of Christ.” (Alan Torrance, 
Persons in Communion, 123 fii. 6). John Paul’s doctrine of the analogia entis must not be misunderstood 
on this point, as allowing for the total comprehension of God or supposing total continuity. For Jolm Paul 
writes, “The essence of God caimot be enclosed in any definition. If, in our thought about God, with the 
categoiy of ‘being,’ we use the analogy of being, with this we bring out the ‘non-resemblance’ much 
more than the resemblance. We bring out the incomparability much more than the comparability of God 
with creature (as the Fourth Council o f the Lateran also recorded in 1215).” {God, 123.) Wliile John Paul 
maintains the incomprehensibility of God and the more complete imderstanding of God through Ms 
revelation, the point is that the continuity for which tlie analogia entis does allow, forms the foundation 
for moral theology. On this point, see Chapter Two of this thesis, section titled, “The Foundation of 
Morality upon the Analogia Entis.’"
197
Human Ontology and Epistemic Access to Justice
The fundamental assumptions that shaped the ontological differences between 
John Paul and Barth can be found in the former’s notion of the analogia entis and the 
latter’s ontology of relation to Jesus Christ. As discussed in Chapter Two of this work, 
the analogia entis forms the basis for John Paul’s moral tlieology.^^ John Paul believes 
that himian beings are ontologically connected with God through shai'ed being. Their 
very existence determines that their natiue is good. Because of this ontological 
continuity, the good that exists in men and women is the good of their nature and it is 
not wealcened by sin. Wojtyla wrote, “The good connected with the very substance of 
OUI' nature is not even diminished by sin, but the good connected with our natural 
inclination is reduced by sin, although not wholly destroyed, unlike the goods of virtue 
(moral good) and grace (supernatural good).”^^  While the reason is affected by sin, 
hrmian beings continue to have epistemic access to the good through reason. Reason 
ascertains the good and posits moral norms that are exemplified in God. In short, John 
Paul’s ontological assumptions regarding the connectedness of God and humanity 
means that we may apprehend justice by means of our reason.
Barth believed that a continuity between God and hiunan beings may exist but 
that such continuity is known by the revelation of God and is only maintained because 
God, in electing men and women to participate in his being, himself became human. 
Hiunan persons should not appeal to a metaphysical pr*inciple of being (the analogia
See Chapter Two, Section One, entitled "The Dignity of Persons in Wojtyla’s Philosophical 
Anthi-opology.”
" Karol Wojtyla, MPB, 74.
VS, 1.
Often Barth’s epistemology is misunderstood at this point. In demonstrating this point, Alan Torrance 
comes to the following conclusion: “We may acknowledge that Barth is indeed sceptical about the 
capacity of some supposed human faculty of reason to establish theological truth ‘off its own bat.’ It 
reflects his sense of the epistemic incapacity of fallen creaturehood that he refuses to go . . . with 
traditional Roman inteipretations of an analogia entis, on the other hand, where these are grounded in a 
metaphysic of being which commits one to an ultimate and foundational continuity between the divine 
and the ‘natmal’ or human order. However, his carefully nuanced discussion o f these issues is certainly 
not grounded in a foundational assertion of human impotence at the rational, epistemic, semantic, 
symbolic, or any other level. Rather, it is essentially concerned to establish that it is theologically 
inappropriate to operate in terms of an ‘idea of being in which God and man are always comprehended 
together, even if  their relationship to being is quite different, and even if tliey have a quite different part 
in being.’ To argue that in so far as the human being is a being, the human creature, ‘is able to know a 
being as such’ and that therefore, ‘in principle he is able to know all being, even God as the 
incomparably real being’ and that ‘Therefore if God is, and we camiot deny his being, or on the other 
hand, our own being and that of creation, necessarily we must affirm Ms knowability apart from His 
revelation,’ is, for Barth, theologically invalid.” Persons in Communion, 166-67. Cf. CD 11,1.82-3.
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entis) in which both God and humanity have a part. Rather, they should appeal to an 
ontology of relation to Jesus Christ, who provides the ontological ground of analogy. 
Humans can laiow God, can know justice or wr ong, inasmuch as God reveals himself 
and his command.^® Thus, God’s justice is a revealed justice, revealed in the person and 
work of Jesus.
Later commentators, such as Eberhard Jüngel, argue that Barth initially
misunderstood the analogia entis and later relinquished his criticism of it.^  ^Alan
Ton ance, on the other hand, suggests that Barth never relinquished his rejection of the
analogia entis as a metaphysical principle. We will demonstrate the viability of
Tori'ance’s argument in two parts. First, Barth’s understanding of the analogia entis
reflects the primacy of the metaphysical principle of being as the ground of epistemic
access. This point is evidenced in Barth’s own explanation of the analogia entis, in
dialogue with Catholic scholarship:
You ascribe being to God in His work and activity. But you also ascribe 
it to man, even if in infinite and qualitative disparity. Therefore, 
whatever may be said about the inadequacy of all other analogies, and as 
the meaning and justification of all other intrinsically ambiguous 
analogies, you aclcnowledge analogy between God and man, and 
therefore one point at which God can be loiown even apart from His 
revelation. That is to say, you acknowledge the analogy of being, the 
analogia entis, the idea of being in which God and man are always 
comprehended together, even if their relationship to being is quite 
different, and even if they have a quite different part in being. As to 
himself a being, man is able to know a being as such. But if this is so, 
then in principle he is able to know all being, even God as the 
incompar ably real being. Therefore if God is, and if we cannot deny his 
being, or on the other hand, our own being and that of creation, 
necessarily we must affirm His larowability apart from his revelation.
For it consists precisely in this analogy of being which comprehends 
both Him and us.^ ®
Barth,//yCL, 10.
Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystety o f the World, trans. Darrell Guder, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1983), 282-283 and "Die Moglichkeit Theologischer AntMopologie auf dem Grande der Analogie,” 
Barth-Studien, (Gtltersloh, 1982), 21Of. See also Hans Küng, A Global Ethic fo r Global Politics and 
Economics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 154; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of  
Karl Barth. 162-7; Colm O’Grady, The Church in Catholic Theology: Dialogue with Karl Barth, 
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1969), 7-10.
Alan Torrance, Persons in Communion, (Edinbiu'gh; T&T Clark, 1996), 162-3. Cf. Robert Sanders, 
Political Responsibility fo r Economic Life in the Mature Theology o f Karl Barth, (Dissertation, Berkeley, 
Graduate Theological Union, 1986), 40-42.
CD II. 1.81. Barth acknowledged that Soluigen’s starting point with the action of God avoided this 
pitfall. But he argued that this starting point is not reflective of Roman Catholic doctrine on the whole.
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As this quotation demonstrates, Barth believed that the analogia entis formed the 
starting point for Catholic epistemology/® His demonstration that human persons Imow 
God through shared being resonates with the assumptions by Wojtyla regarding the 
formdation for moral theology/^ Secondly, Barth rejected the analogia entis as a 
metaphysical principle because he argued that it abstracted God from his real work and 
activity. Such a notion, Barth claimed, introduced a foreign God into the sphere of the 
chiu'ch by attempting to unite the trimre God with the Aristotelian concept of being.^^ 
On the contrary, Barth ar'gued, God’s being is revealed tluough God’s Word and God’s 
act (i.e. God’s readiness to make himself known.)
This insight raises the question whether Jüngel was correct in claiming that 
Baifh relinquished his criticism of the analogia entis. Even in the later years when 
Barth incoiporated God’s “togetherness with man” into his antlrropology, he did so on 
the basis of God’s Word and act in Jesus Clrrist rather than human capabilities. In 
addition, Barth’s discussion of the “lesser lights,”^^  continued to maintain that “the 
eternal will and decree of God has in itself nothing whatever to do with the laws 
knowable and Icnown in the cosmos” "^^ for the lesser lights “are not divine disclosures 
nor eternal truths” ®^ but relative and limited trriths of creation which affirm the relative 
and limited natmal knowledge of himians.^® Therefore, though Barth did indeed appeal 
to the analogia fides and employ analogical methodology in aniving at his ethics, as
Bai'th wrote, “Strong opposition must be made to the idea that the metaphysics of being, the starting- 
point of this line of thought, is the place from which we can do the work o f Chiistian theology...” (CD
II.2.530). Rahner and von Baltliasar attribute the prominence of the analogia entis in Barth’s critique to 
his prior dialogue with Przywara “who first elevated it fi'om being a modest study somewhere in logic or 
general ontology to being a really important nodal point of theological discoui se.” [Ralmer, Theological 
Investigations V, tians. Karl-H. Kruger, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978),’ 59. Cf. von 
Balthasar, The Theology o f Karl Barth, 35-6.] It is not within the scope of this work to addr-ess this 
broader question of whether the analogia entis is in fact the nodal point of theological discourse. We 
have attempted to demonstrate, however, the influence that Hie underlying ontological assumptions 
associated with accepting the analogia entis as the basis for the moral norm had upon Wojtyla/Jolui 
Paul’s social doctiine.
See Wojtyla’s article. On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis o f the Moral Norm,” Persons 
and Community, 73-94.
CD II. 1.84.
Küng claims that Bartli changed positions in tliis discussion o f the lesser lights. The subsequent 
quotation, however, demonstiates that Barth continued to oppose the analogia entis and an a priori 
principle. Küng, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 154.
CD IV.3.151
CD IV.3.141.
CD IV.3.162.
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Torrance argued, Barth never did retract his rejection of the analogia entis as a
27metaphysical principle.
The Analogia Entis and Social Doctrine
Wliat, then, ai e the implications of the analogia entis for articulating Catholic 
ethics? According to Barth, this assumption affects “the whole edifice” of Catholic 
moral doctrine. First, he called the moral doctrine into question because of its 
incapability of seriously establishing the concept of divine command.^^ An imperative 
finds meaning in that which is over it, in that fiom which it is derived. By grounding 
obligation in being, the imperative is “ontically subordinated by another, and noetically 
to be derived from this other.” ®^ So Baith asks, “But if what is over it is the being in 
which man participates in his way as God does in His, how can it be and become 
imperative except with the assistance and co-operation of man, except on the 
presupposition of his agreement?” ®^ On such a presupposition, then, it is impossible for 
the command to confiront the being and existence of that human as a command of God, 
“for the command does not have behind it the eternal power and severity of 
predestination, of the free goodness of God.”^^
Second, Baith argues that the analogia entis obsciues theological ethics because 
it supports the idea that ethics can be derived fi*om reason alone. This sets revelation 
against the light of reason, and it can hide that which is truly Cliristian. Barth 
summarised:
The complaint which we have to malce against the Roman constmction 
of the relationship between theological ethics and general human ethics 
is that it is dominated by this great distraction [the analogia entis'[, and 
therefore it only plays at theological ethics. It thinlcs it can combine and 
co-ordinate the Christian and the human far too easily. To achieve this 
combination and co-ordination it has emptied out what is Cliristian.^^
Barth, The Humanity o f  God, 45. Barth wrote, “It is a matter of G od’s sovereign togetherness with 
man, a togetherness grounded in Him and determined, delimited, and ordered through him alone.” This 
togetherness is entirely different from tlie Catholic ground of unity on a ground of being that is entirely 
neutial because Baith’s ‘togetherness’ originates in the Word and act of God, in the humanity of Jesus 
Clnist.
CD II.2.532.28
CD II.2.532. 
CD II.2.532. 
CD II.2.533.
32 CD II.2.533-4.
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Barth’s overriding concern, therefore, with the analogia entis was the deification of 
autonomous human ethics in place of the command of God. He wanted to maintain that 
God’s command alone reveals and determines just human behaviour'. He feared that the 
assumption that people could know just ethics tlirough their own reason opened the 
door to favouring human attempts at ethics above God’s command. Even the smallest 
opening, Barth believed, could lead to the worst kinds of violence against fellow- 
humanity. Thus, in his rejection of the analogia entis, he sought not only to slam the 
door on such attempts but to throw away the key!
Recently, however, Carl Braaten has raised the following question, “What 
would Barth have to say about the latest papal encyclicals?”^^  For in the papal 
encyclicals, Evangelium Vitae and Veritatis Splendor, John Paul sought to re-estahlish 
a theological basis for “natural law.” "^^ He argued against those Catholic moral 
theologians who appealed to a notion of natural law that did not find its root in God’s 
commands, and he opposed the moder'nist definition of autonomy as freedom that 
creates moral noi'ms. As evidenced in Part One of this thesis, Jolm Paul moved much 
closer to Barth’s position. He began closing the door on the sort of moral theology 
against which Barth reacted so forcefully.
Yet did John Paul close the door against this problem entirely? His appeal to the 
analogia entis reveals that he did not. While the revelation of God in Christ and in 
sci'ipture shaped his ethic substantially, Jolm Paul continued to appeal to the analogia 
entis as the basis for continuity between God and humanity and as the foundation for 
human Imowledge of the justice of God.^ ®
The first example can be found in Jolm Paul’s difficulty with the relationship 
between justice and mercy in D/vea- in Misericordia, which demonstrates his appeal to a 
category of justice that is located in something other than the revelation of God. He 
describes justice as if it is a category in which both God and human beings share, and 
which God exemplifies. John Paul writes, “Justice is an authentic virtue in man, and in 
God signifies transcendent perfection.” ®^ He describes justice as an “order” and a
Carl E. Braaten, “A Response,” in A Presei'ving Grace: Protestant, Catholics, and Natural Law, ed. 
Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 34.
VS, 20. Russell Hittinger also supports this claim in his article, “Natural Law and Catholic Moral 
Theology,” A Preseiying Grace, 19-30.
The knowledge is completed or fulfilled in God’s revelation.
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“norm” that is “precise and often too narrow.”^^  Such a description makes justice sound 
as if it is a concept that exists apart from God’s revelation, for God himself must “go 
beyond the order of justice” in sacrificing his son/^ Although John Paul attempts to 
ground justice in the “salvific order,” ®^ his very criticism of justice demonstrates that it 
is an abstract concept existing, at least partially, outside of God. For John Paul, justice 
appears to be a category, like being, in which both God and human persons share, a 
virtue that God exemplifies. He defines it as a “norm” that must be conditioned by 
God’s love in order to justify men,"^ ® rather than defining justice hy the very act of 
God’s justification revealed in Jesus Christ.
Second, the argument in Fides et Ratio, that natural knowledge and philosophy 
lead to truth about God, betrays John Paul’s optimism about the capabilities of human 
reason. According to Plantinga, such positivism simply cannot be echoed or embraced 
in reformed doctrine."^  ^Even if such a continuity between God and hmnanity, which 
gave epistemic access to morality, to knowledge of good and evil, existed at one time, 
the fall brought about the utter depravity of humanity: human will as well as human 
reason. Barth’s later work did not undermine this early epistemological starting point. 
For example, in CD IV. 1 he argues again that in his desire for Imowledge of good and 
evil, a human misunderstand himself. For God alone loiows good and evil, and his 
Word alone reveals morality to human persons."^^
In conclusion, Barth’s rejection of the analogia entis as a metaphysical principle 
entailed Iris rejection of the natural law basis for Catholic ethics. His ongoing insistence 
that good and evil are not inherently known but are revealed by God, reflected Barth’s 
piimary concern that humans allow the Word of God to oppose self-deification and sin. 
The theory of the analogia entis opened the door to John Paul’s belief that humans can 
loiow the command of God tlirough natural Imowledge. Even if such moral theology is 
refined and completed by revelation, tlie door remains opened to hmiians placing too 
much confidence in their natural Imowledge and failing to hear the conft onting and
"’ DM,5.
Jesus, 426.
""DM,7.
DM, 7 and 12.
See Plantinga’s critique in Chapter Three of this work, in the section entitled, “The Dignity of 
Reason.”
CD IV. 1.448-50.
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opposing Word of God, the Word that reveals and judges every aspect of the person, 
including human reason.
Barth’s Ontology and Ethics
The universal appeal of John Paul’s ethics of natural law call into question the 
confessional nature of the ethics of Barth. Having closed the door against knowledge of 
God’s truth and command tlnough human reason, does Barth limit moral knowledge to 
those within the Clnistian faith? Does he shut the door of ethical dialogue against those 
who do not believe in Jesus Christ? Wliereas Jolm Paul’s theory of natural law creates a 
hasis for ethical Imowledge that is universal,Baith’s complete dependence upon the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ appears to limit etliical Imowledge to those who share 
belief in Christ. Ray Anderson summarises the problem; “Baith’s rejection of the 
supposed ‘point of contact’ (Ankniipfungspunkt) as a basis for natur al theology appears 
to midermine Barth’s theology as ethical address, particulaiiy as an appeal for social 
justice and moral responsibility in the public and political sphere.”"^"^ Can Barth’s ethic 
be implemented in the public sphere? Can Christians call people to account for social 
justice without a theological prolegomena?
Barth never sought a “neutral ground” or “point of contact” with humanity that 
is apart from Clrrist. For Barth, Jesus Clnist is the point of contact between hmnans. 
Jesus Clrrist is the neighbour of all humans, the one who restores human relations and 
who determines just social behaviour toward the neighbour."^® If Jesus is the poiirt of 
contact, how did Barth make his ethical appeal to the non-Clnistian sphere? He 
certainly did not appeal to a law in which all share a cormrron knowledge."^® Rather, he 
appealed to the Christian witness to the worid.'^  ^Accordirrg to Barth, Christiarrs 
proclaim the truth of Jesus Christ to the world, to those who are choserr irr Christ, to 
those toward whom God has spokerr his cornrrrand, to those who are part of God’s
Jolm Paul wi'ites, “The natural law involves universality. In as much as it is inscribed in the rational 
nature of the person, it makes itself felt to all beings endowed with reason and living in history. . . . 
Inasmuch as the natinal law expresses the dignity o f the human person and lays the foundation for his 
fundamental rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all mankind.” 
(VS, 51.) See also VS, 52: “These universal and permanent laws correspond to things known by the 
practical reason and are applied to particular acts through the judgement o f conscience.”
Ray Anderson, The Shape o f Practical Theology, (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2001), 133.
The Shape o f Practical Theology, 133.
“The Christian Community and Civil Community,” 163-4, 168.
Stanley Hauerwas developed this tlieme further in his Gifford Lectines, published as With the Grain of  
the Universe, (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001), 173-204.
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Kingdom without realising his reality/^ They witness to the world both proclaiming the 
reality of Christ and also expounding the ethical implications of his reality/®
By using the theme of witness, Barth emphasised that humans do not (a) 
autonomously decide what is right and wrong or (b) use their rational capacity to 
discern right and wrong according to a universal law. Rather, they listen to God’s 
revelation, his personal command, and they obey. There aie times, Barth said, when the 
world’s law will display greater wisdom than that in the chinch. The church must 
accept this Word of conection as well.®®
What does the witness of the church mean for ethics in the political and 
economic realms of human life? The Cliristian witness does not attempt to set up the 
Kingdom of God on tliis eaifli in the political economy.®  ^Rather, the Cliristian 
witnesses to the reality of the Kingdom that God has initiated. The justice that may be 
established on earth, in the political or economic sphere, exists as an analogue to the 
Kingdom of God. Thus, Barth employs his analogical method in articulating ethics for 
the secular sphere, a sphere whose centre remains Jesus Clirist, even if he is not 
recognised as such. With regard to social ethics, Barth appeals to the criterion of 
humanity using the concept of the neighbour.®  ^He writes, “The Church is based on the 
Imowledge of the one eternal God, who as such became man and thereby proved 
himself a neighboiu to man, by treating him with compassion. The inevitable
Barth wrote, that the chin ch “desires that the active grace of God, as revealed from heaven, should be 
reflected in the earthly material of the external, relative, and provisional actions and modes of action of 
the political community. It tlierefore makes itself responsible in the first and last place to God—the one 
God whose grace is revealed in Jesus Christ—by making itself responsible for the cause of the State. 
And so, with its political judgements and choices, it bears an implicit, indirect, but none the less real 
witness to the gospel.” CCCC, 171.
Barth, God Here and Now, 66; CD IV.3.777 and 830. William James takes the hearing of God’s 
command a step further in his thesis, by differentiating between the formal and material basis of the 
command and arguing that the material content of the command can be heard from below without a 
religious ethic. He writes, “For Bai'th, the material ethical content of the command is located in the 
context of its bemg ‘heard.’ This context is not restricted to the sphere of proclamation (the Church) but 
is grounded in the encounter of one person witli another (others). This encounter takes place wherever 
humans engage in social and political intercourse. The command of God as a formal principle is not then 
‘heard’ until it is heard in this context, with the material content derived out of the demand that humans 
uphold each other’s basic humanity with justice and responsible action.” James, 54.
CD IV.2.726.
"'CCCC, 169.
William James demonstrates Bai th’s consti'uct of neighbour as ethical criterion in his doctoral thesis, 
185-205.
205
consequence is that in the political sphere the Church will always and in all
circumstances be interested primarily in human beings.”®®
In answer to the questions that are posed by John Paul’s appeal to natuial law,
Barth appealed to no common law or point of contact outside of the God-man Jesus
Clu'ist, who is the basis for solidarity between the church and the world.®"^  Chr istian
ethics can be hnplemented in the world but never on a different foundation than the
gospel. Did Barth close the door of ethical dialogue, shutting out those who do not
believe in Jesus Clirist? First, Barth believed that the Cliristian can only address the
non-Christian as one who exists and stands in the light of Jesus Clnist and luider the
command of God.®® The Christian should not appeal to another foundation, such as
notions of general humanity or orders of creation or, indeed, orders of the cosmos. Nor
should Clnistians appeal to an ethical principle that does not find its material startmg
point in human personliood. hr tliis mariner, even the appeal to social justice becomes
an act of witness because it rests upon a foundation of co-humanity that is groimded in
Clnist.®® Second, though non-Christian thinkers may begin from a different foundation,
Barth acknowledges that they may come to similar moral insights, for example, in both
agreeing that the State should be socially responsible.®  ^hr these similarities, they find
dialogue. Third, in his discussion of the lesser lights, Barth indicated that true and good
dialogue is possible based upon the witness of creation. He allowed for tmth to be
laiown thr ough creation in accordance with the finiteness and limitation of humanity.
By implication, ethics may also be conceived in analogy to this limited Imowledge.
Barth explained the possibilities of these lesser lights of creation:
If this dialogue [the self-converse of creation] leads to results, and 
therefore to lights, words and tmths as the emergence of certain 
Imowable and known constants of intelligible and intelligent cosmic 
being, these can and should, as hypotheses, provide foundations and
CCCC, 171.
CD IV.3.776.
Barth asked, “Is God’s revelation revelation of the truth, or is it only the source of certain religious 
ideas and obligations, alongside which there are very different ones in other spheres? Outside and 
alongside the kingdom o f Jesus Clnist are there other respectable kingdoms? Can and should tlieology of 
all things be content to speak, not witli universal validity, but only esoterically?” CD 112526. Webster 
explains, “Cliristian ethics retains a claim to universal validity, even though that claim is not unavailable 
under any other description than that which it takes in the sphere of Christian confession.” Ethics o f  
Reconciliation, 102.
Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, G.T, Thompson, trans., (New York: Harper, 1959), 93-94. Hauerwas also 
makes this argument in With the Grain, 200-201.
CCCC, 180.
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materials for the continuation of the dialogue, but, in sharp contrast to 
the definitive Word of God, they cannot claim final validity, since the 
end of the dialogue is not yet in sight, it must proceed further fi om the 
point now reached, and the goal can be reached, if at all, only with the 
end of the whole of the present fonn of the cosmos and its self-witness.®^
The truth Imowable in creation is limited. Moral statements reached in common will 
never be considered final. But at the same time, Barth argued, they should not be 
underestimated; they can be coimted upon within limitation. While moral statements 
can be valuable for living in this sphere, they will always be challenged and relativised 
by the final self-declai'ation of God.®® According to Bai'th, then, Clnistians may find 
connnonalties with non-Chiistians in the election of Jesus Christ; they may find ethical 
behaviours upon which they agree and from which the church might learn better ways 
of living in accordance with God’s command. The ultimate beginning and end of ethics 
for the church will always remain God’s gospel in Christ and the coimnand that 
corresponds to this gospel.
In conclusion, Baith’s ethic can sustain a dialogue with people who do not share 
his Christian beliefs. Such dialogue is a possibility because of the basis for solidarity in 
Jesus Christ, in whom all have been elected to become children of God, to live in 
obedience to his command, and to live in accordance with their personhood as co­
humanity. Christian ethics witnesses to this gospel and teaches persons to live in a 
manner that coii'esponds to tliis ti'uth. Even if  persons do not Imow the whole truth 
about God as he reveals himself, the lesser lights of creation’s revelation might also 
create a basis for moral appeal; although, they should never create a basis for spealdng 
with confidence about God or hmnanity. Having been given God’s revelation in Jesus 
Christ, Cluistian ethics should begin in no other place. Yet from tliis starting point, 
Christians may arrive at similar ethical conclusions as those outside the faith, and they 
may work in solidarity toward social justice. The difference for Christians is that the 
particular human, Jesus Christ, will constantly stand as the critical criterion of the 
theory and humanistic praxis in the social realm.
In this sense, Bar'th’s ethic, while ultimately dependent upon theological 
prolegomena, can be articulated in a manner that facilitates a way for*wai‘d with ethicists
58 CD IV.3.162-3.
CD IV.3.163. Barth likewise applied tliis understanding in his antliropological discussion of 
phenomenology by arguing that while it may prove helpful in understanding and interpreting humanity, it 
remains limited with a need for critique by the revelation of man in Jesus Christ. CD III.2.202.
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who do not share his core assumptions regarding God, Christ, and humanity. Although 
it lacks the more simple and universal appeal of natur al law,®® it guards against the 
temptation for proponents of natural law to lose a distinctly Cliristian witness in their 
attempt to create a point of contact with the world and to inadvertently support an un- 
Cluistian hmnanism.
Epistemological Assumptions in Dialogue
Both John Paul and Barth appeal to the criterion of hmnanity in defining just 
social ethics. While they both appeal to Christ as the one who reveals true humanity, 
Jolm Paul’s additional reliance upon natmal law and the analogia entis creates a 
divergence between the two. Barth poses the challenge to Jolm Paul: If Clirist is indeed 
the full revelation of hmnanity, then why is there a need to appeal to other sources? He 
argues that Jesus Christ must be the sole criterion for real humanity. Knowledge of true 
humanity is realised tlirough Jesus Christ.
The Second Vatican Council certainly affirmed this belief and the writings of 
John Paul have developed this important criterion firrther, especially as it relates to 
social justice. We find a way forward by challenging Jolm Paul to take this affirmation 
more seriously and to apply it more fully to his epistemological assimiptioris. The 
Protestant side of this discussion would challenge John Paul to begin with Christian 
doctrine, to begin with Jesus Christ, in developing a moral theology. It would ask him 
to allow the revelation of God in Clnist to critique his epistemological assumptions. 
Rather than appealing to both the analogia entis and to Jesus Christ, it would challenge 
him to begin witli the revelation of God in Jesus Clnist as a critique of his philosophical 
antlnopology. The analogia entis and natural law may indeed exist but they provide no 
place to begin in naming the social criteria for human justice.®  ^As Christians, om' 
starting point must be the person of Jesus Clnist.
Such a starting point would indeed appeal to Jolm Paul’s personalism because it 
defines justice not simply as a law or norm, which is “often too narrow,”®^ but in the 
person and act of Jesus Clirist. Social justice does not mean merely the fulfilment of a
William Werpehowsld rightly argues that “the great failure of Barth’s political ethics is that this 
application is never accomplished with clarity or rigor. “Justification and Justice in the Theology of Karl 
Barth,” The Thomist 50 (1986);632.
Human freedom, for instance, is not groiuided in the analogia entis, but in the person of Jesus Christ. 
The Christian Life, 23.
DM, 5.
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law, but it means first being-with-God in a relationship of trust, humility, and 
obedience made possible through human election in Jesus Christ. Secondly, it means 
being-with-fellow-humanity thr ough the gift of self in love and obedience to God’s 
Word. The theology of Barth, then, challenges John Paul and the Catholic church to 
begin with faith in Jesus Christ in assessing and forming the ethical criterion of 
hmnanity. In this marmer, the chmch can guard against the sort of humanism that exalts 
the human and hiunan reason above God and ultimately destroys the neighbour.
Human Ontology and Act
In addition to the epistemological questions regarding the basis for social ethics, 
this comparison between John Paul II and Baith’s social ethics also raises a 
fundamental question regarding human nature and the propensity for justice: Is the 
muedeerned hiunan capable of just behaviom* in society? hi this section, we will look at 
this question from three angles. First, we will compare John Paul and Barth’s 
differences regarding human capacity and incapacity for just acts. The question of 
capacity and incapacity leads to a second issue regarding the meaning of himian 
justification as it relates to social justice. The third aspect of this question relates 
justification to the formation of human persons and society tlnough act. I will seek to 
demonstr ate tlie differences between John Paul and Barth in response to this question 
that has emerged fr om the fimdarnental ontological issues we have raised.
Human Capacity for Just Behaviour
A primary difference between Jolm Paul and Barth lies in this area of the human 
ability to choose good. Both John Paul and BarHi believe that the hmnari person is 
fmidariientally good because persons are created by God and in his good image. 
However, their interpretation of the effect of the fall of humanity creates this vital 
difference regarding unredeemed human goodness. Jolm Paul believes that the human 
freedom to choose between good and evil is a vital capacity of true humanity which has 
been maned by sin but not lost entirely.®® Bar th, in contrast, believes that human sin 
has so depraved the individual that she has lost her capacity to choose that which is 
good. Only in Clirist, Barth would argue, can the human gain freedom to choose in
For this reason, he can appeal to those outside of the Cluistian faith to choose just acts toward the 
neighboiu.
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accordance with God’s command. Thus, only in Christ is true hirmanity restored and 
maintained.
Jolm Paul locates human capacity and freedom in the being of God; the imago 
Dei is the foundation of human morality.®"^  John Paul writes, “Human acts bear' within 
themselves the sign of self-determination of will and choice. The whole sphere of 
morality derives from this. Man is capable of choosing between good and evil, 
sustained in this by the voice of conscience, which impels him to good and restr'ains 
him fr om evil.”®® He believes that, even after original sin, humans have not lost their 
essential capacity to love God and the neighbour.®® Sin has mainly weakened the will 
but it has not broken the will entirely.®  ^Jolm Paul’s belief in umedeemed human 
goodness shapes his didactic approach to social justice in dialogue with those outside 
the Cluistian faith. By implication, if people are instructed how to live in just social 
relations with the neighboru', they have the capacity to live in accordance with God’s 
law even if they do not believe in Jesus Christ. Thus, John Paul has an optimistic 
expectation for human capabilities.
Barth, on the other hand, rejected the concept of “rrmedeemed human 
goodness,” not because people ar e intrinsically bad but because in the goodness of their 
original humanity they have made the inational choice against God. Barth explained, 
“The seriousness of [the hiunan] situation is much greater than can be expressed by the 
idea of a setting aside or damaging of his nature which is good. It consists in the crying 
contradiction that he sets himself—his being in the integrity of his human nature and 
his being in covenant with God—in the ser'vice of evil, and now he has to exist in that 
service.”®^ Human sin has so damaged humanity that the human is estranged from 
himself, his neighbour, and God; he is now inclined “‘by nature’ to hate God and his 
neighbour.”®® Yet Barth’s anthropology is not entirely pessimistic regarding the 
capabilities of human action. Hiunan nature has been made new; the ontology of
DV, 36 and VS, 13.
65 God, 232-3. See also Jesus, 51-52 on human capacity. 
Jesus, 52
67
68
p^ ,l.
CD IV. 1.493.
CD IV. 1.494. Barth is quoting here from the Heidelberg Catechism. He emphasised that there is no 
core of “damaged nature” but man himself poisons his own natur e by his pride and sin. In other words, 
God did not create an evil nature but the human, by turning away from God, made himself evil.
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humanity is restored through relation to Jesus Christ. The following section will 
explore this reconciliation firrther.
Justification and Social Justice
The Catholic complaint against the Protestant doctrine of justification has 
addressed the “extrinsic” natiue of the justice granted. Catholics have critiqued a piuely 
forensic definition of justification that neglected the transforming work of the Holy 
Spirit in the lives of persons.^® When Hans Küng demonstrated to his Catholic 
counterparts that Barth’s doctrine of imputed righteousness transformed humans 
intrinsically, he took ecumenical dialogue to a new level. Yet what Küng did not 
recognise was the discrepancy between the two positions as to the natiue of this 
intrinsic change. For John Paul, Clnist dr aws the goodness out of humanity by giving of 
himself in solidarity and love.^  ^Barth believed that the transformation of humanity was 
far more radical, evidenced in the radical nature of Clnist’s death and resurrection. 
God’s incarnation transformed humanity from within. His death was the death of 
hrmian wrong, sin, and pride, and his resmrection made possible their righteousness, 
their justification.^^
For Barth, justification involves the complete remaking of the human person 
because sin affected the very being of personliood. His doctrine of justification entails 
an “ontology of relation to Clnist,” ®^ in which true human natme, which was 
irrecognisably perverted by sin, can now be formd in Clnist alone. According to Barth, 
the fact that Clnist died totally demonstrates that “the sinful reversal takes place at tlie 
basis and centre of the being of man, in his heart; and that the consequent sinful 
perwersion then extends to the whole of his being without exception.
In contrast, Jolm Paul maintains an ontology of continuity with God in which 
human faculties are not completely lost but merely weakened.^® The person is still free
Anthony Lane, Justification by Faith in Catholic-Protestant Dialogue, (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 
158-161.
DM, 6
CD IV.1.553-4, 627 and CD IV.4.24-27.
A term borrowed from Trevor Hart in “Clnist and God’s Justification of Humanity,” in Regarding 
Karl Barth, 60.
’"CDIV.1.492.
Jesus, 5 1. John Paul wrote, “As regards the spiritual faculties this deterioration consists in a darkening 
of the intellect’s capacity to know the ti'Uth, and in a weakening of free will. The will is weakened in the 
attractions of the goods perceived in the senses and is more exposed to the false images of good
2 1 1
to make moral choices, but the will is enfeebled and inclined to sin. Hmnan persons 
maintain the essential capacities that define true humanity—reason and freedom— 
because the imago Dei has not been lost; an unredeemed human goodness remains.^®
The intrinsic nature of justification in Baifh’s doctrine, therefore, extends 
farther than John Paul’s because real humanity is recreated in Clnist; sin no longer 
characterises the human. Only in Clnist is hmnanity created just and good. In Chiist 
alone humanity finds the freedom to choose good.
Human Act and Formation
The differences in assumptions regarding human ontology also impact their 
conception of moral formation. Before his election to the papacy, Wojtyla argued that 
human formation takes place through act. The human, in the freedom of action, shapes 
himself.^^ Wojtyla wiites, “It is man’s actions, his conscious acting, that malce of him 
what and who he actually is.”^^  Certainly, Christian truth is intrinsic to this shaping, for 
true human fulfillment is found in good and responsible action, and God’s infused 
grace in Clrrist di*aws us towards this action.^® Therefore, Wojtyla argued that the 
hmnan being’s ontological structure synthesised both the efficacy of man (human 
freedom and action) and the subjectiveness of man (the formation of the self through 
free act).^ ®
Wojytla’s insight into hmnan formation calls into question the command ethics 
of Barth. Do Baith’s ethics of command and decision reduce the human self to the smn 
of her individual acts by being concerned with what humans do rather than who 
hmnans are?^  ^Does Barth’s ontology fail to allow for a continuum of hmnan moral
elaborated by reason under tlie influence of the passions. However, according to the Church’s teaching, it 
is a case of a relative and not absolute deterioration, not intrinsic to the human faculties"" [italics mine].
Jesus, 71.
120,
AP, 165. Barth critiqued this conception of grace as infused because it fails to show in what sense man 
is grounded in the great possibility o f God, and it fails to make clear how tlie Christian comes into being 
as “the man who responds to God’s faithfulness with faithfulness, the man who as a free subject is God’s 
true partner in the covenant o f grace.” CD IV.4.5.
80'AP. 74-75.
See the crit 
Dame Press, 1994), 177.
ique o f Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, (London: University of Notre
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formation?^® If one begins with the assumption that we fashion oui* own identity 
thi'ough self-action, Barth may indeed be open to this critique. However, Baifh began 
his ethics by attempting to undermine such an assmnption by first gi’oimding the human 
freedom to act in the ontology of relation to Christ.^® Barth believed that the human was 
not fi*ee to choose good without Chiist and that any attempt to do so is minous because 
it is motivated by the pride of the himian heart in opposition to God. The ontology of 
relation to Christ means we can choose good action because Christ has acted in our 
place, on our behalf.C ln ist has restored om* tme humanity, wliich is om* reconciliation 
with God and fellow humans. True foimation of self is simply not possible outside of 
the act of Christ on behalf of hmnans; we participate in that act.^ ® By his making us a 
pai't of his act of reconciliation and obedience, men and women find the freedom for 
right relation with God and for obedience to his command.^® hi this sense, then, human 
foimation is gromided in an ontology of relation to the paificular person of Jesus Clnist 
rather than an appeal to a general humanum or a weakened but viable fi'eedom to foim 
oneself.
Another set o f questions addresses the efficacy of human act: Does Baith’s emphasis on the action of 
God undermine the efficacy of human act? Does the human maintain autonomy or is she simply 
subsumed under tlie act o f God? I did not include tliese questions lest I repeat the discussion in Chapter 
Two, the section titled, “Command Ethics and the Problem of Human Freedom.” See also CD IV.4.28: 
“In this work it begins to be genuine intercourse in which the human partner, far from confrising himself 
with the divine partner or trying to take His place, occupies the place which is appropriate in relation to 
Him. The work o f die Holy Spirit, then, does not entail the paralysing dismissal or absence of the human 
spirit, mind, Imowledge and will.”
Barth, The Christian Life, 4-5 and CD IV.4.21.
CD IV. 1.230. Barth said that, “This One has acted as veiy man and very Son of God, that He has acted 
as our Representative and in our name, that His incarnation, His way of obedience has had and has 
fulfilled as its ultimate meaning and puipose the fact diat He willed to do this and has done it: His 
activity as our Representative and Substitute.” Cf. See Webster, Barth's Ethics o f  Reconciliation, 95.
Webster demonstrates that for Barth, humans become agents by participation in die history of the 
covenant enacted in Jesus. He states, “Only by virtue of oui* participation in the covenant thiough God’s 
grace in Cln ist that we become agents. This is a direct implication of Barth’s earlier replacement of the 
docti'ines of ‘natme’ or ‘creation’ by doctiines o f the vicarious hmnanity o f Clnist and of untion widi 
Christ: being human, acting humanly, are possibilities grounded in Chiist’s incainational union with us, 
not in some general humanumT Webster, Ethics o f Reconciliation, 93-4.
Barth wrote, “As he has given them the power for it, they become die children of God (Jii. 1:12). As 
such they have and retain peace. Peace, which is coupled with grace in apostolic greetings (Rom. 1:7, 
etc), means their being before God with their fellows and themselves according to the order of the divine 
grace of reconciliation. This ordered being is the root of their freedom as the basic and comprehensive 
determination of their attitude and action. It is the freedom of those who are justified before God, 
sanctified for him, and called to his service: their freedom to exist as such, and no other freedom but this 
autiientic freedom. The tmth, that is, God’s Son, which is its creative ground, makes them free (Jn. 8:32, 
36). They become and are free only where the Spirit of the Lord is, because where the Spirit of tlie Lord 
is, there is freedom (2 Cor. 3:17). These men are called into this freedom. They are not private people. 
They stand in public service.” The Christian Life, 23.
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The subjective aspect of human foimation, then, is not the act of the human 
upon herself but the hiunan as the subject of God’s act and election. Barth’s continuum 
of formation is grounded in God’s election to choose human persons as his children. 
God first chose Chiist as his child; the divine sonship of humanity becomes a reality in 
him a lone .Men  and women have the fi'eedom to call on God as Father because of this 
grace in Chiist Jesus. The form \Gestalt\ of gr ace coii'esponds to the shaping 
[Gestaltung\ of the Christian life.®^
In Barth’s ethics, the continuity of Cluistian development and formation takes 
place because of the continuity of Cluist’s sonship, the ongoing movement and act of 
God.^ ® Altliough Barth describes faith as “a new act each day and hoiu,” he does not 
mean that these acts are discontinuous. Rather, the Christian is in the process of 
“always becoming.”®® The Christian life remains under threat but “the eternity of the 
gr acious will of their Father, the once-for-all act of love performed by his Son their 
Brother, and the promise and fellowship of the Holy Spirit, which are just as valid and 
effective today as yesterday and tomorrow, ensure the continuity of the Christian life, 
the perseverance of the saints.”®^ For Bai'th, Christian ethics is not comprised by 
individual acts that are discomiected from personhood. On the contrary, just Christian 
acts flow fi'om the relation to Jesus Christ in whom their life as children is actualised 
and upon whom the continuity of their lives is maintained, hi this freedom and 
continuity of the gospel, the Christian life finds form.®®
The Christian Life, 75, 77.
The Christian Life, 44. Cf. Webster, The Ethics o f Reconciliation, 112.
Barth writes, “Something very special has to have taken place, and to keep on taking place, when 
certain people may not only be called the children of God but are this, and as such are qualified, entitled, 
able, and willing to call upon God as their Father, when in this calling, in their thanks and praise and 
prayer, tlie Cluistian ethos is actualised and maintained and continued and developed. This is not only 
self-evident; it is totally inconceivable. We can count on it only as on a fact of unique order that the 
existence o f such people and then action is possible, not once alone, but in the continuity of then lives.. .  
What has to take place, and to keep on taking place, if  people are to be Clnistians, is a special movement 
and act of God in which he gives to the Word of his grace—die Word of the reconciliation of the world 
to him accomplished in Jesus Christ—the specific power to reach these specific people among the many 
to whom it goes out and is directed, so that they open themselves up to it in freedom, awake to the 
knowledge that he is their Father and they are his children, and can live in this knowledge. . .In virtue of 
this movement and act of God, it can come about that they do in fact begin to call upon him, and 
continue to do so.” The Christian Life, 90-91.
The Christian Life, 78.
The Christian Life, 94.
""CD IV.4.21.
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Human Ontology and Act in Dialogue
Both Jolm Paul and Barth believe that the reconciliation of the human with God 
in Christ plays a vital role in shaping human action and forming human persons. For 
John Paul, Christ is integr*al to action in tire social sphere because his example displays 
the self-giving obedience to God, which must characterise human action towards the 
other. But his influence is not merely as a model, for in the very experience of love 
fr om God and adoption by God in the redemption of Clrrist, human beings ar*e liberated 
from sin. This liberation forms the basis for liberation and charity in the social sphere.®® 
On these points, John Paul and Barth find agreement. Beyond this, however, where 
Jolm Paul appeals to an ontology that finds its starting point other than Christ and that 
allows for the capacity (even if by “infused” grace) for free and good hmnan action that 
is self-determining, Barth’s ontology of relation to Christ would disclose a vital 
difference between the two. Barth locates in Christ (rather than the imago Dei or the 
analogia entis) the freedom for human action and the goodness of hmnan action. God’s 
just act m Christ precedes just human action; in being summoned by God’s action, 
human action is a secondary act of grateful response.®"^
Having already reached a substantial agreement thr'ough Bartli’s own move 
towards a more Catholic emphasis upon the intrinsic effects of justification and God’s 
redemption, the dialogue can continue to move forward by taking a new look at human 
ontology as it relates to justification and human action. The ethics of Barth challenge 
John Paul to begin with Clirist in exploring and ariiculating hmnan ontology and a 
theory of hmnan formation. By locating human freedom solely in Clnist, John Paul 
could continue to make his appeal for good hmnan action and also articulate a theory of 
human formation that reflects these critical insights.®® For instance, such a starting point 
in Clirist can guard against the human pride that would attempt just acts independently 
of God’s gift of justification. The criterion of real humanity highlights those acts that 
may appear just, but in actuality they are unjust because they ar e acts in independence 
from God and fellow-humanity.
From the other side, Baith’s ethics are challenged by Jolm Paul to think more 
concretely about the formation of persons in society. Because Barth gives great
Jesus, 399.
The Christian Life, 42, 143.
The work of Jolm Webster in Barth's Moral Theology begins to trace the lines of human formation, 
which are implied in such a Christological ontology.
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prominence to the person and work of Christ and the starting point for forming human 
persons, he fails to develop as fully the impact of human action upon the self and 
society/® Though one would want constantly to guard against a theory of moral 
formation that divorces good himian action from God’s action in Clnist, it would prove 
helpful to explore fuiiher the implications of God’s act for the ongoing formation of 
human persons.
Christian Anthropology and Social Ethics
hi the inti’oduction to this work, we questioned the viability of the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights regarding its ability to create the social justice it proposed 
when it states: “Recognition of the inlierent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in 
the world.”®^ Although the UN has provided an invaluable contribution by defending 
human rights on an international scale, the implementation of the declaration has 
proven problematic because it lacks the grounds for articulating the true dignity of the 
hmnan person together with the ethics this dignity entails. For instance, the concept of 
“inalienable rights” creates a stalemate when the rights of one person or group clash 
with the rights of the other.
The violence cmi'ently taking place in Israel/Palestine provides an example of 
this inherent impotence of an ethics of rights, hi recent news, a Hamas leader who 
survived an assassination attempt by an Israeli gunman vowed, “An eye for an eye and 
a tooth for a tooth,” meaning that one Israeli leader must die for every Hamas leader. 
Using an ethic of rights, a Palestinian may argue that he has tlie right to the home that 
his family owned for generations and to the defence of his life, his family, and his land. 
Israelis likewise argue that they have been given a right to the land of their ancestors 
and to the protection of their commimities tlnoiigh self-defence. In the midst of the
Certainly Barth addr esses these themes, but he does so in such brief sketches that the issues such as 
character formation and the spiritual life are left relatively underdeveloped. See for instance CD IV.4.42f, 
60, 74. Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, 131-177.
Adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948, 
http//:www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
The Declaration only states in Ar ticle 30, “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying 
for airy State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destr uction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” Such a statement, which it may argue 
against violence inflicted on another, does not address tire problem of a stalemate that may take place due 
to conflicting rights.
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violence that has ensued over these rights, discussions of peace have continued to reach 
an impasse.
John Paul and the Potential for Solidarity
The social ethics of John Paul and Barth address this problem by grounding 
their moral doctrine in the person of Chiist. For John Paul, the language of self-giving, 
respecting dignity, and practising solidaiity in accordance with the common good 
provides the basis to an ethic of human riglits/® By embracing personalist philosophy, 
Jolm Paul sought to address the problems of individualism, materialism, and 
totalitarianism by holding up the human person as the defining criterion of such 
ideology. His emphasis upon tlie imago Dei seiwes to affirm and define the dignity of 
human persons, and the self-giving of Christ fi*ees men and women to embrace an ethic 
of self-giving and human responsibility for the other.
Thi'ough his discussion of responsibility and free acts in accordance with God’s 
law of love, John Paul talces the human rights ethic to a new level of focus upon the 
dignity of persons, forgiveness, and reconciliation.^®® Based upon his theological 
antlnopology, he can instruct people to choose what is the common good—the good for 
both pai'ties, to abstain from violence and to uphold the dignity of the other. ^ ®^ Because 
of his understanding of the redemption of Christ, Jolm Paul may argue that mercy must 
overcome justice, that forgiveness must overcome wrath, that good must overcome 
evil.*®® He may tell the parties that in making these choices they will come to a fuller 
realization of themselves, their society, and their nations; by choosing the good they 
may realize their true humanity.
However, such an ethic raises the problem of motivation, especially for people 
who do shaie John Paul’s Christian beliefs. For instance, hard questions arise when 
applying such an ethic to situations such as that which we find in Israel/Palestine. How 
can John Paul make such an appeal to two groups who have rejected the divinity of
Jolm Paul writes in RB, 17: “The flmdamental duty of power is solicitude for the common good of 
society; this is what gives power its fundamental rights.”
100 "2^0 Peace Without Justice, No Justice Without Forgiveness,” Message of His Holiness Pope John
Paul II for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, January 1, 1997. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 1997.
RH, 17.
DM, 7-8. He writes, “Mercy that is truly Cliristian is also, in a certam sence, the most perfect 
incarnation of ‘equality’ between people, and therefore also the most perfect incarnation of justice as 
well.”
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Christ? How can he challenge such people to forgive when they neither affirm nor
recognise the forgiveness of God in his Son? What is John Paul’s basis, then, for ethical
appeal? Is it a nonn of justice intrinsic to the human person? Jolm Paul himself states
that the norm of justice is “often too narrow” and that the mercy revealed in the
Gospel must substantiate the ethical appeal:
Mercy becomes an indispensable element for shaping mutual 
relationships between people, in a spirit of deepest respect for what is 
human, and in a spirit of mutual brotherhood. It is impossible to 
establish this bond between people, if they wish to regulate their mutual 
relationships solely according to the measure of justice. In every sphere 
of interpersonal relationships justice must, so to spealc, be ‘coiTected’ to 
a considerable extent by that love which, as St. Paul proclaims, Ms 
patient and kind’ or, in other words, possesses the chm acteristics of that 
merciful love which is so much of the essence of the Gospel and 
Chiistianity.^ '^*
How could such an appeal possibly address Jewish and Muslim relations or Sikli and 
Hindu relations? With brotherhood as merely a potential rather than an ontological 
reality and with Chiist as the basis for appeal to mercy and solidarity, Jews and 
Muslims have been offered no reason for seeking to create brotherhood.
Once again, the issue of human ontology is drawn to the fore. Because Jolm 
Paul did not define solidarity on an ontological level grounded in Clrrist, his personalist 
social appeal is potentially undermined. First, John Paul believes that human persons 
only exist as neighbom* by potential; they become neighbour tlu ough act. In his essay, 
“Participation or Alienation?” Wojtyla writes, “The I—other relationship, as I pointed 
out earlier, does not exist in us as an already accomplished fact; only the potentiality for 
it exists.”^^  ^Likewise, persons become neighbours only tlirough act, in accordance with 
the command of God to love. Their relation as neighbour is only a potential rather than 
an ontological reality.
Such a belief creates a problem for his social ethics because it tends toward an 
abstract ethic that can prove problematic for discerning and acting in accordance with
DM, 5.
DM, 14. He applies tliis to society as well: “Society can become ever more human only if we 
introduce into the many-sided setting of inteipersonal and social relationships, not merely justice, but 
also that ‘merciful love’ which constitutes the messianic message of the Gospel.”
Person and Community, 201.
Person and Community, 200. See also SRS, 40 where Jolm Paul argues that the trinity is “a new model 
for human unity of the human race, wliich must ultimately inspire our solidarity” [italics mine]. The 
tiiime life of God is not a reflection of what exists between real humans, but it is merely a model for the 
potential of unity.
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justice in concrete situations and encounters. Because John Paul embraces an abstract,
universal theory of humanity, his ethics must necessaiily be absti act. He aclcnowledges
the limits of such abstraction:
Participation in the humanity of other people, of others and neighbours, 
does not arise primarily from an understanding of the essence ‘human 
being,’ which is by natuie general and does not bring us close enough to 
the human being as a concrete L This does not mean that understanding 
the essence ‘human being’ is of no consequence for participation, that it 
is foreign or even opposed to participation. Far from it. An 
imderstanding of this essence opens up the way to participation, but it 
does not itself detertnine participation.
He attempts to overcome this problem by arguing that understanding human essence—
in her potential for solidarity with the other—opens up the way for participation. Yet,
because he conceives of hiunanity in a general way, his Christian antlrr opology does
not gromid real persons in a relation of participation with the other or to solidarity with
the other, but only to the understanding that solidarity is a potential reality. At the core,
the imago Dei in humanity is inherently individualistic. Regarding such an approach,
Ray Anderson explains:
If the I-Thou relation with God constitutes humanity in an individual 
sense, an act against another person does not directly touch the imago 
except in an ethical sense. Because God, as the Thou who constitutes the 
tnie orientation to the self, wills that I also love that which he loves, my 
fellow human being, I have an ethical obligation to support the life of 
each person whom God loves. This, however, makes love first of all an 
abstraction and only consequently a matter of immediate and practical 
concern.
By implication, social ethics can formulate abstract principles, apply laws, and discuss 
rights. However, because such discussions take place based on assumptions regarding 
general humanity, they risk missing the ethical demand inlierent in the encounter with 
concrete persons.
Wlien one is facing a concrete ethical situation, such as the curTent conflict in 
Israel/Palestine, John Paul may only appeal to an abstract “ought,” a conception of 
justice and mercy which resides in the human person. For Jolm Paul, the Israeli ought 
to view the Palestinian as a potential neighbor and act so as to uphold his rights and 
promote justice on his behalf. However, when the Israeli parent suffers the loss of his 
child tlirough the action of a suicide bomber emerging out of the Palestinian sector, the
Person and Community, 201. Cf. Samuel Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 201-204 and GS 32. 
Ray Anderson, On Being Human, (Pasadena: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982), 75. '
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potential neighbor has now become an actual enemy. In defense of the intrinsic right to 
defend and avenge the death of the child, the Israeli pai ent dissolves the ethical claim to 
act with justice toward his enemy on behalf of his own self interest for justice. The 
same, of course, is true for the Palestinian paient whose child is killed in the violence of 
retaliation. While John Paul can appeal to the principle of basic hiunan rights gi oimded 
in the image of God, the very sense of justice that resides in the individual person may 
contain the seeds of violence.
Such a conception of ethics and rights proves problematic because it divides the 
fonnal law from the concrete personliood of the Jew or the Palestinian. The formal, 
inalienable right, takes precedence over acting towaids one’s neighbour. While one 
could command the Palestinian to love his neighbour or impose on the Jew the 
imperative to give of himself, such an ethic would be intercepted by the person’s own 
sense of justice and could merely lead to further violence. There is no concrete, 
personal, or material content to such a right or law. Merely an obligation exists, and 
such an obligation carries the seed of violence because persons carry the potential to 
become either neighboiu or enemy. Therefore, with just humanity as an abstract 
essence and justice as an abstract principle, humans may justify their own acts of 
violence on the basis of individual rights and they may become actual enemies tlu ough 
their acts of violence against the other.
Returning to the prior question regarding motivation, what appeal exists to Jews 
and Palestinians to act as neighbours if their brotherhood is only an obligation, a 
potential? If one acts as neighbour and the other refuses to act as neighbour, there can 
be no solidarity and the human potential is left unfulfilled. What motivation would one 
have to transcend her political situation by acting as neighbour, especially after a 
histoiy of broken agreements? John Paul’s optimism regaining himianity may cause 
him to thinlc that men and women are indeed capable of such acts of transcendence, 
triumphant acts that create brotherhood. However, if humans are only under obligation 
to abstract ideals of justice and mercy, tlien John Paul’s antlnopological ethics contain 
the potential for acts of violence and do not provide a strong enough motivation to act 
as neighbour in concrete situations.
Karl Barth and the Ontology of Relation as a Basis for Ethics
Barth talces a very different approach by making his stalling point for social 
ethics the personhood of Jesus Cluist. In Christ, one discovers not only the foimal law.
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“Love your neighbour,” but also the concrete material reality of the neighbour as
fellow-humanity. Not only does the law have an ethical claim, but the concrete person
also makes an ethical claim. For Baith, the person is not neighbour merely by potential
but in concrete reality. The concrete reality of the other generates the etliical claim to
be neighborly. The ethical claim is not merely a principle by which one can
potentially justify one’s own behavior; the ethical claim is a person. Jolm Webster
helps to explain this point:
For Baith, ethics is rooted in nature. By Miatre’ is meant, not a reality 
prior to or existing as a condition of possibility for ‘grace,’ nor some 
general humanum which grace perfects or completes: of ‘n a tre ’ in these 
senses, B r th ’s theology knows nothing. What is meant, rather, is simply 
nature as that which is. Bai*th believes that good human action is 
generated, shaped, and judged by ‘that which is,’ and that ‘that which is’ 
is a Christological, not a pre-Chiistological, category.
Like Jolm Paul, B rth  grounds ethics, in the n a tre  of the human person. However,
because human nature is a Christological category, human n a tre  is determined by
Chiist’s established relation with humanity. Humans are neighbours by nature rather
than by potential.
In other words, the ethics of B rth  seek to describe the ontology of relation to 
Chiist, wliich chracterises the ontology of relation to the other in the analogia 
relationis. According to B rth , hum ri persons exist as neighbours because Clirist has 
reconciled people to one another in conespondence to the divine image. For Barth, it is 
not a matter of choosing to become neighbour,^ for human persons have been 
reconciled in Chiist as neighbours. Therefore, the material reality that all hum ri beings 
are neighbours constitutes a moral demrid upon all persons, Chiistian or Jew or 
Muslim, whether or not they recognise this reality.
Such an ethical appeal may be critiqued on Kantian grounds by raising the 
question of how there can be any obligation upon someone who does not recognise the 
force of the obligation.^ In other words, can an obligation exist for the person even if 
one is not awai e of his duty? Such a question again highlights the difference between 
John Paul and Barth at this very point. John Paul’s ethic addresses this Kantian
Webster, Ethics o f  Reconciliation, 214.
Webster, Ethics, 216.
Kant argued that the human necessarily “must judge tliat he can do what the law tells him 
imconditionally that he ought to do.” Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, Mary Gregor, trans., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 186.
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question because, like Kant, John Paul appeals to an abstract principle, an “ought” 
wliich persons “can” perform. For Jolm Paul, such act is a potential because humans 
have access to the laws of nature through r eason .Bar th  turns this approach on its 
head, however, because he begins with the existence of human as neighbour, and from 
such existence, the ethical appeal arises.^
In contrast to Kant, Baith aigued that the moral conscience is not the command, 
rather, the ethical command has the character of an “ethical event” that is grounded in 
the concrete, social and historical situation by which one person “encounters” 
another. hi other words, Bai'th argued that what is precedes and deteimines the 
“o u g h t . F o r  this reason, the encounter with a fellow-human malces an ethical 
demand upon one whether or not one is aware of the ethical demand. In his exposition 
of the command to love one’s neighbom as oneself, Baith malces no distinction 
between the Christian and non-Cliristian in this regard. “For how can we fail to see that 
even outwith [sic] the Christian sphere and quite apart from the concept of Cluistian 
love humanity is not necessarily present in that perverse and unfounded way, but for all 
the peiwerse and unfounded interpretations it is genuinely there, and is to be sought and 
foimd in the direction which we have talcen.”^^ ^
The universal application of an ethic of justice and human rights has been well 
established by John Paul based on the principle of analogia entis, by which every 
human person bears to some degree an intiinsic sense of integiity and value as created 
in the image of God. We have shown that Barth, in his approach to the issue through 
his Christological anthropology, can argue that all humans are bound to one another as
Wojtyla/Johii Paul differed with Kant at many levels, especially regarding the relation of ethics to 
human experience, act, and drives. In addition, he located the “ought” in the law of God. However, his 
appeal to natural law as a basis for ethics maintains this Kantian connection between the “ought” which 
implies “can.” In Persons in Communion, see “The Role of Reason in Ethics,” 67-69; “The Separation of 
Act fi'om Experience,” 23-32 and 40-2; “The Basis of the Moral Norm,” 81-3.
Although Barth was deeply influenced by Kant in his early years, particularly with respect to his 
epistemology, Barth later rejected Kant’s formal ethical criterion as basically “without content.” Busch, 
44-45.
Barth wrote in his Ethics, “It is not ethics but an ethical even that takes place between two persons,” 
354.
Ethics, 431. Similaiily, Bonhoeffer wrote, “The norm and limit of all emphical sociality is established 
in ontic basic-relations—an assertion that will be of great significance when we deal with the concept of 
tlie chinch. . . This takes us back to what we said at the beginning of this study about the normative 
character of the ontic basic-relations. In the sphere of Chiistian etliics it is not Ought that effects Is, but Is 
that effects Ought.” Sanctorum Communion (Mhmeapolis: Fortress Press, 1998. Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
Works, Vol. 1). 36, 211.
CD III.2 277.
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an ontological construct of personal being. The question remains: How can an ethical 
appeal be made to persons in their concrete situation so as to hold them accountable to 
uphold justice and human rights? This is especially a problem for Barth’s position, it 
would appeal*, because the Cluistological basis for his ethical anthropology remains 
hidden from those who do not yet have this Icnowledge, which can come only by 
special revelation. The fact that Jolm Paul also holds that Jesus Clirist provides a model 
and motive for ethical action creates somewhat the same problem for him.
By returning to the case of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, we can pursue 
this question to another level. Barth’s approach to the same situation would be quite 
different. For Barth, every human bemg exists in solidaiity with other persons. This is a 
reality that does not depend upon special revelation but is based on the intuitive 
laiowledge that another human person is a fellow human being when viewed apart fr om 
ideological, religious, ethic, and political factors. Underneath all that divides human 
persons into categories based on culture, race, religion or national identity, lies what 
Anderson has called a “core social pai adigm,” a social structure of humanity that exists 
as a common denommator for all persons.
The demand upon both the Palestinian and the Israeli in this case is not, first of 
all, an ethical demand, but a summons to be human and to recognise the common 
humanity of the other. An Israeli child who wanders into a Palestinian home and 
presents a claim upon the Palestinian adults in that home to act for the welfare of that 
child. Failure to act for the welfare of that child is not only an ethical failure, according 
to Barth, but a failure to be human. Ought Palestinian and Israeli parents act humanly 
toward each other’s cliildren? Yes, because they are human. Thus, Baith’s ethic does 
not depend upon an ethical principle, whether an intrinsic sense of human justice 
{analogia entis), nor an abstract principle of moral reason (Kant). Rather, it rests upon 
the intrinsic recognition of one’s own humanity as bound up with the humanity of other 
persons. One who does not respond to this demand is acting inluunanly, not merely 
unethically. When one has drawn humanity so deeply into one’s own self interest so as 
to fail to recognize the humanity of another, an appeal to an ethical conscience or sense 
of justice will fall on sterile soil. This is the reason that Barth argues that a sense of
“Socialcultural Implications of a Cln*istian Perception of Humanity,” in, Ray S. Anderson, The Shape 
o f Practical Theology: Empowering Ministjywith Theological Praxis, 161-177.
Barth calls this “the criterion of hiunanity,” CD III.4.536. With regard to the neighbom- see CD
III.285ff.
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humility (not aiTOgance or capability) and repentance are the necessaiy pre-requisites to 
ethical action/
Such an ethic provides the basis for addressing the situation of violence in 
Israel/Palestine. By viewing actual situations from this ontology of relation, one may 
argue that Israeli parents have as much etliical responsibility for Palestinian children as 
for their own. Likewise, Palestinian parents have ethical responsibility for Israeli young 
people. They are responsible to uphold the life of the child, the life of their neighbour. 
Because by their very nature they are human-with-fellow-humanity, they are 
responsible to the concrete person who is their neighbour.
By contrast, the UN Declaiation does not demonstrate why the violence in 
Israel/Palestine is an act of injustice. Individuals may argue that they are merely 
defending their own rights. In addition, the individualism of John Paul’s conception of 
the imago Dei does not substantiate the call to Muslim and Jews to live in solidaiity 
with one another. Baith’s ethics describe an entirely new “moral space,”^^  ^in which 
Muslim and Jews exist not primarily in their political or cultural context but first as 
fellow-humans. Such ethical ground brings concrete humanity into encounter with the 
other as child or parent or neighbour.
Because persons exist as fellow-humans in encounter, Barth can appeal to the 
concrete person, the Jewish child who is innocent of the political injustice that 
suiTounds him and who makes an ethical claim upon a Palestinian mother whom he 
encounters with his request for food or for shelter fr om hann. The cluttering of the 
adult’s conscience with questions of justice may actually distract the adult from the 
claim of the encoimter. In the story of the good Samaritan, the question of 
righteousness and purity disti acted the priest from his ethical claim of his injiued 
neighbour. If the Jewish mother has the resources, of course she should feed the child 
in need, whether that child is Palestinian or Jewish. For humans exist as parent and 
child and neighbom*, fellow-beings in encounter.
“As we do not have Clirist to the extent that we do not want our fellownien, and as there can be no 
divine authority whose acknowledgement does not imply and enclose the acknowledgement of human 
authority, so there is no Christian humility which exliausts itself in repentance before God and will not 
become ministry to the neighbor as well. . .We can neither lose repentance before God in service to tlie 
neighbor nor service to the neighbor in repentance before God,” Barth, Ethics, 419. The previous 
paragraphs are drawn directly from a conversation with Ray Anderson at Fuller Theological Seminary on 
June 30, 2003 and from further correspondence on July 1, 2003.
From Webster, Barth‘s Ethics, 99.
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For this reason, human dignity never canies the potential for establishing the 
right of one individual over the right of another. Human dignity begins with the 
humility of accepting that that which is—the moral space in wliich humans are 
reconciled as neighbours. Himian ethics entails the ethical demand posed by the 
neighbour one encounters. One does not have the choice of becoming or not becoming 
a neighbour to the other, for the defining core of humanity includes the neighbour. One 
may have the choice to deny this reality, but in doing so, one denies her own humanity 
as well as the humanity of the other. In this manner, “real humanity” for Barth means 
living in this relation of communion with the fellow-human, the neighbour both near 
and far.
Conclusion to Chapter Seven
In this final chapter, we have explored the differences imderlying the claim by 
both Jolm Paul and Barth that Cluistian anthropology provides a foundation for social 
ethics. Jolm Paul’s more optimistic view of the capabilities of human reason and act 
have moved him towai'd a social ethic that relies upon the potential of humans to 
become neighbours by acting in accordance with intrinsic noims of justice and peace. 
While Barth would affirm John Paul’s appeal to God as the basis for ethics and to 
Cluist as the one who reveals true humanity, Baith would call into question John Paul’s 
very optimism regarding uiuedeemed humanity because of his own concern to lay bare 
any seeds of violence that may undennine the ethical appeal.
Coming fr om a setting in which such optimism in both hiunan reason and act 
led to oppression and violence, Barth sought to maintain a humility which affirms the 
goodness of humanity by locating that goodness in the election, reconciliation, and 
redemption of Jesus Cluist. By relying primarily upon the revelation of Christ as the 
epistemological starting point, Barth attempted to lay bare his own ethical categories to 
the critique that God’s revelation brings to humans conceptions of justice. When he 
discovered in Bruimer’s appeal to “orders of creation” and “natural theology,” a seed of 
arrogance that could potentially call into question God’s own revelation of justice or 
could substantiate the ethics of the German Cluistians, Barth sought different groimds 
for his own ethics in the person of Christ.
Likewise, he called into to question the belief that umedeemed human persons could act in 
accordance with God’s justice for he recognised tliat such a claim undermined the death and resurrection 
of Cluist. For if Cluist, in his humility, died completely, does not that reveal that the human in her pride
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Barth’s Christological ethics challenge John Paul at this very point. While Jolm 
Paul’s ethics aie drawn out of Christian theology, his ontology relies upon an 
individualistic definition of being and an abstract notion of general humanity that 
undermines his social appeals. John Paul has made a vital contribution to articulating 
and promoting just societies tlirough his appeal to human dignity, responsibility, 
personal formation, and his defence of human rights. However, Barth’s antlrropology 
better substantiates the appeal to human responsibility in actual encounters between 
persons because his ontological construct of humanity is fundamentally social. For this 
reason, a compaiison between tlie two authors has proven fiiiitful both in highlighting 
the fundamental areas of convergence (the starting point for social ethics in Cliristian 
anthropology) as well as the ai*ea of divergence in their ontological consti uct of 
personliood. We have argued in this final chapter that Barth’s relational ontology 
provides a stronger basis for appeal to human responsibility in the social sphere.
Final Conclusion
This work has proposed that social ethics and social programs often fail to 
account for the complexity of human personhood. The implementation of social ethical 
statements such as the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, while they prove 
helpful, force us to raise questions regaining the cause of the continued violence in a 
situation such as the one in Israel/Palestine. Such a statement reaches a stalemate when 
individual rights collide. Both sides argue that they are victims and that their intrinsic 
sense of justice justifies their retaliation. This clash of individual rights and the 
continued violence calls for a deeper investigation into the meaning of persons in 
societal relations.
This work has put foi*ward the thesis that social ethics and social progi ams 
require an imderstanding of personhood that accounts for the complexity of human 
relations in society. I have proposed that Christian theology provides an effective 
foundation for social ethics because its anthropology addresses complexities such as 
ethical knowledge, human fr eedom and action, and the social relations of actual persons 
in society. In addition, the Christian theologians, Jolm Paul II and Karl Baith, account 
for and address the complexity of implementing an ethic of human rights, by appealing
and sloth and untruth could not be reconciled with God or her neighbour without becoming a participant 
in complete death and resuirection?
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to an ethic of respect of and responsibility for the neighbour that is built upon the 
foundation of Chiistian anthropology.
John Paul appeals to Cluistian anthiopology as the basis for his social doctrine. 
Such an antluopology provides the basis for his recuning appeal to the dignity of 
hmnan persons as the critical critique of the structures and systems of human societies. 
He argues that all human persons have a moral and free component of being, grounded 
in the imago Dei of individual personhood. When an impasse is reached by claims of 
“right,” he appeals to Cluist, as the content of the ethical conunand to give of oneself in 
the mercy and forgiveness which overcomes violence.
Wliile it takes steps towaids addi'essing human responsibility, I have suggested 
that John Paul’s Chiistological ethic retains the potential for justifying and committing 
violence against the neighbom* for tluee reasons. First, John Paul’s appeal to moral law 
as intrinsic to human personhood creates the potential for continued violence because 
such optimism regai'ding a person’s epistemological access to notions of justice may 
fail to critique those acts that contain a seed of violence. Hmnans can too easily justify 
their behaviour based upon the appeal to an intrinsic sense of justice, without 
recognising the manner in which their own self-interest or “rightful claims” can 
influence their sense of justice. For this reason, every person’s “intrinsic sense of 
justice” must be set in light of the critical criterion of God’s command.
Second, John Paul’s ontological construct of personliood retains the potential 
for violence because it is individualistic. He defines the individual person as "individual 
substance” and he asserts that humans ai*e neighbours only by potential, leaving 
individuals the choice to act as neighbours and, by means of this action, to become 
neighbours in actuality. Such an ontological construct leaves for a human person the 
responsibility to become a neighbom*. But what motivation exists in the issue that we 
have raised, i.e. when individual rights collide?
Such a question raises the third problem regai'ding the appeal of John Paul’s 
Chiistological ethics to non-Cluistian persons. Jolm Paul can make a clear argument for 
Cluistian persons to act in accordance with Cluist’s mercy and forgiveness, which 
overcomes the law of justice. However, because his ethic of forgiveness is based in 
Cluistian theology, how can he motivate those who aie not Cluistian to extend 
forgiveness?
122 Wojtyla, TP, 167-169.
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Kaii Barth, on the other hand, located ethical content in relation and encounter 
rather than in a Christian principle or instrinsic moral law. He argued that humanity 
itself is co-hmnanity. Humans ar e not individuals with the potential to become 
neighbours. Rather, the ontological makeup of human persons is fundamentally 
relational; human persons are neighbours because Christ revealed and restored this 
determination of fellow-humanity to all human persons. While this assertion is 
determined by Barth’s Cliristology, it is actualised anthropologically. One’s own 
humanity is bound up in the humanity of the other. To impinge upon the life of one’s 
neighbour is to impinge upon one’s own life and self. For this reason, the personhood 
of the other creates an ethical demand that takes priority over one’s innate sense of 
justice. Such a view of personhood creates the basis to argue for human responsibility 
and to addiess the impasse that occurs when individual rights collide.
hi comparing these two men, this thesis has not only provided a theological 
response to the stalemate reached in an ethic of human rights but it has also brought 
forwai'd the dialogue regarding Catholic and Protestant theology and social ethics. 
Recent discussions have centered on notions of natural law and common grace as a 
starting point for such an ecumenical dialogue. hi this thesis, I have argued in favour 
of a different starting point for such discussions: theological anthropology, specifically 
the ontological construct of hiunan personhood. Such a starting point takes takes 
seriously the vital critique raised by Barth regarding the potential for violence located 
in assumptions of an intrinsic notion of justice or an umedeemed human goodness, hi 
addition, this starting point may more adequately address a postmodern culture that is 
deeply suspicious of notions of natural law.^ "^^
The next step fbrwaid involves ongoing discussion among Chiistian theologians 
regarding the issues raised by this dialogue vis-à-vis the ontology of personhood. This 
work has raised significant differences, which must be discussed with a view towaids 
the implications for social doctrine. The way foiward also includes discourse at the 
level of praxis, by seeking to imderstand, assess, and apply the insights of Christian 
anthiopology in the realm of hiunan society. While it lies beyond the scope of this
See for instance, Michael Cromartie, Editor. A Preserving Grace: Protestant, Catholics, and Natural 
Law.
For instance, Alisdair MacIntyre traced this sliift in his work, After Virtue: “It [is] no longer possible 
to appeal to moral criteria in a way that it had been possible in other times and places -  and [tliis is] a 
moral calamity.” After Virtue: A Study o f Moral Theology, (London: Duckworth, 1981), ix. See also 
Mourning Becomes the La\\>, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-5.
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dissertation, implications as to how a deeper imderstanding of human solidarity as an 
etliical constmct might inform public policy and strategic approaches to human justice 
need to be drawn out and applied. For instance, what are the implications for 
constmcting institutions and stmctures on a national and global level which reflect 
these critical insights? Or how does the understanding of human persons as co­
humanity call into question the vast economic divide between industrialised and 
developing nations? And what solutions does such an antluopology put forward at both 
the personal and the stiuctuial levels?
This thesis has argued that based upon a richer understanding of personliood 
that is derived fi*om Cluistian theology, strategic social etliics and commitment to social 
justice can advance the true dignity and humanity of persons in society. From a 
theological perspective, Jesus Chiist provides the foundation for justice in the social 
sphere, as well as the criterion by which to assess human systems and practice. The 
givenness of our co-humanity is defined in and through him. It is this and this alone 
that can seiwe to liberate us fr om human aiTogance, individualism, and sectaiianism and 
provide the starting point toward understanding ourselves and upholding the dignity of 
the other.
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